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Abstract 
 
Military ethics serve as a normative code of behaviour for the armed forces of a state, 
acting as a mechanism of definition and control within the force, between the force and 
its client, and between the force, its adversaries and the wider public. They have two, 
intrinsically linked, functions: a preventative function, which defines the moral and legal 
parameters of conduct, and a constructive function, which creates and maintains an 
effective and controllable force. Preceded by the code of chivalry, they were largely a 
creation of the era of conventional interstate warfare that was waged across the European 
continent from the Treaty of Westphalia through to the desolate end of the Second World 
War; yet, the operations upon which armed forces, and in particular, the New Zealand 
Army are deployed have changed, dramatically. Wars no longer, current operations are 
generally justified on moral principles and involve a multinational, joint and interagency 
deployment sent to intervene in an irregular, intrastate conflict occurring in an 
underdeveloped region and conducted under the intense glare of the media.  
 
This disjuncture between the changing nature of operations and the context in which 
military ethics were formulated provides the fundamental question for the thesis: if the 
milieu in which military ethics developed has changed significantly, what is their current 
utility? Using the New Zealand Army as the frame of reference, first the contemporary 
operational environment and then the specific operational environment in Timor-Leste 
were examined to assess the current utility of military ethics. It was found that the 
preventative function has an increasing utility because it ensures conduct is within 
expected norms in an era where the perception of the adversary, the local populace and 
the domestic and international audience is key to operational success. Despite the 
reduction in conflict intensity, the constructive function has a remaining utility through 
its mediation and amelioration of the stressors engendered by the growing complexity of 
the operational environment. The retention of utility for the constructive function appears 
to have been facilitated by an adaptation of the warrior ethos, from a narrow traditional 
outlook to a broad and comprehensive modern interpretation. 
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Introduction 
Conflict, Militaries and Control 
―The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road 
either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be 
neglected.‖ Sun Tsu.1 
 
―Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?‖  
St Augustine.
2
 
 
War, conflict and confrontation; insurgency, revolution and rebellion, and the numerous 
other permutations of organised violence, are a seemingly inescapable part of the human 
condition. As Michael Howard puts it: ―[w]ar … is not a condition of generalized and 
random violence … It is on the contrary a highly social activity – an activity indeed 
which demands from the groups which engage in it a unique intensity of societal 
organization and control‖; a proposition which engenders the converse: that the societal 
organisation and control required shape the conflict itself.
3
 These various permutations of 
organised violence, from here on referred to as conflict, reflect their protagonists‘ history, 
culture and political-economic systems and take place on both a physical and mental 
plane.
4
 As such they are generally bound and limited by the overall contexts in which 
they occur; a position argued by Martin van Creveld:  
 
―War, far from being the province of unbridled force, is a cultural activity and has 
always been the subject to limitations pertaining to prisoners, non-combatants, 
and weapons, inter alia… The paradox is that war, the most confused and 
                                                 
1
 Sun Tsu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1. 
2
 Saint Augustine, The City of God (New York: Fathers of the Church Inc., 1950), 4.4. 
3
 Michael Howard, ―Temperamenta Belli: Can War be Controlled,‖ in Restraints on War: Studies in the 
Limitation of Armed Conflict, Michael Howard, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 1-3. 
4
 The terms war, conflict, confrontation, insurgency, revolution and rebellion all refer to different types of 
violence, all organised to differing degrees. The reason the thesis will use the term conflict will become 
clear later on, suffice to say here that the contemporary operational environment is chaotic and complex 
and rather than spend reams searching for a near unobtainable categorisation the thesis will launch into the 
main body of work with the understanding that as this progresses both a definition of sorts and a reason for 
the modifier ‗of sorts‘ will become obvious. 
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confusing of all human activities, is also one of the most organised. If armed 
conflict is to be successfully waged, then many trained individuals must co-
operate. People cannot co-operate, nor organizations exist, unless they obey a 
common code of behaviour. This code should match the prevailing cultural 
climate‖.5  
 
Peters also emphasises the same relationship:  
 
―That which is considered ethical alters with time and varies between civilizations 
and even families. At some impalpable level, the impulse to ethics does appear to 
arise from within and may be a collective survival strategy conditioned by 
biological and cultural evolution. Yet the specific content of a civilization's or a 
society's ethics is generally determined by accumulative tradition, epochal 
convenience, and local habit. The ethics of war and conflict are especially fluid.‖6 
  
Taken together, Howard, van Creveld and Peters provide a concise summary of conflicts, 
militaries and control: conflict is a highly social and culturally contextualised activity that 
is limited by these very traits. Conflicts, and the societies and militaries that wage them, 
shape and reflect each other. This process creates the forms of internal and external 
controls that act upon militaries. To be successful a military must be highly organised and 
controlled, and it must have a common code of behaviour that matches the prevailing 
cultural climate, accumulated tradition, convenience and habit.  
 
At its core this thesis is focussed on the change and continuity that such a relationship 
reflects. Conflicts have changed, whether by evolution or revolution; yet military ethics, 
the force that binds, defines, controls and limits militaries, retains a certain historical 
continuity. In a sense, there is a lag between the change in conflicts and the change in 
military ethics as they realign with the new operational environment. This paper will 
                                                 
5
 Martin van Creveld, ―The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War,‖ Journal of Contemporary 
History 26.3/4 (Sep. 1991): 404, 422. 
6
 Ralph Peters, ―A Revolution in Military Ethics?‖ Parameters (Summer 1996): accessed on 30 July 2008, 
available from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/peters.htm. 
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explore the relationship between the transformed contemporary operational environment 
(COE) and military ethics from a Western, and specifically New Zealand (NZ), 
perspective.  
 
This introduction will now provide both a short and necessarily simplified historical 
context and a brief theoretical exposition. The main thrust will attempt to show the 
interconnected and reciprocal relationship between conflict and the forms of control and 
definition that bind and limit the militaries that wage them. To do this there also has to be 
reference to the larger societal trends, mores and drivers, though these are not central to 
the thesis. These ideas will be expanded upon in the following chapters, particularly the 
chapter on military ethics and the chapter on the New Zealand Army‘s (NZA) COE. The 
aim and content of each chapter will be given following the historical and theoretical 
synopsis. 
 
The period between the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia and the recovery and re-
evaluation that followed the Napoleonic Wars stands out as one of the more critical 
historical periods and serves as a convenient starting point for this brief historical 
exposition. This period was one of massive transition for conflict, militaries and the 
forms of limitation and control that bind them. The state and the professionally-officered 
mass standing military evolved in unison, each enabling and aggrandising the other, and 
in the process defining the particular type of organised violence upon which they 
embarked: war.
7
 As Tilly wrote, ―war made states, and vice versa.‖8 The inception of the 
modern state following 1648 saw the re-codification of the rules of war so that by the 18
th
 
Century, warfare had become ―something of a well-regulated stately dance between 
organised forces, by-and-large disciplined and well ordered and, again by-and-large, 
avoiding to a great extent any impact on the civilian population.‖9 Though this stately 
                                                 
7
 Jan Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-
Military States (London: Routledge, 2001), 13. 
8
 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1900 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 67- 
emphasis in original. 
9
 Daren G. Bowyer, ―Challenges to the Military Code of Ethics: How New Wars and New Protagonists 
Challenge the Concept of Warrior Honour,‖ (International Society for Military Ethics Paper, 2007), 
accessed on 24 July 2008, available from http://www.usafa.edu/isme/ISME07/Bowyer07.html. 
 12 
dance descended into the industrialised hell of total war in the 20
th
 Century, the 
normative position of the rules of war have remained essentially the same.  
 
During the period between the 17
th
 and 19
th
 Century four specific factors, ―technological 
specialisation, competitive nationalism, the conflict between democracy and aristocracy, 
and the presence of stable and legitimate authority‖, led to Western European militaries 
becoming highly professional, bureaucratic and hierarchical organisations, set apart from 
society with their own codes and value systems.
10
 The major catalyst for the 
consolidation of military professionalism was the Napoleonic Wars, where the power of 
nationalism and the resultant levee en mass and citizen soldier gave the French such a 
decisive advantage, both numerically and in morale, that Napoleon could shift strategies 
from the force preserving ―wars of manoeuvre‖ that dominated the previous century to 
the strategy of total annihilation of the opposing force.
11
 This new strategy, inter alia, 
gave the French a near insurmountable advantage and upon post-conflict reflection the 
losers, and in particular Prussia, realised the need for a professional officer class and set 
in place innovations that have since been copied by most of the militaries around the 
world. 
 
Thus, as the modern nation-state monopolised the legitimate use of physical force, 
codifying war and creating the professionally-officered mass standing military, military 
ethics emerged as a cohesive concept.
12
 Before military ethics proper, conflicts in 
Europe, and the forces that fought them, were governed by the code of chivalry. This 
code, like the conflicts and militaries it shaped, was a reflection of the feudal society in 
which it originated.
13
 As Western Europe transformed from the feudal-agrarian to the 
capitalist industrial-urban and warfare changed, the code was replaced by military ethics, 
                                                 
10
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 32; Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: 
The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), 5. 
It should be noted that characteristics of professionalism had been coalescing for centuries, but it was 
during the 19
th
 Century that it became a cohesive and widespread concept. 
11
 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2007), 36. 
12
 Mary Kaldor, ―Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror,‖ International Politics 42 
(2005): 492. 
13
 Lloyd Matthews, ―The Evolution of American Military Ideals,‖ Military Review 78.1 (Jan/Feb 1998): 52. 
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which, like the code of chivalry before them, reflected the context in which they were 
created. Thus, the class-based, nepotistic military made way, eventually, for the 
meritocratic, professional armed force, reflecting changes occurring in wider society. 
Similarly, the informal, ad hoc rules pertaining to the conduct of warfare became 
legislated and formal, again reflecting wider trends in society. This critical relationship 
will be explored further in the first chapter on military ethics. 
 
Society, particularly Western society, is no longer the same as it was throughout the 
formative years of military ethics. The world has moved on. The forces that shaped and 
defined Western society have largely disappeared or altered significantly. Consequently, 
warfare has changed, dramatically. Attempting to pinpoint the actual time of change is 
troublesome as most change is evolutionary rather than revolutionary and, as such, is 
incremental. However, one moment is often cited as one of, if not the most, important in 
this transformation: the end of the Cold War. Many of the changes now associated with 
the post-Cold War milieu can be found in either nascent or mature form before the fall of 
the Soviet Union but the end of the bipolar world, and the holistic definition that 
superpower rivalry gave the entire international system, marks the moment when these 
changes came into full effect in concert and this is the reason that 1991 is given as the 
significant date sine pari.  
 
The question then is that if military ethics were developed during a certain period and 
that both society in general, and warfare in particular, have moved on since then what 
utility do military ethics have remaining? 
 
Chapter Summary 
The first chapter is focussed on examining the origin and function of military ethics. It 
initially defines military ethics as a whole before examining the two main functions 
separately. The chapter is intended to provide both an understanding of military ethics‘ 
contextual underpinnings as well as an overview of the two specific functions, which are 
termed the preventative and the constructive. Following that, Chapter Two is interested in 
further examining the dramatic shift that occurred at the end of the Cold War. Once this 
 14 
is complete the chapter will pose the main question of the thesis. Then the two 
hypotheses of the thesis are given after which the concept of utility is examined. After 
this, the third chapter provides a full examination of the NZA‘s COE, looking at the most 
germane characteristics and assessing the implications for military ethics. This chapter 
provides the tools for analysis in the case study and covers both the context of the 
deployment and the response of the NZA. The chapter utilises both NZA-specific texts 
and works from numerous theorists to build up an accurate picture of the COE and then 
extrapolates the possible issues and effects these will have on both functions of military 
ethics. To provide a background against which the COE, and thus the utility of military 
ethics, can be measured, the fourth chapter provides a brief synopsis of the NZA‘s 
operational history from the Second World War up to operations in the former 
Yugoslavia, coving both wars and traditional peacekeeping. The fifth chapter is the case 
study, which is Timor-Leste, where the findings from the third chapter are applied and 
the hypotheses assessed. This chapter covers both the Australian-led operation and the 
following United Nations-led (UN) mission. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the 
findings and assess the implications for both the NZA and internationally. 
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Chapter One 
Military Ethics 
 
―Effective fighters are also ethical fighters, good soldiers in the one sense are also good 
soldiers in the other sense…‖1 
 
Military ethics lie at the turbulent nexus between internal and external moral and 
practical control of military force, mediating a raft of demands and pressures. Though 
often derided as an oxymoron or an atavistic throwback they are a crucial element in the 
creation and maintenance of a functional armed force that acts in a moral and legal 
manner.  
 
Before launching into military ethics proper, a working definition of ethics must be 
given. The difficulty in this is that, as Toner writes, ―ethics is too large to be disposed of 
with a simple definition‖; however, complexity, ambiguity and relativity acknowledged, 
the demand still stands, although it should be stated that this chapter is concerned largely 
with normative rather than meta ethics.
2
 One definition states that ethics is ―a systematic 
attempt to make sense of our individual and social moral experience, in such a way as to 
determine the rules that ought to govern human conduct, the values worth pursuing, and 
the character traits worth pursuing in life‖.3 Whilst the definition Toner gives is that 
―[e]thics is the critical study of standards for judging the rightness or wrongness of 
conduct‖, he adds that ethics is as much about doing what is right as it is about knowing 
what is right.
4
 There is congruence enough between these two definitions for this paper: 
ethics can be seen as a critical and systematic effort to clarify, delineate and apply the 
principles, standards and norms relating to the morality of human conduct. 
 
                                                 
1
 H. Aronovich, quoted in Paul Robinson, ―Ethics Training and Education.‖ Parameters. (Spring 2007): 25 
2
 James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (Kentucky: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1995) 9- emphasis in original; H.J. Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 8. 
3
 Richard T. De George, Business Ethics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), 19. 
4
 Toner, True Faith and Allegiance, 9. 
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Military ethics then would seem to be the specific application of this critical and 
systematic effort to the martial realm. In some sense it is just that, one definition is that: 
―military ethics refers to the moral considerations that apply to activities and institutions 
involved in employing the resources of a nation to secure policy objectives through the 
use or threat of force.‖5 However, it is not as simple as this, Kasher has two issues with 
this direct transference of moral theory to military affairs.
6
 The first is that the 
―philosophical development of moral theory has not converged into a single, commonly 
accepted moral conception‖ and the second is that any ―attempt to apply a given moral 
theory to certain circumstances of military activity can and often does overlook 
normative ingredients of military activity that are neither moral nor technical, but rather 
ethical (where ethical here refers to the ethic internal to the military profession)‖.7  
Essentially, the first of Kasher‘s problems is focussed on the moral foundation of military 
ethics, an answer to which is beyond the scope of this paper, and possibly beyond the 
human ken altogether. Walzer takes this position also, abrogating the examination of such 
foundations as such an attempt, if not entirely futile, would require inordinate effort.
8
 
However, the second issue can be resolved, for the purpose of this study at least, by 
analysing military ethics with regard to their function.  
 
This separation will define the structure and focus for the rest of the chapter; therefore, it 
must be explained and examined holistically before each aspect is analysed individually. 
As eruditely explained by Groll-Ya-ari, military ethics have two distinct and specific 
functions.
9
 These functions provide a useful definition of military ethics, one that is 
separate from any meta-philosophical inquiry. The first function serves a preventative 
purpose, with a moral/legal primacy, focussing on delineating the acceptable moral and 
legal actions and conduct for an armed force.
10
 The second has a constructive role, and is 
                                                 
5
 Anthony E. Hartle, ―Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War,‖ (Review) Philosophy 62.241 (Jul. 
1987): 401. 
6
 Asa Kasher, Problems in Military Ethics of Fighting Terrorism (2006), 6, draft paper accessed on 15 
January 2008, available from http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), xv.  
9
 Yedidiah Groll-Ya‘ari,  ―Towards a Normative Code for the Military.‖ Armed Forces and Society.  20.3 
(Spring 1994). 
10
 Ibid., 457. 
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concerned with group definition and control; it provides the state with an effective and 
manageable force.
11
 As discussed in the introduction, these two functions find their 
origins, respectively, in the codification of warfare that occurred after the Treaty of 
Westphalia and the reorganisation of Western European militaries that followed the 
Napoleonic Wars. The functional definition of military ethics then is that they are a form 
of influence on behaviour that creates and maintains an efficient and controllable 
military (and individual) that acts within established moral and legal parameters. This 
functionality can be seen in Kasher‘s definition:  
 
―Military ethics is a conception of proper behavior in military activity. Such a 
conception of proper behavior rests on three sub-conceptions of proper behavior: 
First, a sub-conception that specifies proper behavior of a person as a professional 
within an organization. Knowing how to accomplish a typical mission and 
understanding the methods used in doing it are examples of what is required 
simply because a person is a professional [constructive function]. Secondly, a 
sub-conception that specified proper behavior of a person as a member of the 
particular profession of, say, combatants and commanders. Manifestation of 
courage and perseverance is an example of what is involved in the professional 
self-identity of combatants. Manifestation of comradeship is an example of what 
is considered as proper behavior within a unit of combatants [constructive 
function]. Thirdly, a sub-conception that specifies proper behavior of a person as 
a citizen of a democratic state, such as Canada or Israel. Proper behavior as a 
member of a democratic society manifests respect for human dignity, for 
example. Here is where morality enters the picture of ethics. Adherence to 
principles of respecting human dignity, including protection of human rights, is 
adherence to moral principles that are embodied within the practices of a 
democratic society [preventative function].‖12 
                                                 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Kasher, 7. It should be noted that there is a similar division, that between ordinary and role morality. 
Ordinary morality is that which would make an ordinary citizen ‗morally good‘ whilst role morality refers 
to the ethics required of a soldier in his or her role. With respect to Kasher, the first two sub-conceptions 
relate to role morality whilst the third corresponds with the third sub-conception. See Paul Robinson, 
 18 
 
However, whilst military ethics do have two separate functions, the separation is a purely 
analytical construct, as in practice the two are indivisible: any attempt to separate one 
from the other outside the abstract will only create a false dichotomy.
13
 The reason for 
this indivisibility will become clear as the examination progresses. Nonetheless, it is a 
particularly useful construct, and one that most theorists employ either implicitly or 
explicitly as it allows for the full scope of military ethics to be assessed.
14
 Therefore, each 
function will now be analysed separately before their relationship is examined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
―Ethics Training and Development in the Military,‖ Parameters (Spring 2007): 24, for the role versus 
general division. 
13
 James H. Toner,  ―Military OR Ethics,‖ Air & Space Power Journal (Summer 2003): electronic version. 
14
 Groll-Ya‘ari. 
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The Preventative Function 
―Lose moral legitimacy, lose the war‖15 
 
―The moral is to the physical as three to one‖ Napoleon. 
 
The preventative function of military ethics is concerned with drawing lines of 
permissibility and legitimacy in, debatably, the most morally complex and ambiguous 
field of human endeavour: warfare.
16
 Its seminal contemporary proponent, Michael 
Walzer, whose work will be the keystone of this section, asserts the moral reality of war; 
as he writes, war is hell, but it is a hell born of man.
17
 The origins of this moral cognition 
lie in the gradual evolution of what Walzer terms the war convention, particularly that 
facet of Just War theory that deals with justice in war or jus in bello, as opposed to that 
which deals with the justice of war or jus ad bellum, the principles of which have since 
been codified into the laws of armed conflict.
18
 Although this distinction between jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum may be contentious, the reason for its existence here is that whilst 
justice in war, in other words the adherence, or not, to ―customary and positive rules of 
engagement‖, is directly under military control, the decision to enter a conflict is, in 
Western democracies, largely beyond military control.
19
 Therefore, with regard to this 
paper, the relevant aspects of Just War theory can be found in jus in bello, the core 
principles of which are discrimination and proportionality.
20
 However, before analysing 
                                                 
15
 Conrad C. Crane and David Petraeus, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington: Department 
of Army, 2006), 7-8. 
16
 Groll-Ya‘ari, 457. 
17
 Walzer, 3-20, 22. 
18
 Walzer, 21, 44-47; Robert L. Holmes, On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), 147. 
19
 Walzer, 21; Brian Orend, ―Just and Lawful Conduct in War: Reflections on Michael Walzer,‖ Law and 
Philosophy 20.1 (Jan 2001): 3. There is another aspect to this issue, which is that Waltzer insists that jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello are logically separate, in other words a just war can be fought unjustly and vice 
versa; others, like Orend, contend that the two are not so hermetic, claiming that soldiers who knew about 
the injustice of the war they were fighting should have refused to fight. This is beyond the scope of the 
paper, but is worth noting. 
20
 Orend, ―Just and Lawful Conduct in War: Reflections on Michael Walzer,‖ 3, 15, 18; James Turner 
Johnson, Can Modern War Be Justified? (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 4; 
Nicholas Fotion, ―Two Theories of Just War,‖ Philosophia 34.1 (2006): 57. 
 20 
each of these separately, the war convention must be explained, for this is what grounds 
and empowers these two principles.
21
 
 
War Convention 
In short, Walzer sees the war convention as the ―set of articulated norms, customs, 
professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles and reciprocal 
arrangements that shape our judgements of military conduct‖.22 The war convention is 
the collective result of centuries of debate, revision and criticism; it stands as the current 
zenith in attempts to set limits on warfare, and as such, Walzer sees it as carrying, and 
therefore made obligatory by, the general consent of humanity.
23
 The war convention is 
the contextual paradigm. It provides a contemporary, though historically substantiated, 
framework on which decisions on warfare are founded. One area in which the war 
convention can be seen to be historically fluid is that of victory; van Creveld writes that 
the ―last function of the war convention is to influence the outcome by telling the 
vanquished when to surrender. If the vast majority of conflicts are not fought to the end-if 
not every enemy person has to be slaughtered- this is because the rules define what does, 
and does not, constitute ‗victory‘.‖24 He goes on to provide numerous historical examples 
of what constituted victory, from that of Grecian victory, where either one side fled from 
the battlefield or sued for peace, to a chivalrous custom whereby a victorious army was 
required to occupy a battlefield for three consecutive days to seal victory.
25
 He concludes 
that, ―in any particular war, the meaning of ‗victory‘ is decided as much by convention- 
tacit or explicit- as by physical results.‖26 Clearly, the war convention is not as all 
encompassing as would be considered necessary for something with such critical 
consequences. Aside from its historic fluidity, it has a decidedly Western bias. The social 
contract-like consent of humanity it is premised on, whilst hypothetically applicable to 
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everyone, would be- to stretch the contract metaphor- more easily read and understood by 
those of us in the West than Hazara Afghanis from the Bamiyan Province.
27
 
 
Jus in bello is one of the most persuasive manifestations of the war convention, providing 
the foundation for many of the rules that have ―since been codified into contemporary 
international laws governing armed conflict.‖28 The core international laws of which are 
―provided by the Hague Conventions…. Geneva Conventions…. and the…. Protocols to 
those Geneva Conventions.‖29 The remainder of this section then will first cover the two 
most relevant and critical principles of jus in bello, following which there will be an 
examination of the law of armed conflict and the rules of engagement.
30
 
 
Discrimination 
Soldiers are, according to Walzer, moral equals; furthermore, they ―have an equal right to 
kill.‖31 But attached to that equal right is a crucial set of prohibitions surrounding who 
they can kill.
32
 This is the issue of discrimination, which sets ―certain classes of people 
outside the permissible range of warfare‖ and draws the line between war and murder.33 
Walzer believes that there is congruence despite temporal and geographical variants: the 
pervasive fundamental conception is that war is ―combat between combatants‖.34 Thus, 
legitimate targets are those who are involved in combat. This is, despite Walzer‘s belief, 
a relatively modern and particularly Western conception, for ―our modern ideas 
concerning the difference between combatants and non-combatants only date back to the 
second half of the seventeenth century. It was this period that war began to be looked on 
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as the business of states acting through their chosen instruments, i.e. armies.‖35 Before 
this the treatment of non-combatants varied widely from case to case. Though often 
charitable to fellow Christians, during the Thirty Years War, which precipitated the 
Treaty of Westphalia, Western European armies pillaged, tortured and ransomed 
Christian non-combatants.
36
 Likewise, the historic treatment of non-Christians, 
combatant or otherwise, was unrestrained and differed greatly each time, though was far 
more brutal than that metered out to fellow Christians.
37
 Finally, although widely 
followed in the West for several centuries, non-combatant immunity was violently 
discarded during the Second World War as strategic bombers killed populations 
indiscriminately.
38
 The change in non-combatant immunity mirroring the nature of the 
conflict itself and the nature of the societies fighting: total, industrial war, fought on both 
absolutist ideological and national grounds, in effect, a zero sum game where surrender 
was not an option.  
 
How is a soldier to distinguish between a legitimate and illegitimate target? According to 
Walzer, a legitimate target is anyone or anything engaged in harm; consequently, taken to 
the logical end point a worker manufacturing guns is a legitimate target, whilst one 
manufacturing boots is not.
39
 The question is, where is the line regarding harm drawn? 
What if the boots were combat boots? The more complex and diffuse society and conflict 
becomes, the harder this discrimination is to make. The second part of this is that non-
combatants cannot be the direct and intentional targets of military attack.
40
 Thus, the 
principle of discrimination demarcates who is a legitimate target. Clearly though, this 
principle is historically constructed and has different applications. Furthermore, non-
combatant immunity is not an absolute; due to the pressures of military necessity it is 
contingent for Walzer in what he terms his revised doctrine of double effect, which 
allows for the deferment of immunity if: 
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1) The act is good in itself; i.e. that it is a legitimate act of war. 
2) The direct effect is morally acceptable. 
3) The intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable 
effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, 
aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimise it, accepting costs to himself.  
4) The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil 
effect.
41
 
 
These criteria are contextually substantiated; each one is dependent on a wealth of 
historical, cultural and personal standards and judgements.  
 
Proportionality 
The second principle is that of proportionality. The essence of this principle is the ―matter 
of adjusting means to ends‖ so long as the ends are not altered to suit the means in some 
form of sophistic or a posteriori justification of disproportionate action.
42
 The result of 
this adjustment is that while belligerent armies ―are entitled to try to win wars…. they are 
not entitled to do anything that is or seems necessary to win.‖43 They are restricted by 
both the war convention and the underlying moral principle; they must balance the 
military necessity against the harm done ―not only to the immediate individuals but also 
any injury to the permanent interests of mankind.‖44 Even Walzer claims that 
―proportionality turns out to be a hard criterion to apply‖ for as Schmitt writes, the 
balance between military necessity and harm done involves ―quantifying and comparing 
dissimilar values.‖45  
 
The very idea of proportionality is culturally and historically loaded. One example van 
Creveld gives is the use of many forms of gas, which is a comparatively humane weapon 
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as ―a much lower proportion of those who became casualties‖ die, yet has been factored 
as disproportionate compared to harm done due to the opprobrium with which it is 
viewed in the West.
46
 He goes on to write that it is hard to find a logical reason for the 
reluctance to use gas and concludes that the best explanation is probably cultural: while 
tearing people apart with artillery or burning them with napalm is acceptable, choking 
people to death is not.
47
 Finally, he writes, ―the distinction between chemical weapons 
and other weapons exists solely in our minds. It is a convention like any other, neither 
more logical nor less. Like other such conventions…. it is a historical phenomenon with a 
clear beginning and, most probably, a clear end.‖48 
 
The jus in bello principles can be seen as the moral foundations upon which the legal 
superstructure of the laws of armed conflict are built, although the relationship is not 
quite so clear-cut or simple.
49
 Their abstract and subjective nature is part of the reason 
that the philosophic principles have been codified into explicit laws. The narrative will 
now turn to the law of armed conflict. 
 
Law of Armed Conflict 
The laws of armed conflict (LOAC) themselves have a noble lineage going back to, at 
least, 1625, when Grotius published his De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
50
 However, it was from 
the mid-nineteenth century onward that international codification took place. This was a 
direct reflection of the Metternichean ‗balance of power‘ in Europe at the time, when 
states, fearful after Napoleon‘s unlimited rampage across the continent, fought ‗civilised‘ 
conflicts with limited aims and sought to codify the means of conflict.
51
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The LOAC can be divided into two distinct components: customary and conventional 
international law.
52
 Customary international law ―consists primarily of unwritten cultural 
norms and generally recognized practices‖ whilst conventional international law is that 
which is codified in explicit written rules, which go beyond but will be represented here 
by the Hague Conventions of 1899/1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Geneva Protocols of 1977.
53
 Customary law, although an anachronism in domestic legal 
systems, is a ―dynamic source of law in the light of the nature of the international system 
and its lack of centralised government organs.‖54 With regard to the LOAC, the two 
components can be seen as contrasting yet complementary aspects. As an example of this 
relationship, Cavaleri writes that the Hague Conventions ―acknowledged the inability of 
conventional international law to address or even anticipate all possible regulatory 
requirements, and consequently mandated that in the absence of applicable treaty law, 
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and proscriptions of customary 
international law.‖55  
 
Another important division within the LOAC is that between those laws that refer to ―the 
means and methods of warfare on one hand, and the establishment of protection for the 
victims of war on the other‖, with those of The Hague generally covering the former and 
the Geneva Conventions essentially concerned with the latter.
56
 As Nash has it: 
―[m]ethods and means include the tactics, weapons, and targeting decisions in war. 
Primary concerns are the nature of military objectives, the elimination of unnecessary 
suffering, discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, and issues of 
proportionality. Protect-and-respect issues include the treatment of civilians, prisoners of 
war, and the sick and wounded, and the requirements concerning the responsibility of an 
occupying force.‖57  
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To place these conventions into context, The Hague Conventions of 1907 came at a time 
when Europe was still in the equilibrium of the Congress of Vienna and technological 
innovation in weaponry was advancing rapidly, hence the focus on means and methods. 
By comparison, the Geneva Convention of 1949, which was focussed on delineating who 
was a legitimate combatant, was a direct response to the massive and deliberate targeting 
of non-combatants that occurred during the Second World War.
58
 Following the 
insurgencies in Algeria and Vietnam, the 1977 Geneva Protocols attempted to recalibrate 
the original Convention of 1949, lowering the standard for combatant status so that 
groups such as the Viet Cong and FLN, who were not encompassed as combatants in the 
Geneva Conventions despite the major role they played in the conflict, were covered as 
combatants.
59
 Each iteration came as a response to, or a reflection of, contemporaneous 
issues and mores.
60
  
 
The LOAC is an enormous body of written and unwritten rules of vastly varying ancestry 
and scope and stands in stark contrast to the parsimonious austerity of the principles of 
jus in bello. The relationship between the two is intricate. Whilst the laws have been 
inspired and guided by the moral, they neither replace nor fully encompass the moral. 
Often the moral and the legal are in concordance; at other times they are in discord with 
little in the way of logical or consistent purpose.
61
 A revealing perspective on the 
relationship can be found in the various terms and distinctions used by scholars 
depending on their discipline. In general, legal scholars use jus in bello and LOAC as 
sequential synonyms, in that their discussions of the two treat the LOAC as the mature 
offspring of the historical jus in bello, whilst philosophers largely refer to the two as 
closely related but inherently different phenomena.
62
 This is not to say that the legal 
scholars believe they are the same, but rather that from their perspective the LOAC is the 
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logical derivative of jus in bello, and in a fashion the logical inheritor of that tradition; 
whilst due to their focus on the moral issues the philosophers are more concerned with 
separating them for analytical purposes. Long provides an illuminating perspective: 
―[i]nternational law… is best perceived as a highly imperfect reflection of moral 
principles, skewed by the interests and shared history of different countries, most notably 
great powers.‖63 The LOAC is concerned with demarcating acceptable and legitimate 
conduct and is, to a greater degree than the jus in bello principles, greatly effected by 
context.  
 
Rules of Engagement 
The rules of engagement (ROE) are the specific application of the LOAC and a nation‘s 
domestic laws and values, tailored to the political and military requirements of an 
operation.
64
 Thus, whilst in some respects concerned with operational aspects they are a 
representation and a product of a particular state at a particular time. At the 
strategic/operational level the ROE are the directives issued by a competent military 
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which an armed force 
will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.
65
 At the 
operational/tactical level ROE provide guidelines for when military force may be used, 
where it may be used and against whom it may be used. They ―provide the soldier with a 
set of standard operating procedures (SOP) that can be utilized with as little deliberation 
as possible.‖66  
 
As an example, here are the United States (US) ROE for the Somalia Relief operation, 
handed out to each soldier:
67
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The above image represents the basic version to be carried in the field. The full ROE for 
the operation are far more detailed; for example, when assessing hostile intent it provides 
factors that may be considered in the assessment, such as: what types of weapons are 
present? How big is the opposing force? In what manner are the weapons displayed, are 
they being aimed? How did the opposing force respond to US forces? How does the force 
act toward unarmed civilians? Other aggressive actions?
68
 
 
There are three types of reason for the promulgation of ROE: political, military and 
legal.
69
 Politically, they coordinate the use of force with political objectives, garner 
domestic and international support (typically via the media) and ease post conflict 
relations. Militarily, they control escalation dominance, they synchronise military effect 
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with political effort and maintain discipline and the professional military ethic. Legally, 
they articulate the control and regulation of force that is required under both national and 
international law. 
 
Simplistically, the ROE are the situation-specific implementation of jus in bello and the 
LOAC, whereby the Just War tradition sets the moral principles, the LOAC codifies these 
and the ROE applies them to specific situations. The influence and legacy of jus in bello 
is obvious in modern ROE, where the critical factors are who you can target, when you 
can target them and with how much force you can target them with.
70
 As the tailored, ‗on 
the ground‘ aspect of the preventative, the ROE are altered by the competent military 
authority as the COE changes. Therefore, the ROE are often as dynamic as the COE, 
meaning that soldiers will have to assimilate new ROE as the mission, or their role 
within, changes. 
 
In conclusion, the preventative aspect draws the lines of permissibility; it delineates 
morally and legally acceptable conduct by providing both philosophical principles and 
concrete legal rules. The preventative‘s function then is that, at the philosophical level, it 
provides general principles that ensure a military conducts itself in a moral fashion, 
whilst the legal rules are the explicit guidelines for the soldier to follow that enable the 
moral principles to be maintained. The preventative‘s function is also to ensure that a 
military conducts itself in a manner commensurate with both domestic and, to a lesser 
extent, international expectations.  This can be seen in the preventative function‘s 
culturally and historically relative nature: the prescriptions are not fixed but rather reflect 
the relevant mores and values of their practitioners.   
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The Constructive Function 
―If there is one defining element of the vocation of the soldier that sets him apart from 
civilian professionals within a democracy, it is… that he alone within his parent society 
is charged by an elected government with the judicious expenditure of the lives of his 
fellow citizens.‖71 
 
The constructive is concerned with the creation and maintenance of group-defining and 
group-controlling attitudes and values that make the armed forces an effective and 
manageable tool. Its primary purpose is as a means of control, both within the military 
and between the liberal democratic state and the armed forces.
72
 In this manner it is 
functional, interested in generating and sustaining operability. Concern for the moral 
aspect is generally still focussed on how this affects functionality. There are several 
relevant and interconnected parts to the constructive: professionalism, ethos and values.  
 
Professionalism 
In examining professionalism, the how and why of the constructive function will be 
illustrated. The traditional proponent of professionalism is Samuel Huntington, whose 
book, The Soldier and the State, is still widely quoted 50 years after it was first 
published.
73
 Professionalism, as Huntington views it, ensures both civil supremacy and a 
fundamental submission from the military.
74
 
 
For Huntington, a professional officer corps displays three characteristics common to all 
professions: expertise, responsibility and corporateness. Expertise refers to the idea that 
the ―professional man is an expert with specialised knowledge and skill in a significant 
field of human endeavour‖; in the case of the armed forces, the ―direction, operation, and 
control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is 
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the peculiar skill of the officer.‖
75
 The concept of responsibility is concerned with the 
professional as ―a practising expert, working in a social context, and performing a 
service…. essential to the functioning of society‖, who, due to the ―monopoly of his 
skill‖, has a ―responsibility to perform the service when required by society.‖76 Finally, 
corporateness embodies the idea that ―members of a profession share a sense of organic 
unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen‖ and that the 
―professional organisation [itself]…. formalises and applies the standards of professional 
competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.‖  77 
 
In Duty With Honour, the central document on Canadian military professionalism, the 
following definition is given as a synthesis of scholarly work on professionalism:  
 
―A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a 
systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, 
education, training and experience. Members of a profession have a special 
responsibility to fulfill their function competently and objectively for the benefit 
of society. Professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes 
standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics 
is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely 
accepted as legitimate by society at large.‖78 
 
This synthesis reveals how the constructive acts as a mechanism of group definition and 
control and as a guarantor of effectiveness. The military professional belongs to an 
exclusive group that has a special responsibility to serve their society utilising their body 
of knowledge and is internally governed by a code of ethics that contains values accepted 
by general society. As a profession the military is a separate and self-regulating entity 
that has a duty to fulfil its obligation to its society in a manner commensurate to the 
values of that society. As Duty With Honour writes, professions developed due to two 
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imperatives: ―a societal imperative to ensure their ability to successfully fulfill their 
special responsibility to the community and a functional imperative to guarantee the 
necessary high quality and relevance of their acquired body of knowledge.‖79 
 
Professionalism as a concept reflects its origins and developmental history. The major 
period of professionalisation was during the Napoleonic Wars, when officers acquired ―a 
specialised technique‖ that differentiated them from the layman and began to ―develop 
the standards, values and organisation inherent in that technique.‖80 Professionalism as a 
defining concept of military service was still being consolidated up until the Second 
World War, affected by changes taking place in Western society: the continued self-
aggrandisement of the sovereign state, the continuing power of nationalism, the 
consolidation of democracy and democratic values, expanding education programmes, 
the rise of meritocracy, the exponential technological imperative and the increase in job 
specialisation.
81
 By the same token, following the Second World War, military 
professionalism was being influenced by the wider changes occurring in Western 
societies, namely the decline in religion and supposed resulting loss of values, rapidly 
increased consumerism and materialism, the broadening multicultural composition of 
states and their militaries and the feminist liberation.
82
 The challenges of the post-World 
War Two environment were such that, in 1971 Colonel Robert Gard wrote of the ―search 
to adapt traditional concepts and practices of military professionalism to changing 
requirements and radically new demands‖.83  
 
It is desirable to modernise and adapt Huntington‘s application of professionalism. For 
Huntington, only officers who are directly involved in the ―management of violence‖, the 
requisite monopoly of expertise, are considered as military professionals, other officers 
and the enlisted are not included in his conception.
84
 Huntington was writing at a time 
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when conscription was still prevalent, and his stark division between professional and 
non-professional is representative of that milieu.
85
 Application of the term professional is 
divisive, with some maintaining Huntington‘s position whilst others believe that it should 
be expanded or applied by degrees.
86
 This paper, whilst not directly concerned with the 
debate, is interested in showing that aspects, if not the actual appellation, can be applied 
to more than just the officer corps directly responsible for the management of violence. 
What is of concern here is to examine what the constructive does and how it does it and 
this can be achieved by looking at why particular facets can be pushed beyond the 
traditional officer distinction.  
 
In his elegant article, ―Toward a Normative Code for the Military‖, Groll Ya‘ari makes a 
persuasive argument that the traditional view of the officer corps as the sole bastion of 
professionalism is outdated.
87
 He believes that four particular changes in the military 
environment have brought about the need for this shift: ―(a) the multidimensional 
battlefield; (b) the dramatic increase in weapons systems [sic] sophistication; (c) the 
unprecedented burden of responsibility on the ranks; (d) the maturing sense of the 
individual‘s rights in the armed forces of democracies.‖88  
 
The import of the first two is that the effect of the technological imperative on the COE 
led to an increasing need for skills, expertise and knowledge across the ranks.
89
 Modern 
conflict has ―increasingly devolved the authority and ability to apply escalating lethal 
force to more junior levels of leadership‖ leading to a greater demand for expertise and a 
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significant reduction of the traditional position of the officer as the military expert sine 
pari.
90
 
  
However, it is the latter two changes in military environment that, in combination, seem 
to necessitate a certain reconceptualisation of professionalism. The unprecedented burden 
of responsibility on the ranks that Groll Ya‘ari mentions refers to Nuremberg Principle 
IV, which states that with regard to a war crime, ―[t]he fact that a person acted pursuant 
to [an] order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility 
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.‖91 This 
principle means that all military personnel are accountable for their deeds no matter what 
orders they were given, thereby conferring on all ranks the responsibility of using their 
expertise for ―socially approved purposes‖.92 Also, Principle IV demands that all ranks 
have the duty to judge the expertise of those issuing orders, assess them relative to ethical 
and legal obligations and, on the basis of the assessment, make definitive decisions, thus 
requiring that all enlisted have adequate expertise to process and complete such decision-
making dilemmas.  
 
The final change in the military environment is the maturing sense of the individual‘s 
rights (and therefore obligations) in the armed forces of democracies. Taken with the 
spread of the all-volunteer force (AVF), this burgeoning sense provides an awareness of 
responsibility that was not present in past conscript forces. It is suggested here that the 
underlying motivation for many in joining the armed forces is a sense of duty to their 
country. Obviously that is not always the only, or strongest, motivation but when 
considering the potential risks and level of remuneration, there is a strong argument for a 
sentiment of this nature to play an instrumental role.  
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These four changes suggest that certain core characteristics of the military profession can 
be applied beyond the officer corps, though there are limits. However, the real issue is to 
show that professionalism helps in the creation and maintenance of an effective and 
controllable armed force by endowing service with a special sense of social 
responsibility, a realisation of obligation and a certain gravitas. It is this, inter alia, that 
crafts an effective killing machine, yet it is also this, in some respects, which tempers and 
guides that killing machine. The concept of professionalism serves as a foundation upon 
which military ethos and military values may be embedded, and it is to these that the 
paper turns. 
 
Military Ethos 
If professionalism is the foundation then military ethos is the overarching superstructure 
that draws and binds; it acts as the ―centre of gravity for the military profession‖ and 
comprises the distinctive culture, traditions and values specific to an armed force, ―the 
imperatives of military professionalism and the requirement of operations.‖93 In a sense 
the ethos unifies the three characteristics of professionalism; it reflects how military 
professionals see themselves (corporateness), how they carry out their function 
(expertise) and how they interact with their government and society (responsibility). It is 
bound by its links to society and promulgated by the sense of corporateness that 
responsibility to the nation and the monopoly of expertise connote.
94
  
 
Military ethos is the binding force; it holds a military together, invests it with worth and 
morale, and draws lines of commonality and control with the larger society. It is 
empowered by professionalism, or rather the concepts that lie beneath: (a) that it maintain 
the requisite expertise to ensure that it is an effective force so that it can fulfil its 
responsibility; (b) that it has a responsibility to its society, to defend it, up hold its values, 
maintain its dignity and serve it honourably; (c) that it should be a cohesive and self-
regulating unit that operates in an ethical manner commensurate with the larger societal 
values. The military ethos is the combination of these and the specific traditions, values 
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and culture of an armed force as well as the general values of society; it has a powerful 
role in the constructive function as an overarching bond that unifies and controls a 
military and ties it to society.
95
 
 
The NZA‘s ethos, or The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, serves as an illustration of 
ethos as a mechanism of functionality and control, with each stated ideal serving either or 
both of these purposes: 
 
Self-discipline to harden oneself physically; 
Total and unshakeable trust in each other;  
Mental toughness to endure extremes of hardship; 
Commitment to complete any duty assigned; 
Overcoming all odds to complete a task; 
Desire to be the best, but not at the expense of comrades or team; 
Commitment to be competent to the most demanding standards; 
The selflessness to put comrades before self; 
Willingness to sacrifice oneself for the mission, unit or comrade; 
The mental hardness to survive the horrors of the battlefield; 
Winning. 
 
The title of the NZA manual, The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, highlights an issue 
that needs to be discussed regarding ethos, namely that the traditional military ethos was 
a warrior ethos, in that it was premised on duty through combat, with the contingent 
physical and mental attributes that this demands.
96
 The warrior ethos fuses the primal 
―fighter spirit‖- the ―psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in 
combat, regardless of his personal safety‖ with the higher worth of service towards 
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country.
97
 As with the preventative function and professionalism, the warrior ethos has 
been challenged by the changing nature of conflict; Janowitz, in his seminal work, The 
Professional Soldier, was the first to explore this, identifying the strain caused by 
technological innovation and the rise of the bureaucratic soldier on the heroic ideal of the 
martial spirit.
98
 Janowitz believed that although this tension can be found in every 
profession, it is particularly pervasive in the armed forces.
99
 As he wrote, ―[t]he growth 
of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise with increased political 
responsibilities has produced a strain on traditional military self-images and concepts of 
honor.‖100 The heroic ideal is under strain from a necessary compromise forced by 
technical and bureaucratic realities, with the managerial and technical components, in 
Janowitz‘s time, winning the ‗struggle‘, though not totally subsuming the warrior ethos 
(as emphasised in his sectional title ―The Persistence of the ―Fighter Spirit‖‖).101 
Janowitz was concerned with what happened to the military professional in peacetime, 
and believed that ―the military establishment requires a balance between the three roles of 
heroic leader, military manager, and military technologist.‖102 Furthermore, he stated, 
―the military profession is confronted with a persistent dilemma… The profession must 
recruit and retain officers who are skilled in military management for its elite, but, at the 
same time, many of its officers, including the most conspicuous ones, must be able to 
perpetuate the traditions of the heroic leader.‖103 The latest perceived assault on the 
warrior ethos has been from peacekeeping, a stress identified by Janowitz and the ex-US 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in his final press conference 
in that role.
104
 This is a position that will be examined in later chapters. 
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Schematic of professionalism and military ethos (with identity replacing corporateness), 
taken from Duty With Honour.
105
 
 
Military Values 
Military values are those desired virtues and qualities that support the creation and 
maintenance of the military ethos.
106
 The inculcation of these values is intended to create 
the ‗good‘ character in which the implicit requisites of military professionalism and 
military ethos can take root and flourish.
107
 They are derived from the values sacrosanct 
to the parent society, and as such they maintain the link between the society and the 
armed forces demanded by professionalism. In a manner they actualise the demands 
made by professionalism and ethos. The values codify what qualities and virtues are 
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necessary to be a military professional and to exemplify the desired ethos; as the NZA 
states, its ―ethos…. is embodied in the values system.‖108 The values-based system is 
widespread, with numerous militaries around the world espousing similar sets of 
estimable values: 
 
United States Army Values:  
Loyalty; Duty; Respect; Selfless Service; Honor; Integrity; and Personal Courage.
109
 
 
British Army Core Values:  
Selfless Commitment; Courage; Discipline; Integrity; Loyalty; and Respect for Others.
110
 
 
Canadian Forces Values:  
Duty; Loyalty; Integrity; and Courage.
111
 
 
New Zealand Army Values:  
Service; Loyalty; Honour; Courage; Commitment; Comradeship; and Integrity.
112
 
 
The NZA values are typical and as such a brief examination of these should illustrate the 
general usefulness. Though not ranked, the first three are given a pre-eminence that 
suggests they provide the foundation for the latter four. Service means that soldiers are 
servants of the state and as such should do whatever New Zealand requires. Loyalty 
means that ―the greater good of the nation comes first‖ and also that commanders support 
their subordinates and subordinates support their leaders.
113
 Honour ―requires a high 
standard of behaviour both in war and peace‖ and demands conduct that does not damage 
New Zealand‘s reputation.114 Courage has two particular forms: physical and moral. 
Physical courage provides ―the soldier with the strength and power to do what has to be 
done‖ no matter the difficulties or dangers and ―involves overcoming fear and still being 
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able to operate effectively in spite of dangers or risks.‖115 Moral courage is ―the strength 
of character to do what you know is right in spite of pressure to do something wrong.‖ 
Commitment ―involves putting the needs of the team or organisation before your own 
personal needs.‖116 Comradeship is the sense of loyalty shown to fellow soldiers, which 
from the examples in the manual includes allied nationalities.
117
 Integrity refers to the 
need for each soldier to be responsible, reliable, sincere and act on sound moral principles 
in all actions. 
 
The usefulness of these values is obvious, for, if successfully instilled, they create a 
soldier who is mentally and physically valiant, places their organisation and comrades 
above themselves and selflessly and near unquestioningly serves their country in a 
principled and meritorious manner. The values can be seen as a short cut in times of 
stress; as Robinson writes, the advantage of military values ―is that in combat there are 
intense pressures and little time for deep intellectual philosophizing [sic]. In such 
occasions having an individual who will behave properly due to conditioned responses is 
highly desirable.‖118  These values are not just laudable attributes; for the military they 
are functional necessities.  
 
As suggested in the above paragraph, one major purpose of the constructive is that it 
enables an armed force to function both effectively and within moral and legal 
parameters in a stressful operational environment. As will be shown in the relevant 
chapter, the NZA COE is increasingly fluid, complex and interconnected across 
numerous germane aspects, which are all stressors.
119
 The Foundations of New Zealand 
Military Doctrine manual states: ―[t]he dynamic and destructive nature of warfighting 
produces massive uncertainty, confusion, [and] chaos…. [and consequently] surprise and 
shock will be a constant drain on resources, both physical and mental.‖120 This is further 
                                                 
115
 Ibid., 14. 
116
 Ibid. 
117
 The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, 22-23. The manual refers to an act of comradeship by a NZA 
officer toward a Gurkha soldier in Borneo. 
118
 Robinson, 30. 
119
 Paul T. Bartone, ―Resilience Under Military Operational Stress: Can Leaders Influence Hardiness?‖ 
Military Psychology 18 (2006): S134-S135.  
120
 Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, 6-3. 
 41 
elucidated in the FM 1: ―[d]oing the right thing for the right reason and with the right 
intention is always challenging. But this challenge is even more difficult during the fast-
moving, ambiguous, and deadly chaos of combat. It is only slightly less so under the 
stressful conditions of providing humanitarian assistance.‖121 Stress being defined as, ―a 
reaction to pressure or a threat that may exceed an individual‘s ability to cope with it.‖122 
Furthermore, ―[n]egative reactions to….stress may include misconduct behaviors….and 
combat stress reactions.‖123 Further effects of stress on soldiers are the screening out of 
peripheral stimuli, decision-making based on heuristics, performance rigidity and narrow 
thinking and the loss of ability to analyse complicated situations and manipulate 
information.
124
 In sum, as the US Field Manual on Combat and Operational Stress 
Control, FM 4-02.51, writes, ―control of stress is often the decisive difference between 
victory and defeat across the operational spectrum.‖125 Finally, as a NATO report on the 
subject notes, one of the best methods of managing ―stress is unit cohesion, perhaps best 
described as ethos.‖126 This is supported by the FM 4-02.51, which states that stressors, 
―when combine[d] with effective leadership and good peer relationships may lead to 
adaptive stress reactions which enhance individual and unit performance.‖127 This 
sentiment is reaffirmed in the NZ Doctrine manual: ―[f]ear and uncertainty [in 
warfighting] are likely to be commonplace…. The bravest men and women may be 
frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears that is a measure of their 
courage.‖128 Thus, as facets of the constructive function, professionalism, military ethos 
and military values ensure that an armed force can function morally, legally and 
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effectively under stress. Again, this is straying into utility, and will be elaborated upon in 
the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
Internal Dynamics 
 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the preventative and constructive are not 
separate entities but rather two distinct yet interrelated aspects of military ethics as a 
whole. Whilst the preventative is essentially concerned with delineating permissibility of 
action, the constructive focuses largely on group definition and control. In these two 
complex roles they sometimes work in accord, at other times they are antagonistic. This 
section will briefly examine the relationship between the two.  
 
Firstly, one crucial area of antagonism between the two, and within the constructive 
itself, is the Nuremberg Principle (IV). No soldier is exempt from prosecution even if 
following orders, which creates a tension, initially within the constructive, then between 
the constructive and preventative. Militaries are rigidly hierarchical, a necessity of 
function, yet the Nuremberg Principle demands that a subordinate question his superior‘s 
order on a moral or legal basis. As Murphy puts it, ―servicemen and women are not 
justified in obeying orders that are manifestly unlawful…[,furthermore] the balance that 
is sought between intellectual brilliance, moral character and discipline to sustain them in 
a desperate crisis can only be effective if the orders received are recognized as legitimate 
and lawful.‖129 This pits service, commitment and loyalty against honour, courage and 
integrity, and obedience against morality. There is no simple solution to this; military 
ethics as a whole are not always logically consistent, and in this case create an extreme 
internal tension.  
 
One of the fundamental linkages between the two functions is that to be a military 
professional, to embody the military ethos and to be true to military values, the soldier 
must act in accordance with the preventative precepts. This is a vital requirement; 
military professionalism, ethos and values demand that the soldier operates in a manner 
commensurate with jus in bello, the LOAC and the ROE. Any breach of these moral and 
legal principles is a breach of the constructive, violating the self-regulating code of ethics 
integral to professionalism, breaking the military values of honour and integrity amongst 
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others and thus contravening the military ethos. This link makes the arbitrariness of the 
division between the two functions apparent.  
 
Conversely, the constructive functions as an enabler of the preventative. That compliance 
with moral and legal parameters is central to the preventative means that it acts as an 
actuator, wherein the soldier who embodies the tenets of the constructive is obliged to 
conduct him or herself in accord with those parameters. In effect, the military values act 
as a short cut, facilitating ‗good‘ decision-making in the chaotic and time-critical realm of 
conflict. The regulatory function of the constructive embeds these necessary qualities 
whilst the group defining function further enables the regulatory and serves to create the 
cohesiveness and efficiency that enhances the decision-making environment. As 
Dickenson and Joyce put it, ―[a] distinguishing feature of a professional military ethic is 
that it provides moral guidance for action and conduct.‖130  
 
Furthermore, together they help individual and collective mental well-being in a morally 
ambiguous and highly stressful profession, for whilst the constructive provides a 
justification for service the preventative delineates the limits of moral and legal conduct 
in the cauldron of conflict. This is crucial, for as explained by Maj. Gen. Sebastian 
Roberts, ―military effectiveness cannot be based on functional output alone, and unless it 
is focussed on higher external ethics, an army risks the moral bankruptcy of the Waffen 
SS.  Soldiers must know that what they do is right, and that they have the support of their 
nation, their society, and their government.‖131 This is supported by the Canadian manual, 
Duty With Honour: 
 
‗Incorporated in the military ethos, Canadian values mandate members of the 
Canadian profession of arms to perform their tasks with humanity. Members of 
the Canadian Forces understand the inherent violence of armed conflict, 
characterized at an extreme by death and destruction. While they must act 
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resolutely, and sometimes with lethal force, the concept of humanity forbids any 
notion of a carte blanche or unbounded behaviour. Further, it demands 
consideration for non-combatants and items of cultural worth. Performing with 
humanity contributes to the honour earned by Canadian Forces members and 
helps make Canadians at home proud and supportive of their armed forces.‖132 
 
Military ethics provide a psychological safety net, investing service with worth whilst 
validating and delineating the exceptions to the general rule of morality that prohibits the 
killing of another individual. They reconcile individual morality with the necessities of 
conflict thus enabling the soldier to operate in the ‗hell born of man‘. 
 
Also, closely linked with investing military service with an inherent worth, military ethics 
as a whole, amongst many other factors, create and sustain morale, which is defined by 
the Australian Army as:  
 
―[A]n attitude of confidence in the mind of an individual and closely related to the 
satisfying of a man's basic needs.  If the training, administration and fight of a unit 
is conducted so as to assist in satisfying these needs of the group and differing 
individual needs, a favorable [sic] attitude will be developed… High morale is a 
positive state of mind which gives a man a feeling of confidence and well-being 
that enables him to face hardship with courage, endurance and determination.‖133 
 
By investing military service with worth and a higher purpose, military ethics provide a 
foundation for morale.
134
 Though not the only foundation for good morale, without a 
well-inculcated and developed military ethic, morale suffers. The preventative gives 
moral limits to action thus giving violence an acceptable face and the constructive 
provides both a higher good, in the form of the state, and, by fostering bonds between 
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individuals, creates, the connections which ensure the formation and maintenance of an 
esprit de corps, in essence, group morale.  
 47 
Chapter Two 
Military Ethics: Contemporary Utility 
 
―The major conflicts and developments of the past 200 years are the context for our 
understanding of the utility of force. However,…force and its uses are eternal. Armed 
conflict is a human condition, and…we will continue to reinvent it from generation to 
generation.‖ General Sir Rupert Smith.1 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, military ethics have two separate yet interconnected 
functions: they delineate the moral and legal boundaries of conduct and they create and 
maintain an effective and controllable military force. These functions replaced the code 
of chivalry and came about as a response to changes in Western society and warfare. The 
issue is that in recent years warfare, and the international system it mirrors, have 
undergone massive transformational shifts due, largely, to the end of the Cold War, and 
to a lesser degree, the attacks of September 11. 
 
The end of the Cold War brought about a transformational change in global politics. 
Expressing the views of many in the early post-Cold War period, Buzan wrote that it was 
an event of such magnitude that ―it is appropriate to talk of the end of an era for the 
international system as a whole.‖2 With the end of the near half-century confrontation the 
hopes held by many that this would mark the beginning of a new and peaceful era were 
shattered as largely intrastate ethnic, nationalist and religious-based conflict appeared to 
spread across much of the globe, though this was as much due to perception as reality.
3
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As Hooker wrote, any hopes of peace ―were dashed by Somalia and Rwanda and Bosnia, 
by the Sudan and the Congo and Kosovo, by Chechnya and Afghanistan and Iraq.‖4 
These conflicts, which in many cases had been suppressed, dismissed as insignificant or 
artfully manipulated during the bipolar era, now took on a new pre-eminence in the 
absence of the previously overwhelming superpower rivalry.
5
 In the following years of 
flux many commentators declared an end, or long-term cessation, of interstate war and 
the beginning of a new era of warfare.
6
 Closely allied with this prediction were those who 
saw the beneficent power of globalisation as having a pacifying effect on the 
international system, with the general thesis that as economic interdependence and 
democracy spread from the West outward, peace would ensue.
7
  
 
Furthermore, the demise of the Soviet Union ended the Security Council gridlock, and 
peacekeeping operations moved from being largely consent-based, neutral and restricted 
missions to encompass non-consent, ‗muscular‘ humanitarian missions that have become 
increasingly ―complex, multi-organizational, [and] multidisciplinary‖.8 The new 
‗muscular‘ missions deployed to largely intrastate conflicts and entailed diverse, and 
traditionally non-military, tasks to be conducted by participating armed forces, often in 
conjunction with a diverse array of actors. Following September 11 these operations 
began to blend with conflict, or mutate into what Freedman terms ―offensive liberal 
wars‖.9 At the same time the U.S. began theorising that there was a ‗Revolution in 
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Military Affairs‘ (RMA) occurring, whereby warfare was changing qualitatively due to 
technological transformation.  
 
To show how dramatic the general shift in conflict has been, it is edifying to quote Gen. 
Rupert Smith at length:  
 
―Industrial war had clear-cut strategic goals. It has been used to create states, 
destroy the evil of fascism and end the Ottoman Empire. In war amongst the people 
[his term for the new type of conflict that will be further examined in the next sub-
section], however, the ends to which we use military force are changing to 
something more complex and less strategic. As we have seen, the driving idea 
behind industrial war was that the political objective was attained by achieving a 
strategic military objective of such significance that the opponent conformed to our 
will-the intention being to decide the matter by military force. These strategic 
objectives tended to be expressed in terms such as ―take‖, hold, ―destroy.‖ In the 
two world wars both sides sought to achieve all of these on the battlefield, within 
the understanding that such an achievement would decide the outcome-which in 
both wars it did. In contrast to these hard strategic ends we tend now to conduct 
operations for ―softer‖ more malleable, complex, sub-strategic objectives. We do 
not intervene in order to take or hold territory; in fact, once an intervention has 
occurred a main preoccupation is how to leave a territory rather than keep it. 
Instead, we intervene in, or even decide to escalate to, a conflict in order to 
establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other 
means and in other ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, 
economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired 
political outcome of stability, and if possible, democracy.‖10 
 
In sum, the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system, and such concurrent developments 
as growing economic interdependence and the effects of technology are seen to have 
caused a dramatic shift in warfare. Though some of this is questionable, the general 
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thrust, that conflicts- the reason for response, the nature of the response and the way they 
are conducted- have changed in a dramatic manner, is widely accepted.
11
 This proposition 
will be examined in the following chapter on the NZA‘s COE.  
 
Before continuing the concept of utility must be analysed. At its most basic, utility refers 
to usefulness and effectiveness. Clausewitz provides the most instrumental, if traditional, 
perspective from which to place this in a military context: ―[f]orce—that is, physical 
force, . . . is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To 
secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true 
aim of warfare.‖12 Thus, the purpose of a military force is the imposition of will upon the 
adversary. Therefore, a military forces‘ usefulness, its utility, is in its ability to facilitate 
the desired outcome through the threat or use of that force, or also, in the modern 
environment, by use of a military force in a constructive (as opposed to the traditional 
Napoleonic/Clausewitzean paradigm of destructive use of military force), non-violent and 
non-threatening, manner. The utility of military force is its level of capacity to impose the 
desired will on the adversary, its ―contribution to the process of effecting a change in 
behaviour‖ with the objective of securing overall success.13 Military utility is often used 
with regard to weapons systems; for example, landmines have utility for four reasons: 
they provide an economy of force; canalise attacks; increase an attackers losses; and 
reduce a defenders losses.
14
 It is in this spirit that the utility of military ethics is 
considered. 
 
Consequently for this paper, military ethics‘ utility can be taken as a subset of the overall 
utility of military force. Both as a part of the capacity to impose, but also as a facilitator 
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of that general capacity, in that military ethics can be seen as a separate if intangible 
aspect of military force and also, due to inherent qualities, as an enabler of the capacity as 
a whole. Thus, military ethics can be of utility when they enhance the capacity of an 
armed force to impose its will on an adversary directly or indirectly. This may seem a 
disingenuous method of broadening the reach of military ethics for self-serving ends but 
rather it is the catholic scope of military ethics that requires such an open definition. To 
clarify, by direct it is meant that an aspect of military ethics has affected the outcome of 
an operation, such as if the moral and legal conduct of an occupying force has convinced 
an indigenous population to stop supplying and sheltering guerrillas, whilst indirect 
obviously refers to a more circuitous connexion; for example, the military values of an 
occupying force-courage, commitment, comradeship and integrity- ensure that that force 
is able to operate under the extreme pressures of conflict or humanitarian aid delivery. 
 
Utility is a relative concept: it is situation specific, as Gen. Rupert Smith stressed when 
he wrote that a ―battle is an event of circumstance, and therefore every element of force 
must be understood as a product of the circumstances in which it was created or used.‖15 
Therefore, the utility of military ethics is dynamic, contingent upon a multitude of factors 
within the COE, the wider world and individuals themselves. This paper is focussed on 
those factors within the COE; those beyond are clearly an influence, deserving a treatise 
in and of themselves. Suffice it to say here that the current transformational phenomena- 
such as the information revolution, multiculturalism and globalisation amongst others- 
that define the global zeitgeist, affect military ethics as they affect most spheres. These 
changes have, in concert, impacted on military ethics and it is posited here they also play 
a part in the utility of military ethics. They are beyond the scope of this paper, though 
they must be acknowledged.  
 
The distinction between function and utility must be clarified. For the purpose of this 
paper, function refers to the role whilst utility refers to the usefulness of the function in 
fulfilling the stated objective, which in this case is overall operational success. The two 
concepts are not hermetic entities, as something that has no usefulness in its role has a 
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non-existent, or at least highly limited, function, unless used for a completely unrelated 
task. Also, in general, something is developed for a specific use, so the function is often a 
derivative of its end utility; whilst it could also be said the role of something is only a role 
if it has utility. 
 
The utility of military ethics for this paper is their usefulness in facilitating overall 
operational success. However, military ethics‘ functions, and their corresponding utility, 
largely developed during the period from the Peace of Westphalia through to the end of 
World War Two. Thus, while their function has remained largely the same, the 
operational environment has changed. The hypotheses may now be given: 
 
The preventative function has an increasing utility in the New Zealand Army’s 
contemporary operational environment. 
 
The constructive function has a remaining utility in the New Zealand Army’s 
contemporary operational environment. 
 
These hypotheses are premised on the perception of the utility of military ethics‘ 
functions in the COE. The perception is that their contribution to overall operational 
success is twofold. The preventative‘s function, that it delineates the moral and legal 
boundaries for an armed force, is seen to have a specific utility in overall operational 
success. This is because the moral and legal guidelines are not just normative or lawful 
ideals to be strived for due to intrinsic good or jurisprudence. There is an inherent 
usefulness in obeying these principles and rules that is of operationally efficacy for 
―[w]hen proportionality and discrimination and the rules that flow from these time-
honoured concepts are abandoned, the military operation is very likely to become 
counter-productive.‖16 This can be illustrated with several quotes, firstly from the United 
States Army Field Manual 1 (FM 1):  
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―The moral dimension of the profession of arms lies in the fact that war is 
ultimately fought for ideas. Ideas motivate combatants. It is only in the moral 
dimension —when opponents understand and believe that they are defeated—that 
victory is complete. While the use of force is sometimes necessary for the 
common good, the authority to wield it carries a moral responsibility of the 
greatest magnitude. The morality of applying force in a just cause derives from 
ancient ethical and religious standards.‖17  
 
Secondly from the Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine, which states that 
―[c]onflict on the moral plane exerts the greater and often decisive influence on the 
conduct and outcome of the conflict.‖18 The moral and legal are functionally useful in 
securing victory because conflict is fought on the psychological, as well as physical level, 
and morally guided conduct has an inherent worth in convincing an opponent of defeat. 
As will be shown in the following chapter, the preventative function has an enhanced 
utility in the COE because of changes in the nature of the combatant, the techniques the 
combatant uses, the nature of the expanded mandate tasks, the media coverage of the 
conflict and type of justification used for the intervention. This has been termed 
increasing, because while the preventative‘s function has not changed, its utility has 
grown due to external changes.  
 
The constructive‘s function, that it creates and maintains an effective and controllable 
military force, is seen to have several aspects of utility in overall operational success. 
Firstly, the constructive facilitates the preventative, thus indirectly aiding in the latter‘s 
utility, through professional responsibility and corporateness as well as military values 
such as courage, honour and integrity. Secondly, the constructive has utility by ensuring 
that the military is both effective and controllable. The expertise and corporateness 
manifested in the concept of professionalism is a part of the effectiveness, as are the 
military values, particularly courage, commitment, comradeship and integrity. The 
professional responsibility and military values, particularly service, loyalty and honour, 
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aid the controllability of the military. Also, at another level, the worth of duty and 
obligation that is embodied in military values such as service, loyalty and honour and the 
professional tenet of responsibility empower the NZA and provide morale, which enables 
the soldier to overcome odds and put operational priorities ahead of personal issues. 
Essentially, it is posited that even though modern conflict is of a low-to-medium-
intensity, the changing realities of the OE, to be examined in the following chapter, 
which see soldiers facing irregular combatants using irregular techniques in ‗alien‘ 
locales, conducting diverse expanded mandate joint, multinational and interagency 
missions that are conducted amongst the people in the glare of the media for moral 
reasons, are such that the constructive has remaining utility even if the traditional utility, 
namely that in the face of fire, has lessened. 
 
Furthermore, the warrior ethos may not be as obstinate as many think; as will be 
examined in the several sub-sections in the following chapter, the reality may be that at 
the pragmatic level modern soldiers are aware of, and have adapted to, the COE and the 
ramifications of being a contemporary ‗warrior‘. Naturally, even if this were true, it 
would not be true for all soldiers. However, if this is occurring then it would show the 
flexibility of the constructive function to new circumstances, and thus that it has adapted 
to retain its utility, though not changed substantively.  
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Chapter Three 
New Zealand Army: 
Contemporary Operational Environment 
 
―Peace and war are no longer antonyms‖ 1 
 
―The vacuum created in the wake of the Cold War has been filled with instability, conflict 
and seemingly continual change.‖2 
 
―[P]ersistent conflict‖—a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and 
individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and 
ideological ends. The operational environment in which this persistent conflict will be 
waged will be complex, multidimensional, and increasingly fought ―among the people.‖3 
 
The NZA‘s contemporary operational environment (COE) is most fully expressed in both 
the Land Force Capabilities Review Phase One- Land Forces and Sealift (LFCR) and the 
New Zealand Army Future Land Operating Concept: Precision Manoeuvre 2020 
(FLOC); the latter which, although obviously intended as a prediction of future 
operational issues, can also be viewed as an accurate-if sometimes extrapolated- 
summary of the NZA‘s interpretation of the COE.4 This chapter will utilise the LFCR and 
the FLOC and a range of primary and secondary works to construct an understanding of 
the dominant trends for the NZA COE that have particular relevance to the utility of 
military ethics. The point is to build up a relevant understanding of the NZA‘s COE, 
particularly the changes that have occurred that have potent ramifications for the utility of 
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military ethics. With regard to the constructive function, the chapter will focus on trends 
that are stressors, add to the complexity, affect morale and discipline, increase the 
possibility of culture shock and place responsibility across the ranks. With regard to the 
preventative function the chapter will focus on trends that pit the NZA against opponents 
who do not prescribe to the dominant Western moral/legal paradigm, that make following 
the principles of distinction and proportionality harder to obey and that enhance the 
criticality of moral and legal conduct.  
 
However, a few definitions, explanations and caveats must be made before continuing. 
First, an operational environment (OE) is defined as: 
 
―[A] composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the 
employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. While 
they include all enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems across the 
spectrum of conflict, they also include an understanding of the physical 
environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and the culture 
of the local population.‖5 
 
It is a holistic term, covering all aspects at the operational level that affect a military 
force. One further point is that it has a near future focus; it maps the current and 
extrapolated conditions, circumstances and influences. 
 
Also, an explanation as to the structure of the chapter; it has been somewhat arbitrarily 
divided into two sections. The first sets the context of the conflict itself and the second 
examines the deployment of the NZA in response. The conflict section is focussed on the 
germane characteristics of conflicts, specifically location, technique and combatants. It is 
largely taken from the indigenous force‘s perspective and is predominantly concerned 
with these conflicts once the NZA has become involved. The following section 
concentrates on the NZA‘s deployment, looking at such relevant aspects as the 
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multinational, joint and interagency composition; plus the operation‘s expanded mandate, 
the intense media scrutiny it functions under and the justification of the deployment itself.    
 
Thirdly, an explanation that must be made regards the seeming terminological confusion 
that permeates this chapter; essentially what this means is that this chapter may seem as if 
it is referring to both peacekeeping and conflict simultaneously. This is a matter of 
perspective, as due to the intra-Western détente, most conflicts occur outside NZ‘s 
sphere; therefore, when the NZA becomes involved, the situation can be referred to by 
numerous terms, depending on perspective and necessity. In this manner, there is a 
spectrum of perception. Also, however, this spectrum exists because the modern 
operation is no longer bound into neat definitional categories. There has been a 
convergence between peacekeeping and conflict at the operational level, and now, as the 
FLOC states, the NZA is expected to ―conduct concurrent operations across the 
spectrum‖ from humanitarian aid to peacekeeping to warfighting and ―alternate with 
agility between Combat Operations and SASO (Stability and Support Operations) 
without warning.
6
 Although possibly too extreme in his conclusion, Rolfe is on the right 
track when he writes:  
 
―The term ‗peacekeeping‘ should be relegated to the dustbin of history. It is 
dangerous because of the way it leads to unthinking assumptions about the kind of 
operations being conducted. Peacekeeping and peace support sound somehow 
intrinsically less dangerous than other military operations. There are, of course, 
only military operations; operations with different aims, different limitations to 
the way the aims are achieved and different factors relevant to achieving the 
aims.
7
  
 
This dynamism and vast degrees of difference mean that there is little purpose in striving 
for definitional distinctions, instead this chapter will approach the topic in a holistic 
manner, with the caveat that this will lead to general rather than specific conclusions. On 
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terms, the situation itself will be referred to as a conflict, with the understanding that this 
covers the full spectrum as illustrated in the NZ Army Future Land Operating Concept 
schema below.  
 
Finally, a brief examination of the NZ Army‘s contemporary operational spectrum is 
required. In the LFCR the contemporary operational spectrum is on a dual track, giving 
the spectrum of conflict and a separate spectrum for peace support operations (PSOs).
8
 
The conflict spectrum goes from low intensity through to mid and then high intensity, 
whilst the PSO spectrum goes from humanitarian missions through to peacekeeping and 
finally peace enforcement.
9
 In comparison, seven years later, the FLOC spectrum has 
evolved both terminologically and epistemologically, using new vocabulary and, 
critically, lacking the absolute distinction made between PSOs and conflict, which 
reveals a transformation in how these operations are perceived. The FLOC outlines how 
the Army ―will operate in the future environment utilising the concept of Precision 
Manoeuvre‖, in which there are ―two principal modes of operation that together form 
Precision Manoeuvre‘s comprehensive approach.‖10 Specifically these modes are Combat 
Operations (CO), both defensive and offensive, and Stability and Support Operations 
(SASO).
11
 Combat Operations ―will be adversary centric, military-led joint multinational 
operations‖, whilst SASOs will be ―interagency-led operations in which land forces 
provide responsive support to interagency effects.‖12 Also, at ―the strategic level the 
purpose of Combat Operations will be to set conditions for commencement or resumption 
of SASO.‖13 Therefore, in conjunction with the FLOC statements in the previous 
paragraph, the operational spectrum can be seen to run from peace maintenance-type 
missions up to high intensity conflict with no absolute demarcation, but rather a fluid and 
syncretic nature in which a number of modes could be occurring simultaneously, or 
conversely, the vicissitudes of the operational environment may mean an instant change 
of mission from SASO to offensive CO. Finally, COs can be seen as secondary to SASO, 
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in that their overall purpose is to set the conditions for SASOs, rather than as an overall 
objective unto themselves. 
 60 
NZ Army Spectrum of Military Operations, LFCR, 2000 
 
NZ Army Future Land Operating Concept, FLOC, 2007 
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Context: Conflict 
―The modern reality of warfare is irregular warfare. The small forces melt away when necessary, 
but do not cede or dissolve.‖14 
 
―In the paradigm of industrial war the premise is of the sequence peace-crisis-war-
resolution…In the new paradigm there is no predefined sequence, but rather a 
continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict‖ 15 
 
There has been a multitude of grandiloquent prophecies regarding conflict potentialities 
and the human condition. Attempting to assign trends would seem futile, with phrases 
like ‗the war to end all wars‘, ‗the end of history‘ and the ‗revolution in military affairs‘ 
serving as poignant reminders of past mistakes.
16
 These erroneous declarations and 
theories suggest that any assignations of trends must be given with the admonition that 
nothing is certain or constant. Nonetheless, throughout the diverse literature on 
contemporary conflict there are constants that allow for some general trends to be given. 
This section is concerned with examining commonalities of potential contemporary 
conflicts once the NZ Army has interceded; in other words, it assumes some level of prior 
conflict, or a high degree of tension that suggests imminent outbreak of hostilities, and is 
concerned with the relevant aspects of that interaction between the NZA and the 
indigenous force, and therefore the indigenous population as a whole, particularly from 
the indigene‘s perspective, with the NZA‘s response covered in the following section. 
  
Location 
The end of the Cold War signalled the decline of the bloc nomenclature, heralding the 
slow demise of the simplistic ‗us‘, ‗them‘ and ‗the rest‘ terminology and the rise of a 
legion of new and competing terms, which mirrored the power vacuum and subsequent 
search for purpose in geopolitics itself. September 11
th
 reinvigorated the linguistic and 
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geopolitical divisions. The FLOC and the majority of theorists agree that most conflict 
will occur in the less developed regions, failed states, zones of friction and areas on the 
fringe of the global economy.
17
 Even for those who moderate their prognoses with 
caveats regarding the possibility of interstate conflict directly involving the West, New 
Zealand‘s unique geopolitical position renders these qualifications of limited utility.18  
 
This has two consequences; the first can be found in the antithesis of the prediction: that 
in the near future, conflict is not likely to occur in the developed/Western regions. This 
developed state détente is, in part, responsible for the strange semantic melange that 
surrounds conflict and peacekeeping. There are numerous explanations for this détente, 
from the potent deterrent effect of nuclear weapons to the network of interdependence 
engendered by globalisation.
19
 Suffice to say, the FLOC, and a number of theorists, view 
an intra-Western war or large-scale conventional war involving the West, and New 
Zealand in particular, as highly unlikely.
20
 
 
The second aspect is that these conflicts will occur in non-Western, undeveloped areas. 
The FLOC states that globalisation has been seen as ―failing less developed countries‖ 
and ―has created a class of actors (often non-state actors) who oppose globalisation‘s 
perceived beneficiaries, primarily the first world nations‖.21 Freedman, in his persuasive 
monographs for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, believes that these 
conflicts will ―continue to be regionally confined, sometimes reflecting deliberate power-
plays by local revisionists, but more often arising from within weak states- countries 
caught on the margins of the global economy‖.22 Finally, in his influential if divisive 
book, The Transformation of War, van Creveld envisions conflict as originating in the 
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less developed regions and spreading out to envelope the globe as the nation-state loses 
its monopoly on organised violence and fails, resulting in a neo-feudalistic mélange of 
low-intensity conflicts.
23
 Thus the NZA is likely to carry out operations in poor, non-
Western environments. 
 
That these conflicts will occur in less developed, non-Western locations has several 
important implications. The first is that adversaries will often not adhere to the Western 
moral and legal paradigm. This is important for both the constructive and preventative 
functions and will be discussed further in the sub-section on technique in this chapter. 
The second implication is of a more practical nature, essentially that these countries will 
have an extremely limited infrastructure, without even considering the effects of the 
conflict. This lack of infrastructure will make many elements of the operation more 
difficult, from logistics to patrols, adding complexity and causing increased stress, thus 
making the constructive‘s function increasingly vital in maintaining a effective and 
operative force. The third issue is that the intervener may suffer from a form of culture 
shock.
24
 The anxiety, stress and anger that are symptomatic of culture shock run counter 
to operational efficacy, especially as the response is typically antipathy toward the 
indigenous culture.
25
 This antipathy is particularly counterproductive in an operation 
where the ultimate aim is securing the allegiance of the indigenous populace, as will be 
explained in the following sub-sections. The key to preventing, or at least ameliorating, 
culture shock during military operations is adherence to both the preventative and 
constructive functions of military ethics; whilst the preventative delineates acceptable 
conduct towards non-combatants the constructive ensures that these parameters are 
upheld.
26
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Furthermore, most theorists believe that the majority of conflicts will occur in the urban 
areas of the aforementioned less developed regions.
27
 This is a sentiment endorsed by the 
FLOC, which claims that the NZA conflict ―environment will be predominantly urban, 
complex and non-linear.‖28 Van Creveld pithily put it thus: ―[w]ar will not take place in 
the open field, if only because in many places around the world there no longer is an open 
field‖.29  Peters is equally as direct: ―[t]he future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, 
high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that 
form the broken cities of our world.‖30 As is Black: ―[f]uture theatres of conflict will 
undoubtedly be urban and involve the world‘s great population centres.‖31 Demographics 
aside, one of the major reasons that conflict has become increasingly urbanised is that for 
the tangibly weaker, irregular adversary, the added convolution of urban areas is a force 
multiplier. Urban areas are complex in every manner: structurally convoluted, 
demographically heterogeneous and psychologically chaotic.
32
 This is true of even the 
most ordered and modern city, for the gargantuan megacities of the non-Western world 
this is but a mute ode to their labyrinthine and polyglot nature.
33
  
 
In the urban battlespace military ethics are critical. The chaotic geography and diffuse, 
inchoate human populace amplify operational stress and exhaustion, thus increasing the 
possibility of indiscriminate conduct and diminished morale.
34
 The indoctrination of 
military values acts as a facilitator of efficiency, morale and morality in such complex 
environments. Clausewitz refers obliquely to this in On War, ―[g]enerally speaking, the 
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need for [military values] becomes greater the more the theater of operations and other 
factors tend to complicate the war and disperse the forces.‖35 This is because the urban 
environment makes the soldier paramount as it reduces the utility of weaponry and 
communications and places high demands on the individual. Collyer concludes in his 
study, Human Performance Issues in Urban Military Operations, that the ―maintenance 
of the human will to fight [in urban operations] depends most…. on [the qualities derived 
from military ethics, such as] leadership, self-discipline and teamwork.‖36 In the Rand 
Study, Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban 
Warfare, the authors recommend that the best technique for ameliorating combat stress in 
urban warfare is to ―build a sense of unit pride and camaraderie‖, train hard in relevant 
environs and, most critically, develop effective comradeship, for the unit ―in its informal 
character [serves] two principal functions in combat motivation: it set[s] and [enforces] 
group standards of behavior, and it [supports] and [sustains] the individual in stressors he 
would otherwise not [be] able to withstand.‖37  
 
Though the future of conflict may be increasingly urban, it should be noted that classic 
irregular warfare strategy involves drawing the enemy into geographically complex non-
urban environments.
38
 This is because the power of irregularity lies in choosing terrain 
that negates conventional strength; that is terrain that is complex, disjointed and 
disruptive. Common types of difficult non-urban terrain are: woods, forest and jungles; 
mountains; marshes and swamps; and deserts.
39
 The essence is that, whilst conflict may 
be increasingly urban because of demographic realities and tactical necessities, there is 
also a countervailing current that is premised on the same tactical necessities. Therefore, 
whilst conflict may be becoming increasingly urban, in the absence of a city the 
underlying logic dictates the use of complex natural environments. This is particularly 
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true for the NZA as the Pacific, one of its prime operational theatres, contains only small 
cities and is still largely rural.  
 
That the irregular adversary will draw his or her opponent into an area that negates 
conventional strength is a significant stressor. Forcing operations to occur far from base 
camps in difficult and demanding terrain places strain on the morale and discipline of a 
conventional army. Though modern warfare is becoming increasingly urban, where an 
adversary is unwilling or unable to draw the conflict into populated urban places they are 
likely to utilise natural complexity to enable the same stressors as those described in the 
section on urban stressors. History is replete with such examples, from the Spanish 
guerrillas who used the ―rugged theatre of the Iberian Peninsula‖ to break the behemoth 
Napoleonic war-machine to the Vietcong whose jungle warfare tactics were so successful 
that the Americans sprayed 77 million litres of chemical defoliants in an attempt to 
negate the advantage the dense forests provided.
40
 The constructive function has 
remaining utility in overcoming, or at least lessening, the negative stressors brought on 
by natural or urban environmental complexity where discipline and morale are key to 
operational efficacy.  
 
Technique 
There is convergence in the LFCR, the FLOC and the literature around the techniques 
used in contemporary conflicts, but rather than compile a list, or try for an impossible 
synthesis, this section will focus on two crucial aspects with respect to the NZA COE: 
irregular warfare and asymmetry.
41
 It would be hard to argue that irregular and 
asymmetric conflicts have been increasing per se, but they have been increasing in 
importance, especially in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 milieu.
42
 Also, it is felt that these 
are techniques that the NZA will encounter most often, as expressed in the FLOC, where 
it anticipates ―a continuation of irregular operations‖ and states, ―most of the conflicts 
will be protracted low intensity stability operations conducted against an adaptive, 
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asymmetric adversary.‖43 Before continuing, a brief proviso on the term technique; it was 
chosen over strategy or tactics because of its lack of specialist meaning, and the blurred 
lines between military levels. Essentially, this section is interested in assessing the 
techniques available to combatants, be they strategic, operational or tactical. 
 
Irregular warfare is the current cause celebre amongst many strategic and military 
scholars, despite being notoriously difficult to define.
44
 This difficulty arises from its use 
as a catch-all term, to the point where a US Department of Defense Irregular Warfare 
Special Study noted that irregular warfare had been used as a synonym for 
unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflict, insurgency, rebellion, 
revolt, civil war, insurrection, revolutionary warfare, counter insurgency, intrastate war, 
small war, peacemaking, peacekeeping and even nation building.
45
 In the same study they 
concluded that irregular warfare ―is an undeveloped concept with an imprecise working 
definition.‖46 The reason for supplying this list is not to contradict the caveat already 
given but to provide some rough parameters within which to analyse irregular warfare. 
Irregular warfare, with regard to this section, refers to techniques that cover the entire 
conflict continuum up to, but not including, conventional regular war, and are often, but 
not exclusively, utilised by irregular forces as a method of counteracting conventional 
strength.
47
  
 
This may seem a rather unsatisfactory definition, and is representative of a definitional 
disorder endemic in the strategic nomenclature. To further obfuscate the issue, Gray 
warns ―of the danger of imposing undue clarity of strategic distinction between regular 
and irregular warfare‖.48 However, the fact that a concept is convoluted and diffuse does 
not render it irrelevant, and with regard to irregular warfare, this diffuse complexity is 
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actually both its essential nature and its very strength. Before briefly analysing irregular 
warfare, one further synonym must be explained. Irregular warfare is often used 
interchangeably with asymmetric warfare and they do share much in common.
49
 Irregular 
methods are often utilized because of an asymmetry, but the important difference is that 
though they are often motivated by an asymmetry this is not a prerequisite.
50
 In other 
words, irregular methods are not limited by the asymmetry of a force, nor are they limited 
to irregular forces. Also, in a sense, asymmetric methods can be seen as a subset of 
irregular methods, with the reason for their dichotomy here as much about clarity of 
comprehension as due to any fundamental differences.   
 
There are several germane aspects with regard to the panoply of irregular methods. The 
first of these is that utilised well, they are complex, perverse and unexpected.
51
 This is 
exactly why there is such a breadth of definitions and meanings; they are, by nature, 
imprecise and complex.
52
 The point is that part of irregular warfare‘s strength lies in the 
unknown: a force utilising irregular methods is always attempting to undermine, 
destabilise or otherwise subvert their opponent. At its core, irregular warfare is ―all about 
uncertainty‖.53 Therefore, the NZA‘s opponents will utilise such techniques as surprise 
and deception, in the form of tactics like ambushes and feints of manoeuvre, to 
destabilise and confuse. Clearly these are not specific to irregular warfare, but they are 
inherent to it in a manner they are not for regular conflict.  
 
The ambiguity, fear and terror that irregular techniques provoke are intentionally 
manufactured destabilising stressors, as the US Army Field Manual FM 22-51 writes, 
―[they] are deliberately designed to cause the breakdown of military professionalism and 
discipline.‖54 The sophisticated irregular enemy will exploit any breakdown in 
professionalism or discipline, seeking to force the conventional military into making 
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errors by provoking them into overreacting to a situation.
55
 Errors, which due to the 
political primacy that will be examined in several paragraphs, are counter-productive to 
success in irregular conflict. 
 
Intimately linked to the irregular technique‘s capricious nature is the issue of operational 
diversity and fluidity. This nature means that an irregular conflict often ―contains 
frequent shifts of tempo and focus.‖56 The FLOC concurs with this increasing complexity 
and dynamism, stating that it expects the NZ Army to ―conduct concurrent operations 
across the spectrum‖, as the distinctions between warfighting, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian or other civil-support operations have collapsed and the modern army is 
required to ―rapidly transition from one operational type to another.‖57 Thus the NZA 
could experience dramatic shifts, from the mundane to the chaotic; the simple dichotomy 
of war and peace being replaced by rapid transitions between routine activities like aid 
delivery and high-intensity conflict. As the Foundations of New Zealand Military 
Doctrine states: ―[I]n the current global context, neither peace nor war exists in its purest 
extreme form. There is a wide range of different situations between war and peace that 
are frequently given labels such as ‗tension‘, ‗crisis‘, ‗hostilities‘, and ‗conflict‘ in which 
the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) will be required to conduct military 
operations‖58 This issue is closely related to the expanded mandate and the ramifications 
will be covered further in that sub-section. 
 
The next key aspect is the primacy of political victory over decisive military success. 
Irregular warfare is political, as is all war by definition.
59
 However, due to irregular 
warfare‘s normal aim, to win the population‘s allegiance, and because of an irregular 
force‘s conventional inferiority, political victory takes precedence over military success 
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in a manner different to that in regular war.
60
 As Gray writes, ―in regular warfare, at least 
for the soldiers, politics typically takes a backseat until the military issue is settled. Not 
so in irregular warfare. In the latter case there will probably be no recognizable military 
decision. Military behaviour must be conducted for its political effects because those 
effects, in the minds of the people, comprise the true field of decision.‖61 To briefly 
requote Gen. Rupert Smith ―we intervene in, or even decide to escalate to, a conflict in 
order to establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other 
means and in other ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic 
incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of 
stability, and if possible, democracy.‖62 As can be inferred from this quotation the 
political pre-eminence extends beyond the area of operations (AO), with the influences 
from without focussed on within the create change. The political primacy of the modern 
operation places an extra burden of responsibility on every soldier and makes conduct 
increasingly critical. 
 
The COE is a battlespace of opinion and perception, inherently linked with the 
psychological and political. It is upon this distinction that many have been thwarted, 
Napoleon in Spain, the French in Algeria, and the French and the USA in Vietnam. As 
Kissinger observed of the US in Vietnam, ―[w]e fought a military war; our opponents 
fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our 
psychological exhaustion.‖63 To disregard or overlook the primacy of political victory in 
an irregular conflict is to miss the fulcrum upon which success is hinged. In a battle on 
the psychological plane, military ethics are a weapon, providing the soldier with the inner 
strength to counter operational stress caused by irregular methods whilst preventing 
detrimental conduct that could cost the allegiance of the populace.
64
 They are a force 
multiplier, put simply, ethical conduct can transform physical power ―into political and 
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moral power‖.65 This has been a hard learned lesson for the United States Army, and it is 
illustrative to quote its latest, ‗revolutionary‘, Field Manuel FM 3-0:  
 
―All warfare, but especially irregular warfare, challenges the morals and ethics of 
Soldiers. An enemy may feel no compulsion to respect international conventions 
and indeed may commit atrocities with the aim of provoking retaliation in kind. 
Any loss of discipline on the part of Soldiers is then distorted and exploited in 
propaganda and magnified through the media.‖66 
 
―Face-to-face interaction by leaders and Soldiers strongly influences the 
perceptions of the local populace. Carried out with discipline and professionalism, 
day-to-day interaction of Soldiers with the local populace among whom they 
operate has positive effects. Such interaction amplifies positive actions, counters 
enemy propaganda, and increases goodwill and support for the friendly 
mission.‖67 
 
The second important technique is asymmetry. Asymmetry has become a noun fraught 
with meaning in the military lexicon; one US study even described it as not ―fighting 
fair‖.68 It is used here in its most simple form, to denote an inequality between 
combatants that can be utilised to one‘s advantage or forces one to find alternative 
techniques.
69
 Asymmetries can be both tangible and intangible. Tangible asymmetries are 
obvious physical attributes, like GNP, troop numbers, and logistical capabilities, whilst 
intangible asymmetries are more nebulous features, like casualty thresholds, 
determination and patience. It is these intangible asymmetries that are of particular 
interest. Tangible asymmetries are significant only in that they encourage intangible 
asymmetrical techniques. This antagonistic action can be seen when the tangibly weak 
choose to draw the battle into civil society to minimise the tangibly strong‘s standoff 
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strike capacity, an asymmetry that will be explained shortly.
70
  It is exactly this calculus 
of conflict that has consigned much of the vaunted RMA-type technology and 
organisation to near irrelevance.
71
 The deep irony was that the RMA had a paradoxical 
nature: it inhibited the type of war for which it was intended. The RMA paradox is 
representative of why strategic theorists see intangible asymmetries as increasing in 
importance; the conventional material superiority of the NZA, acting in coalition with the 
West, is such that any conflict, taking the intra-Western détente into account, is bound to 
be tangibly asymmetrical and, therefore, to counter the tangible asymmetry any smart 
adversary will utilise intangible asymmetries.
72
  
 
It is the intangible asymmetric methods that are of particular concern because they are the 
likely choice for any of the NZA‘s potential adversaries.73 Freedman identifies three 
particular areas that can be exploited by the tangibly weak: ―the threshold of pain (a 
readiness to accept casualties), patience (leading to frustration in Western capitals) 
and…. a relative lack of humanitarian scruples (allowing the war to extend into civil 
society)‖.74  
 
In his polemic against the technologically driven interpretation of war, a broadside 
against the RMA, Black raises one intangible asymmetry: threshold of pain.
75
 The 
threshold of pain is relative and depends on a number of variables including cultural 
differences, willpower, morale and stakes.
76
 As Black states: ―you win a war when you 
persuade your enemy that he‘s lost‖.77 This is a point the FLOC is careful to stress: 
―[c]hanges in public opinion, political will and (perceived or actual) casualty aversion 
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can be vulnerabilities, that can lead to a force being withdrawn.‖78 An example of this 
growing preoccupation with casualty numbers can be found in the abortive US operation 
in Somalia, where the death of 18 soldiers precipitated a full American withdrawal; as 
Luttwak remarks, this is an incredibly emotive response from ―a country in which gun-
related deaths were last clocked at one every 14 minutes.‖79  
 
In their separate works Hooker and Munkler both emphasise the potency of an 
asymmetry in patience, stressing the West‘s continuing problems maintaining political 
and social momentum in the face of deliberately protracted insurgencies, as witnessed by 
the Cold War superpowers respective quagmires in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
80
 The 
asymmetry in patience is pithily summed up in the Taliban saying, ―[t]he Americans may 
have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time.‖81 Patience is closely linked to stakes, 
with the irregular force often having more invested in the outcome of the conflict, which 
is why they take on a tangibly superior force. To combat the higher patience and stakes of 
an irregular force, the conventional force will require strong discipline and morale. 
 
Freedman‘s third area of intangible asymmetry, a relative lack of humanitarian scruples, 
can be rearticulated as an asymmetry of morality and legality, thus providing its full 
scope.
82
 Like all societies, cultures and groups, the West fights conflicts in a manner that 
reflects its values, standards, norms and culture.
83
 As such the West operates within a 
‗liberal‘ mindset and a consequent set of embedded assumptions, which Freedman 
identifies as the separation of the ―military from the civil, of combatant from non-
                                                 
78
 FLOC, p 1-8 parenthesis in original. 
79
 Edward N. Luttwak, ―Where are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids,‖ Foreign Affairs, 73.4 
(July/August 1994): accessed on 12 September 2007, available from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19940701facomment5123/edward-n-luttwak/where-are-the-great-powers-at-
home-with-the-kids.html.  
80
 Hooker, 12-13; Munkler, 9. 
81
 David W. Barnoe, ―Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,‖ Parameters (Summer 2006): 24. 
82
 David Buffaloe. Defining Asymmetric Warfare (Arlington, Virginia: Institute of Land Warfare, Land 
Warfare Papers, No. 58, September 2006), 14, 22- Buffaloe refers to cultural and norm asymmetry, which 
are closely related to moral asymmetry 
83
 Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 35; John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: 
Hutchison, 1993), 387; Robert J. Bunker, ―Generations, Waves, and Epochs: Modes of Warfare and the 
RPMA,‖ Airpower Journal. (Spring 1996): 4; Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival 
at the Dawn of the 21
st
 Century (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 1-30- The Tofflers 
actually propose that the nature of war is largely a reflection of the combatant society‘s prevailing mode of 
production, but their examples actually point to a broader conclusion than they reach. 
 74 
combatant…. and of organised violence from everyday life.‖84 It is these very embedded 
assumptions that the adversaries can use to their advantage. Ignatieff writes that 
―terrorists count on the systematic exploitation of [the West‘s] reluctance to cross‖ the 
moral Rubicon; he continues by stating that it is of utmost importance for the West to 
hold to its moral paradigm despite fighting an enemy intent on using and abusing that 
paradigm.
85
 Ignatieff makes a valid point: adversaries of the West do not have the same 
standards of morality or legality and, so, can use this against Western forces.  
 
The irregular opponent uses the advantages offered by intangible asymmetries, avoiding 
direct military confrontation and seeking to undermine and destabilise their adversary. 
They are often able to withstand higher casualties and purposively prolong conflict so as 
to undermine the morale of the regular force and the political support. The North 
Vietnamese capitalised on these intangibilities against both the French and the 
Americans, taking comparatively huge losses and dragging the conflict out so as to sap 
the political willpower of the tangibly stronger military and state.
86
 General Vo Nguyen 
Giap estimated that they lost 600 000 men between 1965-1968, which translates to 
roughly 3.75% of the North Vietnamese population, compared to 35 500, or .018% of the 
total population for the US in the same time frame.
87
 Yet for the US the casualty rate was 
a major issue. Protracted conflict was an integral part of the overall North Vietnamese 
strategy, or dau tranh.
88
 As North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong said when 
explaining their strategy of protracted war, ―Americans do not like long, inconclusive 
wars . . . thus we are sure to win in the end.‖89 The constructive function is of utility in 
counteracting the asymmetry of patience and maintaining the conventional forces 
commitment and service to the operation.  
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The irregular adversary also uses the asymmetry of morality and legality to their 
advantage; as was the case in Somalia where the ―clan-based militias knew that U.S. 
forces were restricted in applying deadly force when it could endanger citizens‖ and 
exploited this asymmetry by ―firing from the protection of crowds, using their civilians as 
human shields.‖90 Both the preventative and constructive functions are critical in averting 
any slip in conduct that such techniques may elicit; the moral and legal precepts, and the 
military values, ethos and professionalism all run counter to such conduct and 
maintaining this moral and legal high ground is vital for operational success in irregular 
warfare due to its inherent political nature.
91
 The preventative function provides the 
parameters and the constructive function enables these parameters to be maintained. 
 
Combatants 
The concept of a regular mass professionally-officered standing army is only as old as the 
nation-state, and even then in a nascent and localised fashion.
92
 With the prophesised 
dissolution or weakening of nation-state, the general amity across the regions where the 
nation-state is strongest and the friction in the areas where it has never been strong, it is 
of no surprise that there is near universal accord amongst theorists, the LFCR and the 
FLOC that an increasing number of the NZA opponents will be irregular.
93
 Irregular 
forces are, as defined by the US Department of Defense, ―[a]rmed individuals or groups 
who are not members of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security 
forces.‖94 Irregular forces are defined by what they are not: regular.  
 
                                                 
90
 Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the 
Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 189. 
91
 David L. Perry, ―Why Hearts and Minds Matter,‖ Armed Forces Journal (September 2006), accessed on 
21 November 2008, available from http://www.afji.com/2006/09/2002037. 
92
 Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the Nation-State (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 114-117. 
93
 LFCR, 42; FLOC, 1-2, 1-4, 1-7: Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs; van Creveld, The 
Transformation of War, p 192-198, 212; Smith, The Utility of Force, 271; Kaldor, 6; Metz, Armed Conflict 
in the 21st Century, 13; Hammes, 32-43; Craig A. Snyder and J. Mohan Malik in Craig A. Snyder, 
Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 204; Horn,  9; Metz and Millen, 
Future War/Future Battlespace, 12; Ralph Peters, ―The Culture of Future Conflict,‖ Parameters 25 (Winter 
1995-1996): accessed on 12 December 2007, available from 
www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/peters.htm.  
94
 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, April 2001, 
accessed on 12 December 2007, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.  
 76 
The idea of growing irregularity among combatants has been articulated by van Creveld: 
―war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, 
bandits and robbers‖.95 More prosaically, the LFCR wrote that the enemy ―may either be 
a standing army structured for war, be a non-state actor, terrorists or militia, or a mix of 
both.‖96 Kaldor‘s ‗new‘ conflicts comprise of five distinct types of actor: ―regular armed 
forces or remnants thereof; paramilitary groups; self-defence units; foreign mercenaries 
and, finally, regular foreign troops under international auspices.‖97 Gen. Rupert Smith 
also identifies the rise in irregular combatants, as the name for his new conflict paradigm, 
‗war amongst the people‘, suggests.98 Hoffman identifies the proliferation of trans-
national and irregular actors as a dramatic occurrence in modern conflicts, with the 
battlespace now containing combatants with multifarious connections and allegiances, 
from returning expatriate combatants to private military contractors.
99
 The NZA 
battlespace will be awash with numerous types of actors, acting through a nexus of 
indistinct connections and allegiances. This is a far cry from the regularity of a 19
th
 
century battlefield where opponents wore bright uniforms and carried standards to 
distinguish themselves. This has one particularly crucial ramification. Specifically, that 
irregular combatants lack the clarity of distinction that defines the regular; instead, they 
are, in the words of Lawrence of Arabia, ―intangible, invulnerable, without front, or 
back‖.100 The growing complexity of actors is a point the FLOC stresses, writing that 
―[d]istinguishing between combatant and non-combatant groups, belligerent and 
supportive, legally constituted and paramilitary groups can be extremely difficult.‖101 
Yet, whilst it is harder to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant when facing 
an irregular enemy, because of the centrality of a political solution, the application and 
adherence to the preventative function of military ethics is all the more critical.
102
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Intrinsically linked with this problem of distinction are the irregular forces connections to 
the general populace. Whereas the regular force is traditionally an entity of its own, 
hermetically distinct from society, the irregular forces are often society; in Gen. Rupert 
Smith‘s words, ―[t]hey are of, and amongst the people‖.103 It is usually the people who 
support, hide and man the irregular force. Because of the irregular forces inherent 
connections to the people, the key to victory lies, to revivify a popular cliché, in winning 
the ‗hearts and minds‘ of the people; the irregular force demands a political solution in a 
way that regular forces do not.
104
 This is a position held to in the FLOC, which states that 
in ―SASO, the centre of gravity will predominantly, although not always, revolve around 
the allegiance of the population…. The purpose of SASO is to secure the environment in 
order to set conditions for political aims to be achieved.‖105 This is because to defeat an 
irregular force, often the opponent must beat the cause rather than the physical force 
itself; it is vital to isolate the irregular force from its support base by winning over the 
population, or at the least, not antagonising them.
106
 This is the political bridge between 
irregular techniques and irregular forces: irregular techniques bypass decisive military 
victory for the political, and conversely, because of their identity and characteristics 
irregular forces require a political solution. Military success in this type of confrontation 
is often non-transferable beyond its own limited internal bounds and overall operational 
success is usually defined by who holds sway over the population‘s allegiance; as pioneer 
French military theorist Trinquier wrote, ―the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare 
is the unconditional support of a population.‖107  
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Response: Deployment 
―To succeed in the future operating environment, the New Zealand Army needs to be 
agile in both human and physical terms. [The] Army must apply discriminating military 
force to support whole of government efforts‖108 
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Any attempts at identifying trends or commonalities in NZA deployments, given their 
often sui generis nature, must be made with the caveat that rather than providing 
definitive illumination they can barely sketch a rough and inaccurate outline.
109
 
Nonetheless, it is both possible and useful to identify and examine the various germane 
commonalities.
110
 This section is interested in these commonalities from the perspective 
of the NZA deployments, with the understanding that this is a somewhat capricious 
divide between the conflict and the deployment and, therefore, there will be a degree of 
intersection.  
 
Multinational 
The first pertinent trend across the full spectrum is the continuing and expanding 
multinational character of operations.
111
 Historically, the majority of peacekeeping 
operations were multinational, but recently this conglomerate aspect has grown, with an 
increasing number of diverse states contributing personnel to an increasing number of 
operations.
112
 Hirst writes: [c]ollective intervention under international legitimation and 
humanitarian missions are the only grounds on which [the West] will use force externally 
for the foreseeable future.‖113 A statement that is particularly true for New Zealand; the 
FLOC writes, ―[f]uture operations will be predominantly multinational and coalition in 
nature.‖114 Multinational operations, whether as coalitions or alliances, have become the 
norm for Western states for a number of reasons, including pure force aggregation, the 
legitimacy gained by acting in concert or simple risk dispersion.
115
 Further to this is the 
increasing diversity of contributing nations; in the early post-World War Two years 
operations were often Western-dominated, whereas now operations the NZA are involved 
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in are conducted in a polyglot of languages by peoples of sundry cultures, ethnicities and 
religions.  
 
Gen. Rupert Smith describes the difficulties that are specific to multinational operations: 
namely, the problems that arise from the interaction between differing organisational 
structures, doctrines, training methods, as well as the contra-pull of dissimilar political 
objectives.
116
 Correspondingly, Palin writes of the anomalies and contradictions inherent 
in all multinational operations, ranging from the political, through to the military.
117
 In 
particular, Palin identifies a number of generic issues for the military that are relevant: 
the problems in achieving explicit and agreed ROE and a relatively equivalent 
operational doctrine, the difficulties that arise in attaining an efficient and reliable chain 
of command and organisational structure, problems of standardisation and integration, be 
they language or equipment based, media access and the dilemmas that arise from more 
esoteric factors like cultural differences and force-specific remunerations.
118
 A 
multinational operation creates new stressors and exacerbates existing ones.  
 
Thus, the increasing multinational element, and in particular the growing diversity of 
contributing nations, has a distinct repercussion for the constructive function. The stress, 
anger, frustration and culture shock that are implicit in multinational operations have the 
potential to affect the utility of the military force, and therefore, the utility of the 
constructive function is in ameliorating or easing these issues.  
 
Joint 
In an echo of the outside world, former divisions between the services are dissolving. The 
developing joint service nature of modern operations represents the amalgamation of 
many separate trends, from the expanded mandate and the complexity within the military 
sphere to the variegated flux rent on organisational and structural divisions in the wider 
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world.
119
 In the LFCR, it is put simply, ―[t]here is no longer separate if related 
environments of land, sea and air, but a single ‗operational environment‘‖.120 The FLOC 
claims that future ―NZDF operations in the land environment will be inherently joint in 
force composition and in the conduct of the operation.‖121 Of particular interest for the 
NZA is that, due to the high operational tempo and small size, mixed units comprised of 
personnel from the three services are being deployed. 
 
The major issue with this is that the inter-service interaction runs counter to the historical 
development of each service, which has traditionally been more likely to compete against 
each other than work in concert.
122
 In her 2000 analysis of the NZDF, Downes found this 
traditional organisational tension between the three services was still present.
123
 Rolfe, in 
his 1999 book, comments that ―New Zealand‘s armed forces do not plan or train (except 
at the most basic level) to operate as a national joint force‖ and as a result concludes 
―there is no real corporate ‗New Zealand Defence Force‘‖.124 This is a position supported 
by Searle, who writes that the three services have traditionally been more focussed on 
slotting into the Commonwealth military system than working together.
125
 Therefore, the 
demands of inter-service interaction will stretch old relations and add new pressures.  
 
Much like the issues created by the multinational aspect, the tensions and pressures of 
operating in a joint manner, especially in combined units, run counter to the historical 
development of the services and inhibit operational efficacy, highlighting the utility of 
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the constructive function in maintaining a useful and controllable force despite the 
inherent tension engendered by joint action.  
 
 
Civil-Military 
Another trend for NZA operations has been the ever-increasing integration and 
interaction of the civilian and military spheres; a phenomenon linked to the expanded 
mandate and political aims of the new era operations.
126
 The FLOC identifies this 
growing integration and interaction, writing that ―[v]irtually all future missions will 
involve a number of governmental agencies‖ and that the NZA COE will be 
distinguished by ―complex human terrain where numerous population groups coexist in 
the same physical space‖ including non-combatants, ―state militaries, terrorists, rural 
bandits, tribal fighters….mercenaries‖, ―criminal elements, multinational corporations, 
private military companies, environmental groups, rioters, militias, pirates, religious sects 
and urban guerrillas.‖ 127 These FLOC quotes show that there are two relevant 
relationship dynamics, taken from the military perspective: the first is the interagency of 
contemporary missions and has two separate facets, interaction with civilians within the 
mission, such as civilian employees and UN personnel, and with civilians on the fringe of 
the mission, like non-governmental organisations (NGO) and intergovernmental 
organisation (IGO) workers, whilst the second dynamic is between troops and the local 
populace.
128
 This increasingly complex nexus of relations means that, in the words of 
Thakur, ―[c]ivilian, police and military elements have to cooperate willingly and 
coordinate effectively with one another and with NGOs (and the local populace) in the 
pursuit of common objectives‖, although Thakur has simplified the issue here; often they 
are not working toward the same operational and tactical objectives, even if they are 
working in pursuit of a common overall goal, which is not always the case.
129
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Therein lies the problem. Civil-military relations during SASOs, and to a lesser degree 
COs, are complex, denied the Manichean simplicity provided by peace and war.
130
 
Williams writes that ―[m]ost armies have little experience of working with civilians. In 
peacetime, they are generally confined to barracks, or cantonments; in war, unless 
defending their homeland, their relationship with their own civil population, let alone a 
foreign one, is likely to be distant.‖131 The NZA however, is not heavily cantoned and 
there is the increasing number of civilian employees.
132
 The NZDF initiated a policy of 
outsourcing non-core activities in 1995 and this process has continued since, with the 
obvious result that the Armed Forces have become ―significantly more civilian‖.133 
Nonetheless, the dynamics remain complex. The military has to integrate and interact 
with a plethora of other actors, whilst simultaneously winning the indigenous 
populations‘ allegiance and maintaining operational viability. At the interagency level, 
there are several issues, namely, contrasting operational and tactical objectives, the 
difficulty with command and control structure and hierarchy and the clash between the 
rigid, conservative military and the comparatively haphazard liberal civilian- in particular 
the NGO worker- which could be re-phrased as the conflict between the warrior ethos 
and the multitudinous civilian ethoi that inhabit the COE.
134
 With regard to the local 
populace, there is a cascade of problems stemming from local apathy and enmity toward 
the operation as well as problems relating to cultural and political differences.
135
    
 
One final issue that is concerned with the interagency level of interaction is one raised by 
Lt. Gen. Crabbe, Deputy for Commander for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). 
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The issue regards ROE, specifically during UNPROFOR they ―had difficulty in 
determining exactly who it was that could be defended. Would deadly force be used to 
protect some non-governmental organizations [sic] (NGOs) and not others? If so, did the 
NGOs to be protected have an understanding with the UN that we would use deadly force 
to protect them? Is this at odds with their guiding philosophy.‖136 The heightened 
interagency nature of the COE adds complexity, making already difficult to apply ROE 
even more troublesome.  
 
As with the previous two elements, the problems engendered by the increasing civil-
military integration during operations are counter-productive and emphasise the 
remaining utility of the constructive function. In comparison to the NZA‘s historical OE 
in which the unit operated in a relatively hermetic manner, the COE is a complex 
admixture of actors and interactions that are potential stressors through anger, frustration 
and confusion. NZA soldiers have to operate amongst and with people who have different 
motivations and objectives, which may be frustrating and irritating, yet they cannot let 
this effect their operational efficacy. By maintaining discipline and morale, military 
ethics, and in particular the constructive function, ameliorates these dangers to 
operational success by demanding a professional commitment in service to their nation 
and their comrades. 
 
Expanded Mandate 
One of the most obvious trends in NZA operations has been the dramatic expansion of 
mission mandates.
137
 The term ‗expanded mandate‘ has traditionally been used in 
association with peacekeeping operations; however, it is used here in a holistic sense, as 
it is deemed futile to use it exclusively due to the complexity, ambiguity and dynamism 
endemic in the COE. The important aspect is that whereas traditionally a military force 
was often deployed with a clear and focussed mandate- or mission, in the case of 
traditional military operations-, the contemporary deployment not only has a much 
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broader, but also often a more ambiguous, mandate frequently involving sequential, 
concurrent and interdependent political and military objectives.
138
 This breadth of activity 
heralded by the expanded mandate is evident in the FLOC when it states that it expects 
the Army to ―conduct concurrent operations across the spectrum, and rapidly transition 
from one operational type to another‖.139   
 
Essentially then, the modern operational mandate can, and often does, encompass the full 
spectrum of activities from election-monitoring, humanitarian assistance and peace 
maintenance through to combat, creating an environment of enigmatic complexity; a 
phenomenon that led US Marine Corps General Krulak to envisage the ―three block war‖ 
(TBW).
140
 The TBW concept basically states that the COE is so fluid and multifarious 
and the mandate so broad that troops could expect to ―be confronted by the entire 
spectrum of tactical challenges (from SASOs to offensive COs) in the span of a few 
hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.‖141 The FLOC examines 
Krulak‘s TBW concept in its section on multiple mission environments and predicts, 
―that the ―three block war‖ trend will continue to be prevalent.‖142 The challenge of the 
TBW concept is clear: soldiers must be prepared to switch between vastly different 
tactical and operational situations with little notice. Krulak‘s article goes on to describe 
the crucial consequence of the TBW, an effect he terms the ―strategic corporal‖ which 
will be examined in the section on media scrutiny.
143
  
 
As Krulak writes of his TBW, ―[i]n order to succeed under such demanding conditions, 
they will require unwavering maturity, judgement, and strength of character. Most 
importantly, these missions will require them to confidently make well-reasoned 
decisions under extreme stress‖.144 This mission fluidity and ambiguity was identified in 
the RAND Study, How Deployments Affect Service Members, as a cause of considerable 
concern amongst service members, particularly the unpredictable nature of future 
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missions and the diverse skill sets these missions require, making performance and job 
completion more difficult.
145 
Also, dependent on mandate and ROE, there is also the 
potential for ―peacekeeper‘s stress syndrome‖, which is defined as the ―rage, delusion 
and frustration, feelings of impotence and helplessness when confronted with violence 
and atrocities to which the peacekeeper is unable to respond.‖146 Though this impotence 
has lessened in the era of muscular peacekeeping the political restraints on force still 
remain strong. The constructive function has remaining utility by lessening, or at least 
containing, the stress that the expanded mandate creates; the discipline, strong morale and 
sense of purpose and worth embodied in military ethics and the constructive in particular 
are vital in remedying potential issues caused by the expanded mandate.
147
 
 
The complexity and ambiguity engendered by the TBW are significant stressors on their 
own. Also however, the fluidity and convolution of the operation, moving from combat to 
humanitarian tasks, makes a developed sense of morality and legality of conduct crucial 
as the soldier rapidly transitions between significantly different situations and ROEs. Due 
to the dynamism, ROE can often change as the mission changes or, conversely, the 
situation can change so quickly that a new interpretation or perspective of the ROE is 
required; both of which place a large degree of cognitive stress on the individual.
148
 
Contrast this dynamic complexity with the simple instructions given to NZ K-Force, who 
when faced with roving guerrilla patrols at their first barracks were told to ―shoot 
anything that moves‖ without asking questions.149 
 
                                                 
145
 James Hosek, Jennifer Kavanagh and Laura Miller, How Deployments Affect Service Members 
(Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 41. 
146
 John Pearn, ―Traumatic Stress Disorders: A Classification with Implications for Prevention and 
Management,‖ Military Medicine 165.6 (June 2000), quoted in Jun Shigemura and Soichiro Nomura, 
―Mental Health Issues of Peacekeeping Workers,‖ Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 56 .5 (2002): 
484. 
147
 Paul T. Bartone, Amy B. Adler and Mark A. Vaitkus. ―Dimensions of Psychological Stress in 
Peacekeeping Operations,‖ Military Medicine 163.9 (September 1998): 592. 
148
 FM 22-51; A. Walter Dorn, ―Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?‖ Canadian 
Foreign Policy 12.2 (Fall 2005): 22. 
149
 Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War (Wellington, NZ: Oxford University Press, 1996), 64. 
 87 
Expanded mandate operations purportedly strain the warrior ethos, a problem first 
identified by Janowitz.
150
 As Janowitz has it, ―military responsibility for combat 
predisposes officers toward a low tolerance for the ambiguities of international politics, 
and leads to a high concern for definitive solutions of politico-military problems.‖151 
Janowitz, with respect to his ‗constabulary force‘, thought that it would be the military 
‗managers‘ who thrived in this type of operations as they are ―better equipped… to 
participate in the management of international affairs… because his day-to-day tasks 
develop broader administrative skills… The heroic leaders, in turn, tend to thwart the 
constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military 
doctrine.‖152 The ambiguous political and militarily limited nature of peacekeeping and 
expanded mandate operations runs counter to traditional military activity and 
expectations. Goldstein divides these issues into three problems: the victory problem, the 
politics problem and the readiness problem.
153
 The victory problem refers to the fact that 
non-combat operations do not carry the catharsis of combat operations, thus leading to an 
element of frustration.
154
 The political primacy of these operations means that military 
involvement is often complex and vague, which again leads to frustration.
155
 Finally, the 
―readiness problem‖ relates to the military‘s view that its finite capabilities and capacity 
are being split, and therefore, weakened by operations outside the traditional military 
sphere.
156
  
 
The conflict between the warrior ethos and changing realities has been perceived to have 
increased in the changing OE.
157
 There is however, a possible counter to this argument, 
and it is one that is particularly pertinent for the NZA. The warrior ethos may be less 
intractable and more adaptive than is generally thought.
158
 In part, this hypothesis is 
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based on several of the ―fundamental characteristics of the modern New Zealand warrior‖ 
as listed in The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, initiative and adaptability.
159
 Initiative 
is described as ―[i]nnovative thinking, adapting to the current environment and operating 
in response to changing situations‖. 160 The manual then goes on to say that ―[w]hile the 
Army is essentially a fighting force, in recent years it has proved its adaptability in the 
peacekeeping arena… [and that] [a]dapting from aggressive warlike actions to friendly 
interaction with local people has proved to be one of the New Zealand soldier‘s greatest 
skills.‖161  
 
Consequently, facilitated by initiative and adaptation, which are both elements of NZ 
society that are lionised in the colonial meme regarding the ‗number eight wire‘ 
mentality, the elements of the warrior ethos-duty through combat- may be expanded 
along with the mandate. The logic behind this is that duty for the NZA personnel is to 
their country, and NZ can be seen as the international citizen sine pari, therefore, service 
could be to the international community through service to NZ, in effect expanding and 
conflating the NZA‘s client. Also, to ensure operational success in the COE the soldier 
must adopt new methods beyond the purely violent. Thus, as mentioned in the chapter on 
utility, it is hypothesised that to retain utility, the NZA ethos may have adapted in this 
manner, though it should be mentioned that this would be at would be at the individual 
rather than organisational level and would be largely pragmatic over doctrinal. Though 
the above definitions on adaptability and initiative come from the NZA manual, they are 
focussed on practical ‗in-field‘ issues. The reason it is thought the adaptation is largely 
pragmatic is that the manual stresses the warrior, and warfighting nature of the NZA and 
states that peacekeeping, civil aid and humanitarian assistance are tasks for the army to 
do when ―no fighting is required‖.162  
 
The nature of expanded mandate operations- less combat-intensive and longer in 
duration- demands a recalculation of the maxim that war is ‗90 percent boredom and 10 
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percent sheer terror‘ in favour of boredom, though it should be noted that ennui is 
historically inherent in military life, as the above maxim illustrates.
163
 A study done in 
1985 found that ―boredom is one of the major problems experienced by those engaged in 
peacekeeping missions.‖164 It should also be noted that many of the conditions for the 
1985 US based study have little relevance for the NZA, namely soldiers expectations of 
common missions and the type of peacekeeping missions conducted. Nonetheless, 
boredom still has implications for military ethics, in particular the constructive function, 
as it is a ―severe threat to performance‖ and can ―be mitigated by cohesion.‖165 
Essentially then, the boredom of expanded mandate operations affects performance and 
the negative results of boredom can be ameliorated by the discipline and morale imbued 
by military ethics. 
 
Media and Communications 
As the scope and penetration of the mass media has increased, so too has its ability to 
influence; the same is true for the ever-broadening communication networks of the 
world.
166
 The penetration and power of the media in modern conflict is an aspect that a 
number of theorists acknowledge; in particular, many emphasize the importance of both 
the CNN effect and Krulak‘s strategic corporal concept.167 Both the LFCR and the FLOC 
note this phenomenon, with the former stating that the ―media‘s role is fundamental‖ 
while the latter writes that changes in public will and opinion can have a strategically 
deleterious affect on Western forces even though they may have tactical and operational 
superiority.
168
 The US Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0) states that ―the media‘s use of real-
time technology affects public opinion, both in the US and abroad, and alters the conduct 
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and perceived legitimacy of military operations.‖169 Napoleon, operating in a drastically 
limited media sphere, succinctly summed the power of the media up: ―[f]our hostile 
newspapers are to be more feared than a thousand bayonets.‖170 
 
The CNN effect postulates that the modern media has a major, even excessive, impact on 
foreign policy in three specific ways: as a political agenda-setting agent; as an 
impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals; and as an accelerant to policy 
decision-making.
171
 For this paper, its relevance is simple: the media have an inordinate, 
ability to effect the foreign policy of a nation and, consequently, a negative story on a 
military operation could adversely affect the support of the population and the 
government, thus jeopardising the operation. Krulak‘s strategic corporal concept states 
that the intense media scrutiny in the COE, taken with the expanded mandate of the TBW 
and the complexity of the battlespace, has meant that the actions of the lowest ranks can 
have repercussions of a strategic magnitude and, consequently, the onus of responsibility 
has fallen down the ranks.
172
 Essentially, the glare of the media spotlight on unethical or 
illegal conduct at the tactical level can have strategic consequences.
173
 There is a strong 
congruence between the two, with the major difference being that the CNN effect is 
focussed solely on the external response to the situation (i.e. influence on policy) whilst 
the strategic corporal is focussed on both the external response (i.e. the strategic outcome 
of an operation) and the consequences the media magnification has for the internal actors 
(i.e. the onus of responsibility for the soldier).  
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As Gen. Rupert Smith has it, the Internet and television have brought conflict into homes 
of both leaders and their electorates across the globe.
174
 The leaders are then influenced 
by what they see and their interpretation of how their electorate has reacted, they act on 
their perceptions, and often primarily for their own political purpose rather than any 
strategic necessity, to the point where the media is acting as a conduit between the 
electorate and the leader: the media contextualises the conflict.
175
 Images, those that are 
broadcast, are everything; one negative image can counter thousands of positive 
actions.
176
 Horn makes his position clear in his sectional title, ―Media Scrutiny and the 
Reality of the Strategic Corporal‖, under which he writes that the ―CNN effect has 
greatly magnified the notion of the ―strategic corporal‖, where a low-level tactical 
decision or error can become a strategic issue as it is beamed across the globe in real 
time.‖177 He further states that shocking images can ―create intense political pressure to 
cease hostilities.‖178 Quite simply, the import of the media is in its ability to 
instantaneously and comprehensively present a subjective interpretation of a conflict; 
creating a situation where even the most strategically inconsequential occurrence can 
become the fulcrum upon which the conflict hinges. 
 
To focus on the AO, one of the most crucial elements for this paper is that the globalised 
mass media and modern communications, specifically satellite television, the Internet and 
cellular networks have expanded the reach of the strategic corporal concept, so that 
almost instantly, any mistake by the deployed force could potentially be relayed to the 
local populace, often in graphic visual detail. It is the accessibility, adaptability, 
immediacy and open-source nature of the Internet in particular that make this a 
fundamentally new concept in the COE.
179
 Until recently mass information flow was 
constricted and controlled by a number of factors: cost and complexity of recording 
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equipment, the ability to disseminate the information, domestic laws and regulations 
(though the Internet is becoming increasingly legislated) and (with regard to the Internet 
in particular) the appropriate technology to receive the information.
180
  This has all 
changed dramatically; digital video cameras, digital cameras and cell phones with video 
cameras and Internet capacity are relatively cheap and of growing ubiquity across the 
world. Computers, and Internet access, have also grown exponentially through much of 
both the developed and developing world, as have satellite networks and television sets. 
Also, many countries that did not have a thorough telephone network have bypassed the 
traditional landline technology and are now connected through cell phone networks. 
Collectively these factors have caused a communication revolution: many now have the 
capacity to disseminate and receive news, in effect providing strategic capability to the 
individual.
181
 This has had dramatic consequences on the COE, ―[t]he camera [the cell 
phone] and the computer have become weapons of war.‖182  
 
There are several implications for military ethics. As Lt. Col. Daley writes, ―having 
camera crews reporting live from the battlespace, coupled with the knowledge of the 
potential impacts of ones actions in a politically sensitive domain can only add to 
distraction and operational fatigue.‖183 Therefore, the constructive function has remaining 
utility as it ameliorates stress caused by media scrutiny, as it does with other stressors 
discussed. 
 
However, the real import of the media and communications is their ability to transmit and 
amplify tactical level information and thus influence perception and opinion at the 
operational and strategic level both in-operation and internationally. The Pentagon is well 
aware of this, as can be seen in their 2003 report on Public Affairs Guidance on 
Embedding Media: 
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 ―Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public 
perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This 
hold true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose perception can 
affect the durability of our coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct 
operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our 
involvement.‖184 
 
The consequences for the preventative function are critical to the central argument of this 
paper. Unethical conduct at the tactical level can have operational and strategic 
ramifications, swaying the perception of the deployed force‘s home population or 
influencing the opinion of the local populace. This has added import in irregular conflict, 
where both sides are attempting to gain or maintain the local populace‘s allegiance and 
the irregular combatant is attempting to force the intervener to act in an immoral or 
illegal manner. The media acts as the contextualiser of the modern operation; such is its 
power that Baudrillard impudently and provocatively entitled his work The Gulf War Did 
Not Take Place in reference to the synthesized simulacra conducted and conveyed by the 
media from the Levant in 1991.
185
 At a more prosaic level, Michalski and Gow state, 
―images are not just contingent in the battle for hearts and minds, or the struggle for 
success and legitimacy; they are central and imperative‖.186 With reference to the media 
and communications, the preventative function‘s increasing utility is that previously most 
misconduct had limited strategic impact, or at the least delayed strategic impact; now, the 
jus in bello principles, the LOAC and the ROE are a critical part of overall operational 
success because any infraction is likely, dependent on operation, to come under intense 
media scrutiny and have a negative effect on the mission‘s overall success through either 
influencing the indigenous or home populace.
187
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Justification 
The modern operation is increasingly justified on moral grounds and often aimed with the 
overall operational goal of creating, recreating or stabilising a stable democracy.
188
 The 
moral justification of modern deployments, disseminated through the media, in a sense 
conflates Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, where the justification for the operation and the 
conduct of the operation become contingent on one another. Though justification and end 
objective are not the same- a humanitarian intervention and a collective security based 
intervention can both have the creation of a stable democracy as their objective and 
clearly be justified for different reasons- there is a congruity between the two in that a 
moral justified operation creates a condition whereby the justification, the means and the 
ends must be commensurate. Without conflating justification and outcome, this section 
will considered them linked in a pragmatic manner. In other words, interventions that are 
morally justified generally have a moral end goal. The ends, when grounded in morality, 
necessitate ethical means, and thus argue for the increasing utility of the preventative 
function. As Freedman puts it, ―[o]perations undertaken with the expressed aim of 
promoting liberal values but conducted with scant respect for individual life or dignity 
are likely to be futile and counter-productive in their consequences.‖189  
 
Moral justification seems to be a loose term, but what is meant here is that in the post-
Cold War, post-9/11 global system there has been an expansion in interventions that are 
rationalised within the Western moral paradigm, be it the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, cosmopolitanism or the liberal internationalism.
190
 Doary defines these 
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interventions as ―coercive, (and/or non-consensual) politico-military interference in a 
state‘s internal affairs to enforce international norms of behaviour.‖191 They are 
significantly different to traditional peacekeeping in that they do not require consent, do 
not have to remain neutral, are not limited by prohibitive rules on the use of force and, 
most importantly, are not justified (solely) on the basis of maintaining international 
security.
192
 Their taxonomy is fluid, as each is unique; ideologically most are a 
―pragmatic marriage of moral values and state interest‖ in that they conflate humanitarian 
enforcement and preventative war into ―a new normative framework for international 
intervention.‖193 It should be acknowledged that no justification for intervention can be 
taken at face value, underneath altruistic reasoning there often hides a selfish purpose.
194
 
Also, less perniciously, there is also scope for multiple intentions.
195
 Nonetheless, it is 
predicated here that most current and future deployments have been, and will continue to 
be, justified, at least in the public sphere, within a moral framework; naturally, this is in 
no way a comprehensive view on future deployments but it is assumed to have a catholic 
enough reach, especially with regard to the NZ Army.
196
  
 
The importance of morally justified interventions for the preventative function is similar 
to that of the media‘s influence in that it is based on perception; as illustrated by the 
above Freedman quote, the means of a modern operation, where the main objective is 
securing the allegiance of the indigenous populace, must be commensurate with the ends 
to succeed; the locals perception of the troops conduct is even more critical when the 
intervention is premised on moral grounds. The preventative function, primarily, though 
in concert with the constructive function, provides the parameters that ensure that 
conduct corresponds adequately with the moral justification, in large part because they 
both derive from the same Western moral/legalist paradigm.  
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The critical area for the constructive with respect to morally justified interventions is 
related to the desired end state, democracy. It is one closely related to the expanded 
mandate, which is the means aspect of the process. The major issue here is that there is a 
fundamental discordance between liberal democratic values and professionalism, military 
ethos and military values. Thus, the ―authority equilibrium‖, as Janowitz refers to it, 
would be destabilised.
197
 Though similar to the conflict between liberal democratic 
governments and their illiberal militaries, as the problem occurs during an operation it 
could be detrimental to utility, in particular, it is perceived that it could damage the chain 
of command. Though referring to military juntas, Nordlinger‘s statement that the ―martial 
values of bravery, discipline, and obedience under fire have little relevance for the 
governing of states‖ can be reinterpreted in the modern era by replacing ‗governing‘ with 
‗creating, recreating or stabilising‘ in its stead.198 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The NZA COE is increasingly fluid, complex and interconnected across an array of 
indicators and indices. It is now a three-dimensional battlespace with allegiance as the 
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centre of gravity, permeated by the international media, likely to be in a non-Western, 
urbanised or naturally complex location, with a plethora of actors from a variety of 
nations, services and organisations working at a variety of tasks and interspersed with 
locals who are often lacking in the necessities of life; this dense and complex battlespace 
is often characterised by a overwhelming technological and material dominance on the 
side of the intervener in weaponry, communications, hardware and logistics, whereas the 
adversary is usually irregular and utilises irregular and asymmetric techniques to offset 
this conventional superiority.  
 
The hypotheses of this paper are that the preventative function has an increasing utility 
and that the constructive function has a remaining utility. The underlying rationale of the 
first hypothesis involves the amalgamation of several threads. First, the rise in moral 
justification for military interventions has set a standard for operational means to be 
commensurate with operational ends.
199
 Next, the increase in irregular combatants using 
irregular techniques has meant that, for the most part, the nature of victory has changed, 
so that the modern operation is now a battle of opinion and perception, in essence 
political victory has become paramount over military victory in securing overall 
operational success. Overall operational success is intrinsically linked with both the 
original justification and operational conduct and consequently any unethical conduct is 
counter productive in securing the ‗hearts and minds‘ of the local populace, as is any 
overt action that contradicts the justifying principles of the intervention. The expanded 
mandate further enhances the preventative function‘s utility, by completely bypassing 
traditional military activity in pursuit of a political solution, with soldiers operating 
amongst and for the people. Finally, the intense media scrutiny, transmits and magnifies 
any unethical conduct to the local populace and the wider world so that a tactical error 
can become a strategic disaster, thus jeopardising overall operational success as the 
operation loses either, or both, local allegiance or the support of the army‘s home 
population. Individually some of these aspects are not necessarily new, yet taken together 
there is a powerful case for the increasing utility of the preventative function. The 
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conclusion of Igniatieff‘s 2001 Young Memorial Lecture, given at the Canadian Royal 
Military College provides an apt exposition on the current reality and it is beneficial to 
quote it at length: 
 
―[T]here are a number of pragmatic reasons for ethical restraint, even in a war on 
terror. You will operate in a highly visible world, a world where your mistakes are 
visible. You will operate in a world under close public scrutiny. This is a world 
where journalists and ordinary civilians with video cameras will be all over your 
operations, whether you like it or not. Your military careers will be carried out in 
a fishbowl. The distance between the front line where you operate and the 
hometown you come from is shrinking to zero in the modern world. And this 
places you under a substantially greater degree of obligation to play by the 
rules…. Moreover, what is different about this war on terror is that it is not about 
conquering territory, or taking and holding ground. We are in the business of 
neutralizing specific military objectives, but we are also emphatically in the 
business of hearts and minds. And if we fail in this, the international coalition 
supporting this effort will disintegrate. Even the support of the domestic 
constituency will vanish. If these terrorists are the piranhas in the fishbowl, you 
cannot drain the fishbowl — the world in which they swim — by using 
indiscriminate, incoherent military violence. In a war for hearts and minds, 
discrimination is the only game to play…. 
 
One of the most difficult aspects of understanding the force of ethical imperatives 
in the use of military violence is to drop that idea of ethics as a set of handcuffs 
and to begin to think of ethics as a force enabler — to think of ethics not in a 
negative sense but in a positive sense, as a force multiplier. The Canadian Forces, 
because of their long peacekeeping tradition, know that ethical behaviour in the 
field is a powerful force multiplier — precisely because we don‘t have that much 
force anyway. So, we are in the hearts and minds business. We are in the business 
 99 
of multiplying physical power, and transforming it into political and moral power 
simply by the way we behave out in the field.‖ 200 
 
The second hypothesis is that the constructive function has remained important as the 
COE has become increasingly complicated, dynamic, ambiguous and diffuse, despite the 
decrease in high-intensity conflict. The significant stressors highlighted all attest to this: 
the alienation and anger of culture shock from operating ‗amongst the people‘ in 
expanded mandate operations, the compound mental and physical intricacy of the urban 
or complex natural environ, the diverse potentialities of attack, the inherent lack of 
certainty and the difficulties of distinction implicit in irregular warfare, the complexity 
and friction that stems from the organisational, doctrinal and cultural melange of the 
multinational, joint and interagency operation and the flux and apathy rent by the 
expanded mandate. The constructive function of military ethics is, as the literature states, 
one of the best methods for reducing or preventing the stress induced by the 
characteristics of the COE. Naturally it is not the only, or necessarily always the best, 
method for stress control but the constructive function of military ethics is useful in 
managing and ameliorating the intensifying effects of the COE and also, crucially, in 
enabling and ensuring the preventative function.  
 
Furthermore, it is believed that the constructive function, and in particular the warrior 
ethos, has adapted to fit current operational realities. This adaptation is premised on NZ‘s 
position as an international citizen and an appreciation of the COE and the utility of non-
violent means in securing operational goals.  
 
The division between the two is not quite as simplistic as is presented, as the constructive 
function enables the preventative function and the preventative function is an intrinsic 
part of the constructive function. For analytic purposes however, this division remains 
useful. The examination will next give a brief view of the NZA‘s historical OE, then it 
will move to the case study of Timor-Leste, which will aim to review the reality of the 
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COE characteristics and the increasing utility of the preventative function and the 
remaining utility of the constructive function. 
 101 
Chapter Four 
History of New Zealand Army Operational 
Environment 
 
The aim of this chapter is to place the NZA COE into context by reviewing the NZA‘s 
historical operational environment. Specifically, it will look at key missions, beginning 
with World War Two (WW2) and ending with the NZA commitment to United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. The focus will be on the type 
of conflict, the characteristics of the deployment and how this shaped capabilities and 
attitudes. Because of the scope of this chapter, each operation will be necessarily brief 
and generalised with a broad sweeping perspective rather than detailed analysis. Finally, 
this chapter has had to be selective and many NZA peacekeeping operations, in 
particular, have been omitted for reasons of space.  
 
The reasons for inclusion in this chapter were that an operation was either important due 
to the size, type or timing of the mission. Kashmir was included because it was one of the 
first UN peacekeeping operations that the NZA was involved in and stands as a good 
example of a traditional Cold War peacekeeping operation. The Commonwealth 
Monitoring Force was examined as it was relatively significant in terms of numbers and 
occurred during a transitional phase in both the NZA‘s, and the international system‘s 
attitude towards peacekeeping. Cambodia had to be analysed as it encapsulated the 
enthusiasm of the early post-Cold War period and stood out as a landmark UN operation 
with a broad and ambitious mandate that had an unprecedented number of personnel from 
a diverse array of backgrounds and contributing nations. UNPROFOR was significant 
because it was the first combat contingent deployed on a UN mission since Korea and the 
largest sent on a peacekeeping operation and because the complex situation reveals the 
intricacy of the modern operational environment. 
 
 
 102 
World War Two 
Conflict 
The Second World War defies simple descriptions, though in some sense it can be seen as 
the catastrophic zenith of the Napoleonic/Clausewitzean way of war- marking the height 
of conventional, predominately Western, interstate warfare- and as such is representative 
of the milieu in which military ethics evolved.
1
 The NZA fought in numerous environs 
across the globe during WW2, with major campaigns in Crete, North Africa, the Pacific 
and Italy.
2
  The NZA Division, NZ‘s major land contribution, would spend five years 
fighting WW2 in North Africa and Europe, while a second division served sporadically in 
the Pacific. The first significant action for the NZA was in Greece and Crete.
3
 During the 
two weeks of fighting in Greece the NZA conducted a defensive retreat as the German 
tanks and infantry, supported by artillery and planes, effectively used the blitzkrieg 
strategy, the epitome of regular, large scale interstate industrial warfare, to drive the 
Commonwealth forces down the mainland, eventually forcing their evacuation to Crete.
4
 
Once on Crete the NZA had to defend the island from an airborne attack, followed by 
retreat and evacuation after German forces secured the island.
5
  
 
The North African campaign was the NZA‘s longest during WW2, lasting from 1940 to 
1943, and though fought in a non-Western location the adversaries were regular Italian 
and German armed forces, fighting within the same Clausewitzean paradigm.
6
 Although 
North Africa was the birthplace of NZ Special Forces, in the form of the Long-Range 
Desert Group (LRDG), the majority of the fighting was conventional, in that it pitted two 
regular forces against each other in large battle formations along a near barren strip of 
desert terrain.
7
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The war in the Pacific against the Japanese hinted at the new direction in warfare, though 
it should be noted that NZA involvement was, in comparison with other theatres, 
extremely limited; the NZA were fighting an enemy who did not operate within the same 
moral/legal paradigm- consider the kamikaze phenomena and their attitude to surrender 
and subsequent treatment of prisoners of war- in the complex jungle environs of the 
Solomon Islands.
8
 The Japanese armed force was largely modelled on Western 
organisational and doctrinal concepts, however, and was still a regular state military.
9
   
 
The final key operation for the NZA in the European theatre was the campaign to take 
Italy from the Germans at the end of 1943.
10
 This campaign was hard fought, with the 
NZA experiencing urban combat for the first time during the war, though this did not 
comprise the majority of battle terrain.
11
  
 
During WW2, the NZA fought largely Western opponents, with the Japanese as the 
exception, in regular, conventional interstate war. Despite the atrocities committed on the 
Eastern Front, in the theatres the NZA operated in, the ―struggle insofar as it pertained to 
regular forces was tolerably clean, sometimes- as in Northern Africa- almost 
chivalrous.‖12 The Napoleonic/Clausewitzean influence was particularly redolent: large-
scale, professionally led, tangibly and intangibly symmetrical, national armies bent on the 
total annihilation of the enemy, acting, mostly, within a shared moral and legal 
paradigm.
13
  
 
The political and the military levels were distinct but related, as compared to less 
conventional conflicts. Both sides fought to defeat the other militarily in direct 
confrontation and though each side also attempted to defeat the other politically through 
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actions such as strategic bombing, intended to weaken the populace‘s morale, the levels 
of war still functioned in a relatively conventional manner, channelling victory at the 
lowest levels upwards. Finally, although they fought in multifarious locations around the 
globe the NZA were relatively insulated from non-combatants and generally faced off 
against other Western forces, so potential for culture shock while on operation was 
relatively limited.  
 
Deployment 
WW2 saw the NZA fighting alongside mostly Western allies, with the exception of an 
Indian contingent, though they, like the majority of the coalition, were part of the 
Commonwealth.
14
 Despite the shared Commonwealth military heritage, there was friction 
within the NZA caused by the multinational aspect. At one level there was culture shock, 
with the NZ troops dealing with public school attitudes that pervaded the British Army 
officer culture, and there was also anger over the perceived failures of British leadership 
during the North Africa campaign and the continuous problems of operating under 
foreign command whilst still constrained by political directives from the New Zealand 
Government.
15
 Although they were operating in a multinational coalition the NZA 
Division, because of its size, often operated on its own, as the division was the maximal 
sized unit of manoeuvre.
16
 Operations of the Second World War were joint in a manner 
never before seen, with relatively high levels of sea and, particularly, air support in all the 
campaigns the NZA were involved, though it was only in the Pacific theatre that all three 
New Zealand Defence Force services fought together and in most circumstances 
interaction between services was limited except at the command level.
17
 Contact with 
non-military personnel during the various campaigns was limited- particularly in North 
Africa, though it should be noted that in camps such as Maadi locals provided camp 
labour.
18
  However, in general NZA‘s battlefields were largely cleared of civilians. 
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Aside from the support personnel, the NZA‘s main task was combat-oriented as can be 
seen by their actions throughout the various campaigns; however, there were long pauses 
between frontline action when the troops were training or on leave.
19
 Though beholden to 
the LOAC throughout the conflict, application was relatively simple as there were no 
dynamic, situation-specific ROE, the battlefields were relatively concise and the 
combatants were easily identified.
20
  
 
The technological capability of the media during WW2 was extremely primitive, with 
information taking days, weeks or even months to be disseminated, an eternity in contrast 
to today‘s instantaneous global communications network. Furthermore, although the 
NZA had war correspondents ‗embedded‘, information from the battlefield was tightly 
controlled, with the Allies practising ―supply-side censorship‖- effectively withholding 
information from the press; also, support of the war was so thorough that the likelihood 
of negative events being published was limited with most media outlets self-censoring 
sensitive information.
21
 Within the various theatres, the effects of any indigenous media 
were extremely limited, both because of their limited penetration and due to the nature of 
the conflict; however, the power of the media was still apparent in theatre, as shown by 
both sides use of ‗black propaganda‘ radio stations to dispirit and influence opposing 
troops.
22
 As a British Dominion, New Zealand‘s justification for WW2 was that it was a 
defensive war against fascist aggression against the empire and the, nascent, ‗free world‘; 
though the justification contained a moral element it was largely premised on the grounds 
of collective security, in that it was primarily concerned with the balance of power 
between states rather than within states.
23
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Consequences 
The Second World War changed the social, economic and political contours of the world, 
and while it had some influence on armies in general and the NZA in particular, because 
it fitted in the paradigm of what war was at the time the lessons were essentially of a 
reinforcing rather than revolutionary nature. The idea of a massed military designed to 
oppose other massed militaries in industrialised conflict was firmly entrenched after 
WW2 despite relative successes of partisans and irregulars in different theatres and the 
use of irregular techniques by both regular and irregular forces during the conflict. The 
major military lesson taken from the Second World War was the success of blitzkrieg 
(lightening war), which is commonly known in military parlance as manoeuvre warfare 
and whose characteristics are ―speed, surprise and mental as well as physical 
dislocation.‖24 Such was its success that manoeuvre warfare would be entrenched in the 
doctrines of most militaries for decades and, in many respects, would outlive its utility as 
irregular techniques rose to the fore.
25
 Information warfare, through media and 
communication would also further cement its centrality in conflict though it would 
require further technological innovation to increase the theoretical steps. A major 
political consequence of the conflict was the creation of the United Nations, an 
organisation whose foundational principles successive New Zealand Governments would 
prescribe to and commit proportionally large numbers of NZA personnel in support of 
throughout the following decades. The NZA operated with its ‗traditional‘ partners in a 
relatively hermetic environment, with little contact between services or with civilians. 
Before WW2, New Zealand‘s Territorial Forces were under strength, ―weak and ill-
equipped‖ and they returned to a similar condition after the conflict before going through 
fundamental changes over the next decades.
26
 Despite this, as a group, the NZ Division 
returned to NZ as highly professional soldiers with a diverse set of skills in conventional 
warfighting and it would be these men who would provide the necessary personnel for 
operations in the years to come.
27
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Korea 
Conflict 
The Korean War pitted the South Koreans and a UN coalition against North Korean and 
Chinese forces, with the NZA contributing a battalion, referred to as Kayforce, for almost 
two years.
28
 Although non-Western, both the North Koreans and Chinese were 
communist and thus their militaries were influenced by this Western ideology indirectly 
and by their relationship with the USSR directly, though this similarity should not be 
overstretched.
29
 Official NZ military historian McGibbon writes that the NZA personnel 
respected the Chinese because they ―proved honourable opponents in action, seldom 
mistreating their prisoners, in contrast to the North Koreans‖ who bound and mutilated 
UN prisoners, leaving their corpses to be found on the battlefield.
30
  
 
The Korean War was largely conventional, with the only caveat being that North and 
South Korea were proto-states; otherwise, it saw two tangibly symmetrical, regular forces 
using largely conventional techniques in open battle on a relatively clear battlefield.
31
 
While both the South and North Koreans did have a small number of guerrilla operatives 
working behind lines, and it was to North Korean guerrillas that the NZA suffered its first 
casualties, in relative numbers this irregular action was irrelevant.
32
 The conflict had an 
initial dynamism, in keeping with the principles of manoeuvre warfare, though a front 
line stabilised within six months and the following two years were spent fighting a static 
war of attrition, much like that along the Western Front.
33
 Like the Second World War 
before it, the Korean War was fought by largely regular forces acting under Western 
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organisational and operational principles, and the division between the combatants and 
the non-combatant local populace was clear and impermeable, with the AO forcibly 
cleared of civilians before combat.
34
 Also like the Second World War, the levels of war 
ran along conventional lines, with both sides attempting to defeat the other on the 
battlefield, even though the conflict was limited politically in a manner the world wars 
had not been because of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and UN-mandating.
35
 The 
Korean War had a marked politco-military significance, as external political limitations, 
especially when the Chinese became directly involved, restricted military action at a level 
unseen in the two total world wars, making the conflict limited. The peninsula served as a 
proxy battleground for a Sino-American conflict and thus the larger consequences of 
escalation-ultimately, nuclear war- constrained military action. The advent of nuclear 
weapons had a potent effect on conflicts, limiting them in a manner previously unknown 
and the Korean War was the first to be constrained in such a manner.
36
 Also, because the 
operation was UN-mandated, the consequences of military escalation were spread wider 
than unilateral or multilateral action and consequently the conflict was fought for limited 
ends with limited means.
37
 
 
Deployment 
The NZA operated within a British brigade that Australian infantry were serving with and 
relations at all levels were cordial and congenial, and though there were minor issues 
over pay rates, the esprit de corps of the brigade as a whole was high, aided by the fact 
that many had served in similar multinational groupings during WW2.
38
 The operation 
marked the apex of Commonwealth military cooperation.
39
 Altogether the UN coalition 
comprised of troops from 16 countries, though due to the nature of the conflict contact 
between less associated groups was limited and the only contact with other services was 
in the form of air support.
40
 The local Koreans were often treated as inferiors and used for 
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heavy work, though even this contact was limited as the NZA personnel were 
discouraged from contact due to the guerrilla threat and fear of catching smallpox.
41
  
 
As with WW2, because the conflict was conventional interstate action the NZA 
performed combat-oriented tasks, even though the operation was UN-mandated. The 
NZA had basic ROE in Korea, at their first barracks the soldiers on piquet duty were told 
―to shoot anything that moves‖ even though they were stationed far from the front line at 
the time.
42
  
 
Although the Korean War was the first significant conflict of the Cold War, as it quickly 
became a stalemate and was obviously confined to the peninsula the New Zealand public 
lost interest.
43
 Part of the disinterest was probably due to MacArthur‘s formal and 
informal controls on media coverage, which, after initial negative reportage, channelled 
media focus away from contentious stories and sanitised the perception of the conflict.
44
 
The New Zealand Government‘s justification for involvement in the war was firmly 
rooted in containment of communism and the principle of collective security, with the 
underlying motivation of cementing a firm defence relationship with the US and 
supporting the nascent UN.
45
 
 
Consequences 
Though this was the NZA‘s first peacekeeping operation under the rubric of the UN, and 
despite President Truman‘s early categorisation of the intervention as a ―police action‖, 
the reality in-theatre was that it was a conventional conflict between state militaries along 
the lines of the two World Wars, with combat forces fighting each other with the aim of 
defeating them militarily according to the traditional principles of war.
46
 One major 
military consequence of the three years of conflict on the peninsula was an affirmation of 
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manoeuvre warfare‘s superiority after the stalemate of attrition.47 Because of this relative 
continuity with the two previous global conflagrations, the Korean War had little impact 
on New Zealand military thinking, though in actuality it marked the final phase of major, 
conventional interstate war.
48
 One marked difference from all previous conflicts was that 
as the first significant conflict fought after the advent of nuclear weapons, the Korean 
War was the first ‗artificially‘ limited war.49 Artificial, in that previous wars were limited 
because of deficits in capability- either tangible or intangible; whereas post-nuclear 
conflict was limited because participants had ―to place artificial restraints on the conduct 
of war to preclude it from escalating into more total war, nuclear war.‖50 Another 
significant issue was that the Korean War was the last time the NZA sent a volunteer 
expeditionary force overseas, ending an era of military deployment that stretched back to 
the Boer War and marking the increasing professionalisation of the force.
51
 
 
Kashmir 
Conflict 
Following Partition the Indian sub-continent was plunged into internecine conflict; one of 
the major points of tension between the fledgling states was the province of Kashmir, 
over which they began fighting in 1947.
52
 The issue was brought to the Security 
Council‘s attention by India, who complained that Pakistan was supporting irregular 
incursions of ―well-organized tribesman equipped with machine guns and mortars‖.53 The 
two sides agreed to a plebiscite, and despite difficulties, support for UN involvement was 
relatively constant from both sides.
54
 Though the NZA contribution would never exceed a 
handful of soldiers at a time, the commitment would last over two decades.
55
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The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was 
deployed to monitor the cease-fire in 1949, with the NZA supplying personnel in 1951.
56
 
Though the catalyst for UNMOGIP had been irregular incursions backed by Pakistan, the 
military observers task was monitoring the Indian and Pakistani regular armies stationed 
on either side of the cease-fire line. The cease-fire line itself snaked across ―extremely 
rugged country‖ and the work of the military observers was ―physically demanding‖, 
stationed with the respective state militaries on either side of the cease-fire line and 
regularly patrolling the rough territory.
57
 Over the course of the NZA‘s contribution to 
UNMOGIP there were several flare-ups, the most critical between 1963 and 1966 and 
during 1971, when the two states fought ―full-scale war[s]‖.58 Though the conflicts 
drastically changed the ―scope and magnitude‖ of UNMOGIP operations, the mandate 
remained the same and NZA personnel maintained the requisite neutral and non-
aggressive stance.
59
  
 
The new relationship between the military and the political levels with regard to 
traditional peacekeeping operations is clear in the following quote from Birgisson: 
―UNMOGIP served the important purpose of reducing the prospect of armed conflict and 
assuring both parties of impartial observation of each other‘s activities. It was an 
effective peacekeeping mission, keeping the lid on military conflict while a political 
solution was sought.‖60 In contrast with conventional conflict, the aim for the traditional 
peacekeeping operation was to suppress military conflict so that political solutions could 
be explored.
61
  
Deployment 
The NZA contribution was never big, though troops served in Kashmir until 1976 when 
the NZ Government withdrew support. Over this period the NZA personnel served with 
other members of the NZDF and personnel from Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 
Finland, Italian, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay, though as the observers 
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operated in groups of two the level of interaction was extremely low.
62
 Furthermore, the 
military observers‘ AO was the remote cease-fire line that weaved across the remote and 
mountainous areas of Kashmir meaning that the level of interaction with non-military 
personnel was extremely limited.
63
  
 
UNMOGIP was a traditional peacekeeping operation with a narrow mandate that was 
focussed on cease-fire monitoring and the investigation of alleged breaches; day-to-day 
work consisted of patrolling the cease-fire line across arduous territory.
64
  
 
There is limited information regarding media exposure at both the domestic and 
international levels, though considering that both states requested UN supervision, 
internal coverage would have been relatively acquiescent and, for New Zealand, because 
the initial NZA deployment consisted of three men at a time when even the much larger 
force in Korea was only getting limited coverage is suggestive that if there was any 
media attention it would have been extremely limited. The NZ Government acceded to 
the request ―because it was consistent with its policy of strongly supporting the United 
Nations and the Government was anxious to play a part in resolving a serious dispute 
between two important members of the Commonwealth.‖65 
 
Consequences 
At the general level UNMOGIP can be viewed as a template traditional Cold War 
peacekeeping operation; a neutral force that is only allowed to use force in self defence 
and is there by permission maintaining a cease-fire between two state groups; an 
operational template that was to become increasingly irrelevant in the second half of the 
Twentieth Century. UNMOGIP, and the other similar operations, however, showed ―that 
observer groups are needed and work: not as a panacea, but as long-lived expedients… 
[These operations] fully described the new institution of part-time soldiering for the UN 
and threw up difficult custodial problems in the wake of the divorce between security 
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requirements and political issues.‖66 These operations, while playing a vital role, were far 
from the then typical perception of military operations and, as the above quote shows, 
marked the beginning of a period where traditional military expectations and evolving 
operational realities began to diverge. The first salvos on the warrior ethos had been fired. 
However, with such limited commitment of personnel and hardware, the early observer 
missions merely hinted at the chasm that would open between what militaries wanted to 
do and what they had to do. Also of note, these early observer missions were indicative of 
the UN‘s inability to pursue the collective security goals of its Charter as they could only 
send small numbers of military observers if all parties had consented and they remained 
neutral and used force for self-defence only.
67
 
 
The number of NZA personnel who served on UNMOGIP was extremely limited, so the 
consequences across the whole organisation were limited; one point is of interest 
however, the first three NZA military observers deployed were Territorials, which is 
indicative of the relative importance that peacekeeping operations were held at the time 
in New Zealand.
68
 The NZA, like the rest of the world‘s military, saw peacekeeping as a 
sideline to their real business of warfighting. This would change as both the nature of 
peacekeeping and war changed.  
  
 
 
 
Malaya 
Conflict 
The Malaya Emergency was fought against mainly ethnic Chinese guerrilla fighters of 
the Communist Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), who used the dense and 
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naturally complex backcountry jungles to offset their tangible weakness.
69
 The New 
Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) would be born in the jungles of Malaya, with 133 
NZSAS serving for a year before being replaced by the regular NZA, followed by two 
battalion rotations spanning nearly two years.
70
 Although the MRLA used irregular 
techniques, they were in many respects similar to a regular army; they had a conventional 
Western military structure, were strictly regimented, ―highly professional‖ and wore 
military uniforms that had insignia that made them recognisable.
71
 The influence of the 
communist ideology in some respects balanced the fact they were non-Western, 
especially with regard to doctrine and organisation; any similarity should not be over-
stressed however, as there were numerous differences.
72
 Originally the MRLA attempted 
to mount relatively large, conventional military operations, a strategic mistake for the 
tangibly weaker force, which they soon corrected, adopting a ―traditional guerrilla 
approach of isolated ambushes, assassination of key figures, and the carrot-and-stick 
policy of intimidation and aid to the local population.‖73 The irregular strategy and tactics 
made the tension ―unremitting‖ even for those NZA personnel who rarely came into 
contact with the MRLA guerrillas.
74
  
 
The Malayan Emergency was an inherently political conflict, requiring a political 
solution; as was noted by Thompson, ―the government must give priority to defeating 
political subversion, not the guerrillas.‖75 The conflict is often portrayed as one of the few 
successful counter-insurgency campaigns, as the Commonwealth Forces eventually won 
the local populace‘s allegiance by resettling hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasants 
into 500 villages, granting them land titles, which previously they had been denied, and 
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giving them financial aid to build houses.
76
 The Commonwealth Forces also enfranchised 
the Chinese and promised Malaya independence once the insurrection was over.
77
 Thus, 
in comparison to WW2 and Korea, the interaction between the NZA and the locals was 
critical, as Pugsley notes, ―everything depended on gaining [their] trust and goodwill.‖78 
The levels of war can be seen as collapsing in this conflict, where the political bypasses 
the military, requiring its own solution rather than the traditional calculus whereby 
military success is converted into political victory. 
 
Deployment 
Despite the British, Australians and Fijians also operating in Malaya, the NZA operated 
in a relatively hermetic manner, patrolling as national units, though at the command level 
there were difficulties with British Headquarters.
79
 The only contact NZA members had 
with other services during the operation was calling in supply drops. The NZA operated 
alongside ex-MRLA members and initially struggled to deal with their ―vastly different‖ 
culture.
80
 Early operations were conducted in isolated areas, and though latter missions 
occurred in a more populous AO, they were patrolling the more remote areas of the AO 
and contact with the local populace was still relatively limited, though the limited contact 
they did have was considered to be effective.
81
 As well as the brief but critical contact 
with the local populace the NZA had a number of indigenes who worked as scouts and 
intelligence gatherers who they developed strong bonds after initial culture shock.
82
  
 
The majority of the NZA‘s tasks were long-range patrolling in the jungle, and though 
they did occasionally also take on other functions, such as manning identity card check 
posts the level of non-traditional military activity was limited.
83
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The Malayan AO had a high degree of media penetration; the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP) had a radio station and newspapers whilst the British used these mediums as well 
as leaflet drops, mobile film units and loudspeaker planes.
84
 Both sides understood the 
importance of perception in an irregular struggle. Internationally, however, the 
Emergency received little media coverage and subsequently little public attention in New 
Zealand.
85
 The British were careful to limit offshore exposure of the insurgency and New 
Zealand followed this line closely. The NZ Government committed its forces to the 
Malayan Emergency due to its Commonwealth defence arrangements; the British reasons 
for confronting the MRLA were, whilst influenced by the worldwide effort to contain 
international communism, initially centred on internal security, and latter, with the 
decision to grant independence, focussed on collective security.
86
 
 
Consequences 
At the general level, the conflict in Malaya was representative of the more complex and 
variegated operational environment that had begun to emerge in the second half of the 
Twentieth Century as the world decolonised and the Cold War shaped the geopolitical 
environment. The British strategy against the MRLA is still widely referenced as the 
acme of counterinsurgency and the lessons learned are frequently, if oft inappropriately 
or ineffectually, applied. Specifically, and illustrative of the Emergency‘s influence on 
military thinking, it is considered by some that the US applied- inappropriately- the 
lessons of Malaya to the conflict in Vietnam, with the strategic hamlet program.
87
 The 
NZA‘s commitment in Malaya ―had a defining influence [,]…. shaping the role, 
organisation and equipping of New Zealand‘s armed forces.‖88 One of the major 
consequences was the NZA‘s realisation it would have to learn how to combat irregular 
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techniques, with training programs instigated both during and after the conflicts.
89
 
Another consequence was the realisation that any future conflict would need to be fought 
by a wholly professional regular force rather than a needs-based ad hoc territorial force 
officered by professionals.
90
 While the Korean War was the final volunteer territorial 
force, the Emergency marked the transitional phase, where volunteers enlisted as regular 
soldiers, with every operation since involving a regular, professional standing army.
91
  
 
Vietnam 
Conflict 
The Vietnam War was a watershed moment in international conflict, in perception as 
much as in actuality, for even though many of the attributes of the war were not new, 
they came together in a dramatic and potent fashion and brought a superpower to its 
knees.
92
 Its impact is revealed in Krepinevich‘s near plaintive question at the beginning 
of his influential book, The Army and Vietnam: ―[h]ow could the army of the most 
powerful nation on Earth, materially supported on a scale unprecedented in history… fail 
to emerge victorious against a numerically inferior force of lightly armed irregulars?‖93  
 
The conflict was fought against a non-Western foe that was actually both regular and 
irregular and utilised guerrilla and insurgent techniques to break the political will of their 
tangibly stronger and strategically deluded adversary.
94
 The NZA commitment over 
roughly six years started with an artillery battery, which was joined by one infantry 
company which then swelled to nearly battalion size until the last contingent left at the 
end of 1971.
95
 There was a cultural gulf between the Vietnamese and the Western forces 
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and troops serving there suffered from a degree of culture shock that permeated from the 
lowest to highest ranks; in short, the Western troops did not understand their Vietnamese 
opponents and many of the mistakes of the conflict have their origin in this lack of 
cultural empathy.
96
 The Vietminh and Viet Cong generally avoided direct military 
confrontation, preferring a protracted conflict in the complex natural environs that would 
sap the US, and its allies, willpower.
97
 Like the MRLA before them the Vietnamese 
preferred to fight in the abundant jungles of their country, using the natural complexity of 
the land drain to the morale and conventional strength of their adversary. 
 
In comparison to WW2 and Korea, the Vietnam conflict, like the Emergency before it, 
was a battle for the allegiance of the local populace.
98
 In this it was political in a manner 
unlike conventional war, where two armed forces battle for decisive military victory. 
Like Malaya, the conflict was fought ―amongst the people‖ and had no clear and defined 
front, instead it was fought across ―44 different provinces, 260 districts, and 11 000 
hamlets‖.99 Though the Vietminh wore uniforms the Vietcong did not, and rather than 
being almost all young men such as in regular armies, they could be anyone, from old 
women to young children.
100
 This is a critical point; in Vietnam the NZA faced a 
population rather than an army. Vietnam marked a significant change in operation for the 
NZA; they were now fighting a near indistinguishable enemy who used largely irregular 
techniques, such as ambushes, in a battle without a front. This left NZA personnel in a 
constant state of stress, in contrast with previous conventional conflicts where the stress 
was sporadic and interspersed with long periods of downtime.
101
 While Malaya 
introduced the concept of ‗hearts and minds‘ to the NZA, Vietnam, being the longest and 
most contentious deployment in NZA history that was an obvious failure, had a potent 
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impact on NZA thinking, with a comprehensive lessons learned programme after the 
conflict.
102
 
 
Deployment 
Vietnam marked a turning point in NZA operational history, placing them under US 
rather than British command, a transition that caused many difficulties, especially in the 
doctrine and logistics.
103
 Both the artillery and the infantry units that served in Vietnam 
were attached to Australian units, another source of friction, especially over the 
Australian conscripts‘ better pay and conditions in comparison to the professional, 
regular NZA personnel.
104
 Despite these issues though there was a relatively high degree 
of esprit de corps between the NZA, the US and Australian troops. At NZHQ NZA 
personnel were serving with a number of nationalities including Korean, Thai, Philippine 
and Nationalist Chinese, though this was not the case in the field.
105
 The NZA was the 
only service to send significant numbers of personnel to Vietnam and most NZA 
personnel had little contact with other services except for the few who operated as 
forward air coordinators.
106
 Because the Vietnam War was fought amongst the people on 
a dispersed battlefield, the NZA came into contact with locals and in general proved 
successful at winning the ‗hearts and minds‘; contact with NGOs and non-Vietnamese 
citizens was limited but occurred, in comparison with the earlier conflicts where this type 
of interaction was rare at best.
107
 Along with heightened irregularity was the increased 
criticality of contact between NZA and Vietnamese: each contact mattered more. 
 
Both the artillery and infantry units in Vietnam were engaged in primarily combat tasks, 
either providing the combined Australian and American unit with supporting fire, in the 
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case of the former, or jungle patrols and cordon and search operations, in the case of the 
latter, however, in 1971 the NZA commitment changed from combat to training of the 
South Vietnamese Armed Forces; a precursor to the expanded mandate operations it 
would undertake in the future.  
 
The Vietnam War was a media event like no other conflict before it, marking a dramatic 
turning point both because of the critical content and the near instantaneous broadcasting. 
New Zealand media, and NZ newspapers in particular, offered an independent, objective 
and newly critical perspective, although it should be noted that the New Zealand 
Broadcasting Corporation coverage was limited by both governmental control and a 
degree of self-censorship.
108
 The Vietnam War saw the first large-scale antiwar protests 
in New Zealand, which was a product of, inter alia, the new and critical manner in which 
the conflict was portrayed in the media.
109
 The NZA was aware of the new power of the 
media on public opinion, as can be seen from the introduction to their lessons learned 
publication: ―[t]he political ramifications of apparently military matters invariably altered 
normal consideration. Public reactions, actual or potential, were at all times important 
influences.‖110 The New Zealand Government, as with Korea and Malaya, justified its 
involvement in Vietnam on containing communism and the principle of collective 
security; also however, in contrast to previous conflicts, bar Korea, New Zealand was 
now acting at the behest of a new patron, America, rather than for its traditional 
Commonwealth master, Britain.
111
 
 
Consequences 
In some senses one of the most important consequences of the Vietnam War was an 
appreciation of the ‗new‘ nature of the conflict and a desire to assimilate the lessons 
learnt and build on them and the similar, in some ways, experience in Malaya- this was 
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true, at least, for the NZA to a degree.
112
 Important, however, was the converse reaction, 
which was especially prevalent in America, in which the military saw irregular conflict as 
secondary and of lesser importance than preparing for the expected global conflagration 
with the USSR. This logic was valid, to a point, as any conflict with the USSR would 
likely have far more portentous consequences; however, the loss to a ‗numerically 
inferior force of lightly armed irregulars‘ was a source of embarrassment and anger to 
many in the military establishment and for this reason many of the lessons of Vietnam 
were not learnt.
113
 Instead, irregular conflicts were seen as less important and even 
irrelevant to the larger strategic picture despite their continuing growth throughout the 
world.
114
 To the astute observer though, Vietnam was the klaxon call that heralded the 
increasing potency of irregular warfare, and a lesson that militaries ignore at their peril. 
Furthermore, like the Korean War before it, Vietnam was a proxy war and was thus 
limited in the same ‗artificial‘ manner. The politico-military desire to limit the war so that 
it did not escalate to mutual nuclear annihilation meant that all military action was 
governed by this overarching principle. Another consequence was the revelation of the 
emerging power of the media and public opinion on military affairs and the end of near 
unquestioning public support for military operations.
115
 Many in the US military blamed 
the media for ‗losing‘ the war, ignoring the multitude of mistakes they had made 
throughout the conflict.
116
 These indignant howls were not completely misplaced, as the 
Tet Offensive proved: bloody, visceral images played on television sets across the US as 
the Vietcong launched a nation-wide set of co-ordinated attacks sharply contradicting 
official reports that the US was winning the war and would be able to withdraw 
victorious. Although Tet was a military failure for the Vietcong, easily defeated by the 
US, it had been a political triumph, striking the democracy in its soft, public, underbelly. 
Military opprobrium, however, should have been self-reflective rather than directed at the 
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media, as it was their misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict that facilitated such 
an upset.
117
  
 
Zimbabwe 
Conflict 
The former British colony of Rhodesia (renamed Zimbabwe after intervention) had been 
riven by a fourteen-year civil war between the white minority government and the 
nationalist Patriotic Front, who themselves were composed of two separate and 
antagonistic irregular, uniformed forces, when in 1979 the sides meet in London to 
negotiate.
118
 The conflict that led to the London negotiations was relatively representative 
of the post-colonial struggles that occurred across much of the globe during this period, 
with ―no set-piece battles, but rather a series of small-unit actions, ambushes and counter 
raids‖ similar to Malaya and Vietnam.119 In December 1979, 74 NZA personnel were 
deployed to Zimbabwe for just over two months as part of the Commonwealth 
Monitoring Force (CMF), whose task was to observe the cease-fire that had been agreed 
upon in London.
120
 They arrived in a country decimated by years of civil war with a 
limited infrastructure and large amounts of displaced people. The NZA personnel felt 
alienated from all three sides, and there was a strong contrast between New Zealand and 
Rhodesian cultures and attitudes, both native and colonial.
121
  
 
The cease-fire came into effect days after the NZA arrived so the threat level was 
relatively low. It was far from safe and stable though, as they were operating in small 
groups among Patriotic Front guerrillas who ―had no intention of being disarmed‖ in a 
situation ―where the wrong look or reaction could have led to bloodshed‖.122 The nature 
of the operation was political rather than military, in that NZA personnel had to gain the 
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trust and allegiance of the guerrilla fighters, who initially opposed New Zealand 
involvement due to sporting ties with South Africa; they proved adept at this, even 
sharing their own supplies to ameliorate tension over deficiencies at the Assembly 
Points.
123
  
 
Deployment 
The CMF comprised of mostly British personnel with minor contingents from Australia, 
Kenya and Fiji, though the NZA personnel generally operated in small, isolated groups 
with little interaction with other national contingents and none with other services.
124
 In 
contrast, the NZA mixed with a number of civilians during the CMF operation, including 
a small number of NGOs who were involved in refugee resettlement and the refugees 
themselves.
125
 NZA interaction with civilians was effective, Crawford concluded his 
analysis stating that ―[c]entral to the success New Zealand teams was the good 
relationship they established with the Zipra (Patriotic Front faction) forces‖.126 
 
During the brief operation the NZA personnel carried out a number of diverse tasks: 
disarming, or at least attempting to, comparatively large numbers of unwilling fighters; 
handing out limited humanitarian aid; and mediating between belligerents.
127
 The NZA 
successfully completed these tasks, or managed them in the case of disarmament, despite 
the ad hoc nature of the operation.
128
 
 
The CMF was a traditional peacekeeping operation, in that it was consented to by all 
parties, required neutrality and was limited by stringent rules on the use of force; its role 
was to ―monitor and report on observance of the ceasefire by both sides‖ and it had no 
enforcement jurisdiction.
129
 New Zealand‘s involvement in this peacekeeping operation, 
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like the conflicts before, was predicated on Commonwealth duty and allegiance to 
collective security. 
 
Consequences 
The CMF was seen as a relatively successful operation; possibly because it ―seemed to 
fly in the face of logic. Its composition and mandate went against conventional wisdom 
concerning the centrality of impartiality, the requirement to disarm the warring parties, 
the necessity for at least a minimal enforcement capability and the inevitability of a long-
term presence in theatre.‖130 The UN took many lessons from the CMF and the operation 
can be seen as one of the transitional moments leading up to the dramatic shift at the end 
of the Cold War.
131
  It was a transitional operation, which did not fit into the traditional 
mould as did UNMOGIP and others, yet was still relatively limited in comparison to later 
operations.
132
 Though not a direct consequence of the CMF operation, it was at this point 
in time that peacekeeping operations began to be viewed as a primary function of the 
NZA by both command and personnel; during the 1960s and 1970s participants had come 
chiefly from the Territorial Force, though by the 1980s this had ended and the operations 
were largely manned by NZA Regulars showing both the growing diversity and scope of 
peacekeeping operations and the perception of their importance.
133
 This stands in contrast 
to UNMOGIP, one of the NZA first peacekeeping operations, where the initial 
deployment of three was composed of Territorials. This change in perception was fuelled 
by both the growth in the size and scope of the operations and an expanded appreciation 
of the wider security agenda. Essentially then, it was both a practical and philosophical 
comprehension of the growing centrality of peacekeeping operations. 
 
Cambodia 
Conflict 
                                                 
130
 Stuart Griffin, ―Peacekeeping, the UN and the Commonwealth,‖ Commonwealth & Comparative 39.3 
(November 2001): 158.  
131
 Griffin, 159-160. 
132
 Thakur, 4. 
133
 Pugsley, Kiwis in Conflict, 278. 
 125 
Cambodia had suffered through decades of violence when in 1992 the United Nations 
Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC) was deployed to take control of the country 
in the lead up to the UN organised national elections.
134
 Troops in Cambodia experienced 
a degree of culture shock, not just due to its non-Western aspect but also because of the 
intense isolation and devastation the country had experienced since 1975.
135
 The Khmer 
Rouge had been fighting a retrograde guerrilla war since losing power in 1979 and by 
1992 the largely irregular force did not wear uniforms, making them virtually 
indistinguishable from other Cambodians.
136
 The fragile Cambodian peace collapsed as 
the Khmer Rouge broke the Paris Accords, taking a number of UNTAC personnel 
hostage, including New Zealanders, and trapping a group of NZA personnel in a building 
and firing at them with small arms.
137
  
 
The Khmer Rouge adhered to standard irregular techniques, generally ―causing 
widespread disorder and chaos‖ and specifically taking hostages with the intent of 
destroying the political will of the UN and its constitute nations.
138
 The situation in 
Cambodia was exceedingly complex, with a rogue army who refused to subscribe to the 
Paris Accords sniping at UNTAC forces, who were highly constrained in their action by 
stringent ROE; the political took primacy, both because of the legal constraints and 
because of the need for UNTAC to present itself as a just force so as to win the allegiance 
of the populace. The political nature of the situation, and particularly the battle for 
perception, was apparent to the Khmer Rouge, who attempted to cause schisms within 
UNTAC by labelling various contingents ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘, a strategy that was relatively 
effective and split the heterogeneous force until counter measures were emplaced.
139
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Deployment 
UNTAC was ―the most ambitious operation in the history of UN peacekeeping‖ and this 
is reflected in the composition.
140
 The NZA was part of coalition that comprised of 16 
000 military personnel from 45 countries representing all five inhabited continents.
141
 
There were a number of issues relating to the multinational facet of UNTAC. Inequities 
of pay caused tension; as did differences in discipline, risk aversion and ROE.
142
 As Ryan 
writes ―the military component of UNTAC was plagued with internal problems that can 
be ascribed to the ‗wide disparities in the training, equipment and competence of various 
national contingents‘‖ and that ―[a]t the worst this inconsistency within the force 
threatened the ability of the UN to achieve its mission.‖143 Added to the armed forces 
were the almost 140 international NGOs active in Cambodia during UNTAC, a 
proliferation that would be a defining characteristic of post-Cold War operations in 
contrast to previous operations where NGOs were virtually non-existent.
144
 Also, there 
were 4 000 police, 1 149 international UN civilian staff and 465 UN Volunteers from a 
variety of nations.
145
  
 
At the time UNTAC was the expanded mandate peacekeeping operation sine pari, with 
near sovereignty over Cambodia. Military personnel conducted a large number of 
different tasks including: the cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of the various 
armed factions; the supervision, monitoring and verification of withdrawal and non return 
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of foreign military forces; mine clearance; and military security.
146
 This expanded 
mandate stands in stark contrast with the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring and 
supervising a cease-fire of pre-Cold War operations.
147
 However, NZA personnel were 
still constrained within the traditional peacekeeping framework and beholden to strict 
traditional peacekeeping ROE so that when the Khmer Rouge fired upon them they were 
only able to fire warning shots over their heads.
148
  
 
UNTAC was ―given more control over media than any previous UN mission‖ and 
displayed the media-savvy characteristics of a modern operation, operating its own radio 
station and newspapers and carefully controlling the formation of opinion within 
Cambodia; at the international level the operation received widespread attention, which 
both the military and civilians heads thought was negative.
149
 UNTAC, like most 
peacekeeping operations before it, was mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 
and in the eyes of the international community was therefore justified under the 
principles of collective security, though underlying guilt over previous inaction and the 
dire situation in the country provided powerful reasoning.
150
 Nonetheless, while the 
justification for the operation still conformed to Cold War principles of international 
security, the reality of the operation was that it had many similarities to the humanitarian 
interventions of the post-Cold War era, though the UN was invited in by the various 
warring Cambodian groups.
151
  
 
Consequences 
UNTAC, whilst a major operation for the UN as a whole was not highly significant for 
the NZA as only a small number of non-combat troops were deployed, namely mine 
clearance, engineering and communications teams. One important element was the 
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development of the NZA mine clearance team as a world class group who went on to a 
number of other operations including Afghanistan.
152
 For UNTAC as a whole, as both a 
qualitative and quantitative break with Cold War peacekeeping operations, there were a 
number of lessons learned. One of the most critical with regard to this thesis was the 
obvious importance of correct conduct and the maintenance of discipline in modern and 
ambitious peacekeeping operations in areas that are still experiencing significant tension. 
Due to its size and the resultant discrepancies between national contingents, there were 
serious cases of misconduct in Cambodia that had deleterious effects on the perception of 
the mission as a whole.
153
 The second lesson was that personnel would have to be of a 
higher-than-previous standard because the expanded mandate increased demands on the 
troops, both in regards to discipline as mentioned above and in general skills and 
proficiency, particularly in such areas as negotiation and mediation, and language as well 
as knowledge sets relevant to cantonment and humanitarian aid dispersal.
154
 The size and 
scope of UNTAC bought the issues of troop quality into focus and found many 
contributors wanting, particularly conscripted personnel. 
 
Furthermore, it was found that to be effective in accomplishing increasingly extensive 
tasks in such a chaotic and fluid situation, peacekeepers would need less restrictive and 
more explicit ROE.
 155
 Closely allied to this was a realisation of the necessity of post-
Cold War peacekeeping operations being backed up with the military capability to 
prevent or respond to any escalation of conflict. Also of note was that with the expanded 
mandate operations of the post-Cold War period, and their growing complexity and 
interagency nature, there had to be a unity of effort and a high degree of coordination 
both between military contingents and between the military and civilian components of 
an operation for a successful outcome.
156
  
                                                 
152
 Judith Martin, ―Cambodia-Helping Rebuild a Nation,‖ New Zealand Defence Force, accessed on 24 
February 2009, available from http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/publications/defence-update-
newsletter/2005/32/chran.htm. 
153
 Ibid. 
154
 John B. Haseman, ―Garuda XII: Indonesian Peacekeeping in Cambodia,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Summer 1996): 94. 
155
 Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, 139-141. 
156
 William J. Doll and Steven Metz, The Army and Multinational Peace Operations: Problems and 
Solutions (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Insitute, 1993), 5, accessed 20 April 2009, available from 
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub343.pdf. 
 129 
 
Former Yugoslavia 
Conflict 
The NZA‘s large-scale commitment in the Balkans began in 1994 when a 250-man 
infantry company was deployed with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for fifteen 
months.
157
 Kiwi Company, the single largest contingent deployed since the Korean War 
and the first combat unit committed to a UN peacekeeping operation, was sent into what 
was at the time ―the most complex regional conflict‖ since the end of the Cold War, and 
unlike traditional peacekeeping missions, operated in a ―hostile environment‖ amongst a 
plethora of regular militaries and irregular militias and paramilitaries who were not 
consistently respecting any of the various cease fire or peace agreements.
158
 Adding to 
the confusing melange of actors, action took place across a diverse AO that included both 
rural and urban areas between Byzantine networks of adversaries using both regular and 
irregular techniques.
159
 With respect to urban operations, the siege of Sarajevo is 
considered to be one of the most diverse in history, involving a number of different 
factions, lasting three years and ranging from low-to-high-intensity combat- with UN 
forces all the while attempting to bring humanitarian aid and mediate.
160
 
 
Critically, the numerous irregular groups were not beholden to international law nor did 
they prescribe to the Western moral paradigm, with the UN identifying a number of 
violations including: ―killings, torture, inhuman treatment, inflicting great sufferings, 
injuries to physical integrity or health, forcible displacement, conversion to other religion, 
forcing to prostitution, application of measures of intimidation and terror, taking 
hostages, confining to concentration camps and other illegal forms of detention, forcing 
to serve the enemy's army, starving the population out, looting of property, [and] 
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destruction of towns and other settlements.‖161 The DePaul University International 
Human Rights Law Institute list of militias and paramilitaries operative in the former 
Yugoslavia during the conflict has forty-one groups identified.
162
 Though occurring in a 
European environment, the diverse ethnic and religious mix of the actors in the conflict 
offered the potential for culture shock; the situation was so complex that the Kiwi 
Company Commander stated that ―the longer you are here the more confusing [the 
conflict] becomes‖ and that even many locals did not understand the complexities of the 
conflict.
163
  
 
UNPROFOR‘s mission was inherently political, constrained by stringent traditional 
peacekeeping ROE and with no specific enemy, ―the Steyr [was] not the main personal 
weapon- the Kiwis‘ ease in forming friendships [was].‖164 Despite the restrictions 
imposed on the NZA personnel, they were still operating amongst a mid-intensity conflict 
where at least 300 peacekeepers had been taken hostage by various groups and ―17 were 
being used by the Bosnian Serb Army as human shields against the return of NATO 
jets.‖165 The difficulties in achieving success were manifold as ―the gap between the 
UN‘s pretensions and its capabilities‖ increased throughout the operation and the 
pressures and demands on the peacekeepers grew while their ability to act contracted.
166
 
In short, the NZA were caught in a deteriorating situation in which their range of actions 
was limited by increasingly irrelevant political constraints with the dual result that they 
were unable to deliver the requisite security for the locals or themselves.
167
  
 
Deployment 
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Though Kiwi Company largely operated on their own, they were attached to a number of 
British battalions during the operation, whose military culture surprised some NZA 
personnel.
168
 Also, the NZA worked closely with Dutch and Canadian units as well as 
patrolling along the confrontation line with Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government 
military forces.
169
 Amongst the NZA contribution to UNPROFOR were a number of 
Tactical Air Control personnel who operated with air forces, which was the only inter-
service contact during the operation.
170
 With such a diverse array of contributing nations 
UNPROFOR suffered from a number of the same problems as UNTAC. Beyond the 
military interactions in the AO, NZA personnel operated amongst a diverse variety of 
actors ranging from the various warring factions, locals and a large number of NGO 
personnel from over 530 separate organisations as well as the Western media.
171
  
 
UNPROFOR‘s mandate became increasingly ambitious as the situation in the Balkans 
deteriorated, making fulfilment of the recognised objectives of deployment increasingly 
difficult. The UN antagonised various combatants by breaking its traditional 
peacekeeping principles, even though the ROE remained relatively static.
172
 The lack of 
support for the expanded mandate of UNPROFOR caused anger, frustration and 
disappointment amongst serving soldiers, caught between the reserve of traditional ROE, 
which were extremely complex, ineffectual and confusing, and new, limited, enforcement 
measures.
173
 The NZA‘s principle task was monitoring the compliance to the agreements 
between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government authorities, they placed an emphasis on 
―undertaking humanitarian activities such as creating medical clinics for local civilians, 
developing a mine awareness programme, rebuilding damaged schools, digging pipelines, 
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filling pot holes, moving rubble, disarmament, restoring utilities such as electricity and 
water, and delivering seeds, toys and aid to refugees.‖174  
 
As would be expected for a modern operation in a developed area, the media were 
―highly influential on public opinion in the former Yugoslavia during the country‘s 
terminal crisis and violent disintegration.‖175 UNPROFOR was deployed in AO with 
―relatively sophisticated media‖ and local governments who sought to ―exploit [their] 
formal and informal control over the most influential media outlets to frustrate the actions 
and purposes of the international mission.‖176 At the international level the conflict and 
UNPROFOR were the contemporary cause célèbre and both received intensive and 
instantaneous media coverage, which became increasingly negative as the situation 
deteriorated.
177
 The international media by this stage were armed with a ―lap-top 
computer, a Marisat telephone, and a portable ‗up link‘ satellite‖, allowing for real time 
coverage of the conflict.
178
 Gowing, though questioning the power of the CNN effect, 
does illustrate how the media created and maintained a degree of Western resolve toward 
the crisis, which is an opinion confirmed by Gen. Rupert Smith, who served as 
UNPROFOR British Force Commander.
179
 The power of the modern media was such 
that UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, in reference to the conflict, 
―[t]oday, the media do not simply report the news. Television has become a part of the 
events it covers. It has changed the way the world reacts to crisis.‖180 UNPROFOR, 
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whilst still predicated to a degree on collective security, was the first humanitarian 
intervention, ushering in a new era of PSOs.
181
  
 
Consequences 
UNPROFOR is often cited as one of the UN‘s post-Cold War failures, where capability 
fell short of ambition and it was an important lesson for the troop contributing nations, 
including New Zealand, regarding ends and means.
182
 In particular, the deteriorating 
situation outpaced the mandate and the ROE, which were perceived by many militaries as 
being too restrictive, left the troops constrained when circumstances changed; the 
necessity for clear and cohesive objectives and flexible means to achieve these objectives 
became apparent during UNPROFOR.
183
 Also, the lack of cohesive political will and 
commitment from contributing nations, another issue tied up with the gap between 
ambition and capability and the changing OE, meant that the operation was not conducted 
as a unified whole but rather by separate entities with similar, though not the same, 
objectives.
184
 As Gen. Rupert Smith commented on UNPROFOR, ―[t]here was no 
strategic direction… all acts were tactical.‖185 The conflict in the Former Yugoslavia was 
representative of contemporary conflict, with a diverse set of actors from local 
paramilitaries to military contingents from across the globe as well as a multitude of 
journalists and aid workers; it had such an impact on Gen. Rupert Smith that it led him to 
develop his new paradigm, the ‗war amongst the people‘.186  UNPROFOR suffered from 
the same disparities in quality of personnel as UNTAC and further illustrated the 
necessity of high quality professional troops in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations. 
Allied to this was, as the then NZA Chief of General Staff Maj. Gen. Reid, identified, the 
criticality of the discipline and morale of the junior leaders in the post-Cold War 
peacekeeping environment.
187
 This is a clear echo of Krulak‘s strategic corporal concept 
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and is indicative of the added responsibility placed on all personnel in the modern 
operation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 135 
The NZA‘s operational environment has seen significant changes since WW2. The form 
of the conflict has moved from conventional interstate warfare that saw two Western, or 
Western influenced, regular armed forces fighting to defeat the other militarily in a well-
defined battlespace to nebulous irregular conflicts that are conducted amongst local 
populations from non-Western locations requiring political rather than military solutions. 
As conflict has become increasingly irregular it has been drawn into increasingly 
complex terrains; witness the difference between the ‗clean‘ battlefield of North Africa 
versus the frontless battlespace of Vietnam. Opponents have become increasingly 
intangibly asymmetrical, and correspondingly, the weaker has adopted irregular 
techniques such as ambushes and hostage taking. Similarly, the adversary has become 
harder to identify, from the massed and uniformed, invariably young and male, Western 
militaries, familiar in physical and mental form, to the non-Western irregular forces that 
are dispersed, unidentifiable and not beholden to the Western moral/legal paradigm.  
 
Political success- ‗hearts and minds‘- has become increasingly common and important; 
from Malaya on the NZA have been deployed to situations where the military defeat of 
the enemy has not been as important as gaining the populations allegiance; though this is 
a truism for traditional peacekeeping operations, over the relevant period it was also a 
trend in conflict-oriented operations as well. Closely related to this, and particularly so 
for peacekeeping operations, is the dominance that the political has gained over the 
military levels, so that military considerations are often secondary to political realities; 
whereas in WW2 and Korea the military issues were relatively separate, such that in 
North Africa General Montgomery had relative autonomy from British High Command, 
while in comparison the various leaders of UNPROFOR were constrained by stringent 
and irrelevant ROE, the individual political considerations of the various national 
contingents and the allegiance of the various adversaries and their constituent 
populations.  
 
NZA deployments have always been multinational, the major change has been that the 
coalition partners have become increasingly diverse and that, in part due to the nature of 
the operation, the interaction between the national contingents has increased. The inter-
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service interaction up to UNPROFOR has not changed significantly. The reason for the 
lack of change to that point is twofold; first, is that the conceptual changes that the NZDF 
went through during the late 90s and early 00s had not been implemented and, secondly, 
the operational tempo of the NZDF as a whole only began to increase dramatically at the 
turn of the millennium. At the civil-military level the growth in actors in the AO was 
enormous over the half-century period covered; the relatively barren AOs of WW2, 
Korea, Kashmir and Malaya stand in stark contrast to the highly complex and busy AOs 
of the modern operation, which are populated by militias, guerrillas, civilians, journalists 
and literally hundreds of different NGOs. For example, the contrast between Korea, 
where the AO was consciously cleared of non-military personnel, to the Former 
Yugoslavia, where there were at least forty irregular groups and over 530 different NGO 
organisations and three separate populations, is vast and is indicative of the complexity 
faced by the NZA.  
 
Comparisons between early operations tasks, be they conventional conflict or traditional 
peacekeeping, and the modern mission‘s expanded mandate are interesting; while high-
intensity conflict could never be called narrow in scope, the modern operation involves a 
number of non-combat tasks, including humanitarian aid delivery, disarmament and 
demobilisation, force cantonment and election-monitoring, whilst also including low, and 
maybe mid, -intensity combat, although up to UNPROFOR this was a symptom to be 
ameliorated rather than confronted. During the historical scope of this chapter the conflict 
lowered in intensity whilst the peacekeeping operations became more ambitious and were 
deployed in areas that were increasingly unstable; in this way military operations have 
begun to fuse the two so that the contemporary mission is usually a hybrid form- the 
Three Block War paradigm- where the NZA has to face the full spectrum of operational 
tasks from SASOs to CO. Correspondingly, the ROE for modern operations have become 
increasingly complex as the mandate has expanded, adding another layer of intricacy to 
the operation. 
 
The media is another area that has seen massive change in the relevant period; coverage 
during WW2 was limited by both technology and censorship in a manner that the modern 
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operation is not, though it should be noted that many governments still dictate coverage 
to differing degrees. Despite this, the general trend has been for the continued growth in 
freedom of the media. By the late stages of this period the journalist was armed with a 
panoply of technological devices that gave instant global access and, in the examples of 
both UNTAC and UNPROFOR, the freedom to express negative views.  
 
Finally, the justification for deployment, though remaining fairly constant, has expanded 
beyond the traditional Cold War rationale of collective security to include humanitarian 
issues. The end of the Cold War allowed for expanded justification and this will be 
illustrated in full in the two case studies, as the period covered in this section ends at the 
dawn of this new era. One final note is that though New Zealand has ostensibly 
prescribed to the principle of collective security throughout this period, we have followed 
a clear trend of patronage and allegiance, starting out as a Dominion of the British 
Empire, then as a loyal member of the Commonwealth and finally as somewhat reluctant 
vassal of the US. 
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Summary of NZA OE Continuum and Implications for Military Ethics 
Characteristi
c 
Historical OE COE Constructive  Preventative 
Location Intra Western, 
even if fought 
in non-Western 
areas, clear 
battlefield 
Non-
Western/Underdeve
loped/Complex 
battlespace 
Culture shock/ 
Terrain and 
infrastructure 
issues 
Non-Western:  
different moral/legal  
paradigm 
Technique Regular/Clause
witzean 
Irregular, 
asymmetric  
Critical: 
techniques 
intended to break 
morale and 
discipline  
Distinction/Proportion/ 
LOAC/ROE 
harder to apply 
Combatant Regular/Wester
n  
Irregular, disparate 
and multitudinous, 
non-Western 
Complexity: 
discipline 
Distinction/Proportion/ 
LOAC/ROE 
harder to apply/More  
important 
Multinational Limited/ 
Commonwealth 
Extensive/Diverse Culture 
shock/Material 
grievances/Compl
exity/Command 
issues 
Different ROE: 
application complexity 
Joint Limited 
interaction/ 
Defined 
division 
Common/Integrated Inter-service 
clash/Complexity  
--- 
Civil-
Military 
Hermetic/Simil
ar/Non-critical  
Integrated/Diverse/ 
Critical 
Culture 
shock/Complexity
/ 
Clash between 
military and 
civilian ethoi 
Distinction/Proportion/ 
LOAC/ROE 
harder to apply/More  
important 
Expanded 
Mandate 
Rare/Combat 
oriented 
operations 
Common/Diverse 
concurrent and 
coterminous 
operational tasks  
Boredom/Frustrat
ion/Political 
interference/Com
plexity/Clash or 
adaptation of 
Warrior ethos 
Dynamic ROE/ 
Politically inhibited 
Communicati
on/Media 
Delayed/ 
Limited/ 
Controlled 
Instant/Pervasive/ 
Uncontrolled 
 
Complexity/Extra 
responsibility 
Conduct amplified:  
more critical 
Justification Security based Morally justified --- Means and ends must 
be  
commensurate 
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Chapter Five 
Timor-Leste: INTERFET and UNTAET 
 
―We are dying as a People and as a Nation.‖ 
Bishop Belo, Timorese Nobel Laureate, in a letter to the UN Secretary General.
1
 
 
―New Zealand was prepared to match our words with our deeds and the military 
contribution made by our nation to this operation was our most significant since the 
Korean War. That New Zealand took this action is entirely consistent with our long 
history of strongly supporting the United Nations, the principles of collective security and 
the rights of small states.‖ 
The Honourable Dame Cartwright, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in and 
over New Zealand.
2 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the international intervention into Timor-Leste (formerly 
known as East Timor) that began on the 20
th
 of September 1999, as ―wave after wave‖ of 
C-130s flew through the acrid smoke of the burning capital of Dili, landing the first 
echelon of Australian, British and New Zealand troops and equipment at Komoro 
airfield.
3
 Timor-Leste would be the NZDF‘s largest military operation in nearly half a 
century; a total commitment of over 6000 Defence Force personnel, with the NZA 
contributing six battalion rotations over the course of the deployment.
4
 The United 
Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) had been mandated to conduct a 
ballot regarding Timor-Leste‘s political future, three months before the International 
Force East Timor (INTERFET) was deployed, which, in the interests of expediency, was 
only UN-sanctioned; it was not until February 2000 that INTERFET was replaced by the 
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UN-led United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), whose 
mandate ended in May 2002 when the country declared its independence. This chapter 
will utilise the whole operation for examination, from the initial phases of UNAMET, the 
whole of INTERFET through to end of UNTAET.
5
  
 
 
 
Specific Operational Environment 
The situation in Timor-Leste was largely the product of clumsy decolonisation and 
perfidious Cold War politicking.
6
 After the 1974 Carnation Revolution ended Salazar‘s 
authoritarian Estado Novo and, following subsequent promises of independence made by 
Portugal, a civil war broke out between Timor-Leste‘s political parties.7 As Portugal‘s 
interest and influence over its charge waned, Indonesia invaded with covert international 
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approval and overt international indifference, though it should be noted that a number of 
international organisations publicly condemned the incursion.
8
 The invasion was ordered 
by Indonesia‘s military dictator, Suharto, a tyrant who had come to power in 1965 by 
―unleashing a bloodbath that left an estimated one million dead‖.9 On the 17th July 1976, 
Timor-Leste was incorporated as a province of Indonesia, heralding the beginning of a 
―long, bloody and disastrous occupation‖ by the Indonesian Army (TNI).10 The TNI ruled 
Timor-Leste as a near fief and, while the local populace was subjected to random and 
tailored violence and their general situation deteriorated, the TNI avariciously profited.
11
 
Although a third of the pre-invasion population had been ―put to the sword… the 
guerrilla resistance… survived, maintaining… an effective presence in East Timor‘s [sic] 
rugged mountains. It [was] a case unparalleled in the history of guerrilla warfare, 
especially when one considers that the theatre of war was a small island territory without 
the benefit of sanctuaries over contiguous borders.‖12  
 
Most of the international community, with a few exceptions including New Zealand and 
Australia, never gave de jure recognition of Indonesia‘s sovereignty over Timor-Leste 
but for 24 years their de facto hold over the territory was complete.
13
 Again it would be 
the vicissitudes of their ruler that would offer Timor-Leste a chance for independence, 
when in 1999 Suharto was replaced by a caretaker president, Habibie.
14
 At the beginning 
of 1999 Habibie announced there would be a referendum on the status of Timor-Leste 
and in May of that year Indonesia, Portugal and the UN signed an agreement for the 
UNAMET to supervise the vote.
15
 Habibie‘s decision had been unexpected both 
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internationally and domestically. The TNI, long a pampered and independent institution 
under Suharto, had developed strong psychological and economic links with the territory 
and was unwilling to relinquish its hold; it began to prepare accordingly, supporting and 
arming militias across the region.
16
  
 
UNAMET had around a thousand international personnel including 240 UN staff, 270 
civilian police, 50 military liaison officers and 425 UN volunteers.
17
 It was an 
―outstanding achievement‖ in ―terms of planning and execution‖ of the ballot it was 
mandated to conduct and which it managed to complete on the 30
th
 of August 1999, 
despite a background of rising violence instigated by TNI-supported anti-independence 
militias.
18
 In the lead up to the vote, the pro-Indonesian militias were determined to 
disrupt the process, and when it became clear that the referendum would probably result 
in a decisive vote for independence, they became increasingly intimidatory and violent.
19
 
After the referendum results were announced, revealing that 78 percent of voters had 
rejected autonomy within Indonesia and had voted for total independence, the militias 
unleashed a ―systematic campaign of destruction and terror‖ upon the populace, 
infrastructure and the UNAMET staff.
20
 During this period of violence a number of NZA 
personnel displayed high degrees of personal bravery and were awarded various 
distinctions, including the NZA senior national officer (SNO) Col. Reilly who drove 
through five kilometres of militia-controlled territory to rescue a trapped colleague.
21
 
Reilly, who had also served in Bosnia, would later say he had never seen such anarchy.
22
 
As the UNAMET staff were evacuated amidst an increasingly volatile and unstable 
situation, plans for a multinational PKO were already underway. 
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UNAMET was a relatively standard UN mission. In contrast, INTERFET and UNTAET, 
though to different degrees, were substantively different from past, traditional, 
peacekeeping operations.
23
 INTERFET was one of the new post-Cold War ‗muscular‘ 
peacekeeping operations and the strongly worded UN mandate provided it with ―all 
necessary measures‖ to restore security; premised on a worst-case scenario, it 
―unambiguously allowed for security to be restored and maintained using all necessary 
and legitimate force, including the use of deadly force.‖24 What made it significant was 
not only the near-unprecedented ‗teeth‘ given it by the UN, but because it was Australian 
and not UN-led, was formed with such speed and that it assumed de facto responsibility 
for governance and rule of law until the UN‘s presence could be established.25  
 
If INTERFET was significant as one of the new, and most ‗muscular‘, peacekeeping 
operations, then UNTAET was a landmark for international relations, marking the most 
ambitious UN project to date, one that aimed at no less than the creation of a viable 
sovereign state.
26
 Under Security Council Resolution 1272, UNTAET was ―endowed 
with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor [sic] and [was] 
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the 
administration of justice‖ with a mandate that demanded it: ―provide security and 
maintain law and order‖; ―establish an effective administration‖; assist in the 
development of civil and social services‖; ―ensure the coordination and delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance‖; ―support capacity 
building for self-government‖; and ―assist in the establishment of conditions for 
sustainable development‖.27 As Maj. Gen. Michael Smith, Deputy Commander of the 
UNTAET PKF, described it, ―UNTAET was to be the de jure [sic] government of a 
broken country.‖28 Chopra, former head of the UNTAET Office of Direct Administration, 
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described UNTAET‘s scope thus: ―[t]he organisational and juridical status of the UN in 
East Timor [sic] is comparable with that of a pre-constitutional monarch in a sovereign 
kingdom. UNTAET is in all aspects the formal government of the country. Both 
legislative and executive powers are in the hands of a single individual, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator… UNTAET‘s 
full legislative and executive powers make it unique among experiments in transitional 
administration, since it is the first time sovereignty has passed to the UN independently 
of any competing authority.‖29 
 
The UNTAET PKF was one of three ‗pillars‘ intended to nurture the gestation of a 
nation, the other two were the Governance and Political Administration and 
Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation.
30
 Together these three pillars 
were to take on one of the most ambitious projects in the UN‘s history: the construction 
of a functioning state from the ashes. This monumental goal, described by Maj. Gen. 
Michael Smith as the ―UN‘s… greatest challenge to that date‖, was the culmination of 
half a century of peacekeeping and, more specifically, nearly a decade of expanded 
mandate operations- particularly in Cambodia and the near simultaneous operation in 
Kosovo.
31
  
The scope and scale of operations in Timor-Leste were of a magnitude that the mission 
had a portentous and ambitious raison d’etre, the salvation of a deprived people and the 
creation of a sovereign state. This can be seen in the speeches of the two relevant New 
Zealand Prime Ministers. When addressing the first wave of NZA personnel deployed 
Jenny Shipley said, ―[t]he people of East Timor [sic] are looking to you and your 
counterparts from Australia and many other nations to restore order and convince them 
that one day they will be able to get on with their normal lives‖.32 Helen Clark, in a 
speech to the sixth and final rotation of troops, said: 
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―Enormous progress has been made since the peacekeepers from New Zealand and 
other nations went to East Timor [sic]. We have helped restore a degree of peace 
and stability to a people who have suffered terribly. The contribution of New 
Zealand Defence Force personnel and civilians has been outstanding. Order has 
been restored in East Timor [sic], allowing the safe distribution of humanitarian 
relief. The enormous task of supporting the East Timorese [sic] in the re-building of 
every aspect of their new country's infrastructure and civil society is well under 
way. East Timor's [sic] first president has been elected and next month this new 
nation will gain the independence for which its people have long struggled.‖33 
The operational environment in Timor-Leste would go through several phases and it is of 
use to identify these here so they may be referred to in the first two sections. The first of 
these phases covers the initial deployment of INTERFET troops into Dili and will be 
referred to as the influx; the next phase covers the period of consolidation of Timor-Leste 
by INTERFET through to the handover and initial operations of UNTAET and will be 
termed consolidation; the final phase, identified here as the upsurge, will focus on the 
period of intense militia activity during UNTAET‘s tenure. The rest of the chapter, from 
the deployment perspective, will discuss the entire operation from the onset of 
INTERFET to the end of UNTAET because the NZA deployment did not change 
significantly and also due to limitations of information on the various characteristics. 
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Context: Conflict 
Location 
In general, Timor-Leste largely fits the expected mould with regard to location; the 
fledgling nation was politically, physically and economically isolated for decades and, 
even after years of UN and international aid, could be classified as a weak state.
34
 During 
the influx INTERFET troops were operating in the capital city of Dili, which had a 
population of 100 000.
35
 Force planners had anticipated potential high-intensity urban 
operations, though upon arrival Dili was found near deserted of its civilian population, as 
were all other major populated areas, having been abandoned as the militia and TNI went 
on a destructive rampage.
36
 Dili was not, however, devoid of people- with eleven 
battalions of TNI and numerous militia members still in the city- or free from friction; 
NZA SNO Colonel Dunne ―was conscious of…. a high degree of tension in the air, and a 
significant amount of firing at night heightened the feeling that serious conflict could 
break out at any time.‖37 The militia and TNI had destroyed much of Dili-some estimates 
are as high as 80%- and the city was still ablaze as the soldiers alighted. As they 
consolidated their hold on the city against varying degrees of resistance, INTERFET 
commanders realised they ―were stretched… in a city that size [and that they] need[ed] 
more infantry people than [they] had‖; for example, Victor Company (VC), the first NZA 
regular unit on the ground, were given an AO which had been previously covered by a 
battalion.
38
 The period of consolidation was, although ultimately relatively benign, one of 
great stress and potential for a high degree of violence, to which a number of incidences 
attest.
39
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The influx was a period of uncertainty; as Crawford and Harper wrote, it was ―a leap in 
the dark‖.40 The location of the OE for the NZA during the influx shows the utility of the 
constructive function; a tense, if not overly violent, destroyed urban environ populated 
with a large number of potential adversaries for which INTERFET was undermanned. 
The stressors on the NZA were significant and the maintenance of morale and discipline 
critical; the utility of the constructive lay in ensuring that despite the flux and violent 
potential of the situation the NZA remained an effective and efficient force. That they did 
is evidenced in Blaxland‘s analysis of the operation for the Australian Land Warfare 
Studies Centre, where he writes that once deployed in Dili ―INTERFET troops exercised 
remarkable restraint, resulting in… a speedy elimination of the threat from armed militia 
members… The troops‘ self-discipline, restraint under provocation, and focus on the 
higher commander‘s intent… proved a noteworthy feature [of the operation].‖41 As 
discussed, comradeship and esprit de corp are critical in urban operations, the ‗mateship‘ 
(as it is colloquially known in the NZA) ameliorating the mental anxiety that is implicit 
in such a stressful context. Also, courage and commitment in the face of the unknown 
would have been vital, for, although the AO was relatively benign in the end, the soldiers 
had no idea of what could happen.  
 
The two following phases, consolidation and upsurge, saw the NZA operating in the 
mountainous jungle area of Cova Lima. As stated in the FLOC, the Cova Lima AO was a 
far larger area than was traditional for a battalion group and has been described as 
―uncompromising and uncomfortable‖, so much so that the environmental rigours were 
etched into the memories of many who served there.
42
 The landscape of Cova Lima was 
characterised by disruptive, mountainous terrain that was ―ideal for insurgent or guerrilla 
activity‖.43 The infantry completed an average of three patrols a day, aggressively 
pursuing the increasingly active militia, who were terrorising the local populace and 
making it hard for refugees to return home, as well as projecting a highly visible presence 
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across the region.
44
 Responding to hundreds of militia sightings, the soldiers had to cover 
large expanses of difficult terrain and lie in wait for days at a time, a task which Crawford 
and Harper state ―require[d] strong discipline, mental and physical toughness and 
patience‖; in other words, the constructive function was of utility as the NZA were 
operating against an ‗unknown‘ adversary across a large AO, in which the militia had the 
advantage, for long periods of time.
45
  
 
The ―harsh operational environment‖, described as ―hostile‖, ―steamy and fetid‖ proved 
extremely difficult, with rain often occluding transportation and communication across an 
already underdeveloped and overstretched infrastructure.
46
 The road network was sparse 
and fragile, with few roads and those that were usable becoming virtually impassable 
during monsoon season.
47
 The inadequate roads caused the deaths of two NZA soldiers in 
separate incidents. In the first of these, the first death during INTERFET, Warrant Officer 
Walser‘s truck rolled down an embankment after the road collapsed; his loss was 
demoralising to his fellow soldiers and all those ―who served alongside Walser were 
deeply moved by his untimely death.‖48 The second death several months later was 
described as ―a shock for the camp community, the second time we‘ve been through it 
and doubly hard coming on Anzac Day, and so close to them coming home.‖49 Operating 
in underdeveloped areas creates risks that would otherwise not exist and can be a stressor, 
and sometimes a killer. The deaths of two fellow NZA personnel from such accidents 
would strain morale and the constructive function, especially values such as service, 
loyalty and commitment, is critical in maintaining morale after such ‗pointless‘ deaths. 
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There is no clear evidence regarding culture shock during the two years the NZA were 
deployed, this could be because, as one NZA soldier said, ―[t]he place is so foreign and 
yet within it we are so confined that you feel detached.‖50 However, the lack of 
convincing evidence would suggest there were no significant incidents, though this is just 
conjecture. 
 
Techniques and Combatants 
In the months preceding INTERFET‘s arrival the pro-Indonesian forces had undertaken a 
campaign of intimidation, terror, destruction of property and widespread displacement 
after being issued specific orders from the TNI, though this last fact was not clear at the 
time.
51
 This rampage by the militia is typical of irregular techniques, creating a turbulent 
atmosphere of fear, uncertainty and dislocation strengthens the irregular actor by creating 
an environment that is advantageous. Following numerous deaths and the destruction of 
80% of properties, nearly a third of the population had escaped over the border to West 
Timor while almost another third were internally displaced.
52
 When INTERFET troops 
touched down they did so in an area that had suffered chronic and acute intimidation and 
dislocation and found the burning capital Dili almost devoid of civilians, though not 
empty.
53
  
 
During the influx the Timor-Leste AO was a complex mixture of combatants, including 
regular TNI troops, TNI Kopasuss Special Forces, local police, Indonesian backed 
militias and pro-independence militias.
54
 As the situation deteriorated, the farrago had 
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intensified and distinction between various groups had become increasingly difficult.
55
 
There were more than a dozen pro-Indonesian militia groups operating in Timor-Leste in 
1999 and while at the beginning of that year there were approximately only 1900 men in 
these militias, by the referendum, following a period of often coercive recruitment 
involving threats or bribes, the numbers had swollen to around 25 000.
56
 
 
 Clear distinction between combatants was difficult, not just due to the number of 
different actors but because: a.) some militia were wearing TNI uniforms, some TNI 
soldiers were wearing militia clothing and many militia were not wearing any uniforms, 
b.) TNI regulars and Kopassus were training, supplying and leading militias, c.) whilst 
officially the TNI were supposed to be aiding INTERFET they were not acting in a 
consistent fashion but rather showed widely variant displays of amity and enmity, d.) 
locals were wearing militia colours and identification as protection, e.) the police force 
had mixed loyalties, f.) a large number of the populace were displaced and transient, 
though Dili itself was largely clear of non-combatants.
57
  
 
In the report for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Robinson 
writes that in late 1999 UN Special Rapporteurs observed ―on many occasions no 
distinction could be made between members of the militia and members of the TNI, as 
often they were one and the same person in different uniforms.‖58 Others were not 
wearing any uniforms and in a simple and direct illustration of the asymmetry between 
the INTERFET troops and the militia, a local women said, ―[i]t is easy for [the militias] 
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to hide, because they look like everybody else -- there is no uniform‖.59 This array of 
combatants stands in stark contrast to the traditional adversary, who was uniformed, 
distinct and acted with a cohesive and consistent modus operandi; with the disparate 
groups in Dili acting erratically, application of the principle of distinction would have 
been difficult; yet because of the delicacy of the situation- trying to avert an all-to-
possible escalation with Indonesia- distinguishing, or at least making every appearance 
that this was the case, between militia and TNI was critical, despite the confusing reality.  
 
It is useful to expand upon an incident that occurred during influx that was relayed by the 
INTERFET Commander, Maj. Gen. Cosgrove. A platoon of INTERFET soldiers 
confronted a battalion of TNI soldiers who were acting belligerently and were ―[d]ressed 
in a mixture of military and civilian clothing… Their dress added to the tension as the 
TNI had agreed that their troops would wear uniform and not mix items of civilian 
clothing. As they had arrived unannounced, it was difficult to determine whether the 
convoy contained troops or militia.‖60 Fortunately the TNI Battalion backed down and a 
major confrontation was averted. This incident reveals the difficulty of distinction for the 
INTERFET troops, dealing with ostensibly ‗rogue‘ and belligerent TNI units who were 
indistinguishable from militia.  
 
The first New Zealand contingent to arrive in Timor-Leste during influx was the NZ 
SAS, followed closely by VC. The SAS secured Dili, then moved out to reconnoitre and 
partially secured much of Timor-Leste in long-range operations.
61
 VC Commander, 
Major Howard, described Dili thus, ―[t]here was a threat, every now and again there 
would be shots somewhere…. There were definite threats. You felt something could 
happen at any minute.‖62 The ambiguity and inherent threat of the situation are 
characteristic of irregular warfare. Added to the perception of threat were the pre-
deployment intimidatory menaces directed at Australian and New Zealand troops by the 
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militias, that many of them would die on Timor-Leste with their hearts ripped out.
63
 This 
illustrates a moral asymmetry: the believability of the threat was heightened by the 
irregular and foreign nature of the militias, who were not bound by the same moral and 
legal rules, thus imbuing the threat with a potency it would otherwise not have. This 
disparity was clear during the influx as ―TNI trucks loaded with Indonesian troops… and 
Militia… cruised through Dili firing indiscriminately whenever out of sight of 
INTERFET troops. The TNI was playing with INTERFET‘s ROEs. The ROEs limited 
INTERFET‘s mandate to situations where a soldier was being ‗personally‘ threatened or 
was acting to protect civilians who were in the process of being threatened… The 
shooting party was obviously well planned and thoroughly reccied, shooting at East 
Timorese [sic] only when they were out of view of the [soldiers] and therefore outside the 
ROEs.‖64 Furthermore, even though the INTERFET commanders had a level of trust with 
their TNI counterparts, the TNI units were an unpredictable quality, with many operating 
in an ostensibly ‗rogue‘ fashion and, as the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies 
described, the Kopassus were using ―tactics of a kind countries like New Zealand would 
never use.‖65  
 
This intangible asymmetry was further emphasised during the influx, when the soldiers 
discovered mutilated corpses, placing pressure on the NZA military ethics.
66
 As NZA 
Platoon Commander Wilson stated, ―[t]hey are quite dignified people and when you see 
some of them with their families butchered only weeks ago, it makes us want to march 
over to West Timor and sort out the perpetrators personally. It‘s hard knowing we 
can‘t.‖67 The necessity of maintaining the moral and legal high ground was critical in this 
type of situation, which was facilitated by both the constructive and preventative 
functions. This can be seen in Wilson‘s statement; whilst empathy and compassion pull 
towards retribution the personnel knew that this was not an appropriate action, the 
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preventative provided the reasoning and the constructive provided the discipline and the 
motivation to adhere to that reasoning.  
 
Of interest however, was that as the civilians returned during the influx the persistent 
presence of the TNI became a point of tension and INTERFET forces had to mediate, 
This alienated the local populace, as in the interests of pacifying the situation the NZA 
had to associate or side with the TNI: the taint of the TNI‘s unethical legacy and 
continued lack of professionalism, in effect, tarnishing the coalition forces.
68
 In some 
cases the forces had to co-man road blocks; the INTERFET troops having to passively 
watch as the TNI ―shook down East Timorese [sic] passing through, taking what little 
cash and goods the survivors had.‖69 Similarly, NZA Private Harris described a situation 
where he and other NZA soldiers saved two militiamen from being ―bailed up by angry 
locals.‖70 These two cases suggest that the preventative function is not always useful in 
winning allegiance, at least in a localised and short-term sense, though it should be added 
that during the influx INTERFET‘s priority was short-term security rather than allegiance 
and, even so, the operation was riding a wave of genuine and widespread Timorese 
appreciation.
71
 
 
Nonetheless, the importance of maintaining moral and legal parameters can be seen in the 
NZDF considerations over arming the armoured personnel carriers configured as 
ambulances. Although it was New Zealand‘s position that INTERFET forces was not 
beholden to the LOAC, the NZDF, as a matter of policy, honoured the LOAC; 
furthermore, even ―though there is no specific rule in LOAC which says that .50 calibre 
weapons may not be mounted on ambulances… It was considered that placing the (red 
cross) on any item of material which is ostensibly in war-fighting configuration can be 
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seen as inviting non-respect for the symbol by opposing forces.‖72 In this case by 
observing the preventative aspect the NZA were attempting to ameliorate a possible 
deterioration in conduct by the TNI and militias. 
 
During the influx it was found that the ―local populace were more reassured by four-man 
patrols, alert but with weapons held casually, than larger units on high alert with weapons 
trained.‖73 Placed into practice, this would have intensified the pressure on the 
constructive function, requiring the soldiers to compromise their safety for the overall 
good of the operation and demanding physical courage and commitment as well as a 
higher sense of service: the political constraints of the operation impinging on military 
considerations. 
 
The influx period, while not actually involving much combat, was a tense and ambiguous 
time, with numerous groups of combatants who were acting erratically and were not 
beholden to the same moral/legal precepts as the NZA. The TNI and militia had created a 
tempestuous, chaotic AO in which the constructive function had remaining utility by 
ensuring that the NZA were a controllable and useful force. In such an environment 
discipline is critical, as NZA Sergeant Sturm commented, ―the uncertainty [played] a big 
part in mental fatigue‖.74 The complexity and resultant stress during influx is evident in 
Farrell‘s concluding remarks:  
 
―The ADF and NZDF‘s successful handling of the situation belied the difficulty 
and complexity of the task. Operating in such close proximity with the TNI, 
within strict ROEs and a confining mandate made the [soldiers‘] situation on the 
ground stressful to say the least.‖75 
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In their report for the Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre report Breen and 
McCauley also describe the heightened levels of tension during influx: ―[t]he tense, 
unpredictable situation over-stimulated INTERFET troops, leaving them edgy, 
apprehensive, sleepless and alert.‖76 It is in combating the effects of mental fatigue and 
stress that the constructive function retains utility. In another Australian Land Warfare 
Studies Centre report, Ryan emphasises the importance of discipline:  
 
―The discipline displayed by INTERFET forces was admirable throughout the 
entire operation. Although the cross-border incursions by militia and the 
sometimes-poor fire control displayed by Indonesian forces resulted in a number 
of incidents, INTERFET troops exercised remarkable restraint and thus avoided 
fighting, which might have escalated the situation.‖77 
 
Furthermore, when operating against an adversary who does not subscribe to the same 
moral/legal paradigm, moral and physical courage become even more critical because the 
fear of personal consequences is higher and the possibility of torture and mutilation is an 
added stressor. Another contributing factor is the expertise inherent in professionalism, 
where the training and knowledge give the soldier the ability to act effectively in the 
stressful environ, providing the skills to operate under pressure. The constructive function 
also prevented the NZA from contravening the rules of the preventative function, as the 
quote from Wilson shows: witnessing the effects of the terror campaign caused 
retributive thoughts which, if acted upon, would have breached the preventative 
function‘s parameters. The preventative function showed utility during influx because it 
drew the lines of permissible conduct for the NZA, even when those they were not legally 
beholden to, with the result that, as the above example regarding arming ambulances, 
partially ensured that the conduct of the TNI and militia did not degenerate further.  
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The consolidation period saw the NZA move out to the Cova Lima region, arriving in 
Suai, the regional capital, on 10 October 1999 to find a ―ghost town‖ and evidence of 
numerous killings.
78
 The discovery of a number of mutilated bodies and of a woman in a 
―deranged state‖, who had obviously been tortured and screamed constantly at night, 
―brought home the savagery of the East Timor [sic] crisis to New Zealand troops.‖79 
Once the town of Suai had been secured the NZA began patrolling and securing the entire 
region, as previously described in the location section. Though the soldiers often heard 
rifle fire they rarely came into direct contact with militia groups during the consolidation, 
causing frustration.
80
 When militia had been apprehended during patrol, the NZA had to 
adhere to the strict LOAC and ROE surrounding the capture of prisoners, even though 
sometimes because of their actions against their fellow Timorese, in the words of NZA 
Cpl. Mumby, they ―[w]ould love to give them a hiding but [instead] we maintain our 
professionalism‖81 In sum, though the situation during the consolidation was at its most 
placid, it was still tense and reminders of the brutality of their adversaries were still 
present. Morale and discipline, as well as values such as commitment, loyalty and service 
would have been vital in the exasperating months of chasing shadows through the 
jungles. They became equally important when, on the rare occasion, militia were caught 
and the soldiers had to show them every courtesy provided by the LOAC and ROE 
despite their conduct towards the Timorese. The day-to-day reality however, was of long 
and testing patrols and ever increasing non-military tasks, which will be discussed in the 
expanded mandate section.  
 
The upsurge period started in March 2000, just after INTERFET had handed over to 
UNTAET, with increased militia sightings and exchange of fire incidents between militia 
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and UNTAET forces.
82
 Through this increased contact, it became evident that the militias 
were better trained, armed, skilled and determined than had been originally assessed.
83
 
During the upsurge, distinction between militia and non-combatants remained difficult, as 
can be seen from these remarks by NZA Pte. Brockman-Palmer, ―[r]emember that time 
we came across those guys in red t-shirts[?]‖ he asks the others… Militia often wore red, 
and for a while locals were wearing Coca-Cola shirts which looked similar. ―We had our 
guns up so fast they almost shat themselves.‖ It ended ok.‖84 The fact that most people 
carried machetes and the widespread availability of TNI uniforms in Timor markets, and 
that many locals were still wearing them as late as the upsurge, also added to the problem 
of distinction.
85
 The ambiguity of the situation, with militia sometimes wearing ad hoc 
uniforms and many locals wearing TNI uniforms and carrying machetes, reveals how 
difficult identifying combatants was for the NZA. 
 
On the 24 July 2000 militia, and possibly members of Kopassus, ambushed a NZ patrol, 
killing a soldier and mutilating his body.
86
 This event appears to have revealed an 
insufficiently inculcated constructive function, as the rest of the platoon ―pretty much 
refused‖ to go back and check to see whether the soldier was dead or just injured; the 
reason for this reluctance and apparent insubordination was that the possible number of 
militia they would have to face intimidated them, though in reality they outnumbered the 
militia two-to-one.
87
 The apparent chaos that followed the incident shows a distinct 
inadequacy of the constructive function‘s cultivation, especially with regard to the 
expertise inherent in professionalism and also in the military values like comradeship, 
loyalty, commitment, courage and service. Ron Smith highlighted the lack of expertise 
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when he discussed the limited training of NZA before the deployment, particularly that 
live fire training had been suspended several years before deployment.
88
 As NZA Lt. Col. 
Burnett said regarding the NZA deployment: ―[w]e have a lot of young soldiers who have 
only been in the army for a year or so.‖89 The lack of expertise and general inexperience 
was also emphasised by Rolfe, an expert on the NZA; he pointed at the ―spate of 
‗unauthorised discharges‘… [as] a sign of inexperienced and inadequately trained 
troops.‖90  
 
The mutilation of the NZ soldier‘s body, which shocked NZ troops in Timor-Leste, 
reiterated the intangible moral asymmetry that existed between militia and the 
multinational force as well as how important constructive function was at combating this 
asymmetry.
91
 This can be seen in the statement by Lt. Col. Dransfield when asked for 
how his battalion would react to the mutilation, ―[o]ur soldiers are professionals and we 
are proudly from a nation which represents certain values.‖92 
 
This ambush, and another that resulted in the death of a Nepalese soldier attached to 
NZA, marked the zenith of militia activity, who were practicing classic irregular 
methods, choosing the time and place for a confrontation then disappearing.
93
 
Furthermore, the militias were aware of the restrictive UNTAET ROE and ―had 
developed tactics to exploit the constraints imposed, such as… having the lead man in a 
militia patrol unarmed, with the remainder following behind remaining armed in order to 
deceive UNTAET troops.‖94 The militia used the UNTAET soldiers‘ limitation, that they 
could not shot unarmed people, against them, using subterfuge to turn the ROE into an 
offensive tactic. The use of ROE as an intangible asymmetric advantage reveals the 
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complexity of the COE and the criticality of the dual functions of military ethics in 
delineating acceptable conduct and ensuring that it is upheld. It reveals the intricacy of 
the relationship between the constructive function and the preventative function: in this 
case the preventative function was prohibitive and endangered the safety of the soldiers, 
yet the ROE had to be maintained to ensure moral and legal authority, which was 
facilitated by the constructive function. Following the upsurge in activity the Falintal 
commander gave the advice that ―too much movement by UNTAET patrols allowed the 
militia to attack on grounds of their choosing‖, and once the patrols had changed tactics 
there was a considerable decline in militia activity.
95
 
 
Allied to the change in patrol tactics was UNTAET Commander Lt. Gen. Niumpradit‘s 
recognition that the militia‘s success was directly related to their ability to intimidate 
and/or win support from the local population, and he therefore changed the military force 
of UNTAET‘s centre of gravity from a direct focus on militia activity to maintaining the 
support of the local population, a change commensurate with the change in mandate from 
INTERFET to UNTAET.
96
 This meant that more emphasis was given to constabulary-
civil-military affairs (CMA) activities, there was increased utilisation of Falintal skills 
and knowledge and, most importantly, UNTAET troops made efforts to become closer to 
the people and, in particular, community leaders.
97
 The results of this were that ―the PKF 
was perceived by a traumatized population to be an honest, professional, and friendly 
military force free from major human rights violations and intent on maintaining their 
security and support.‖98 More specifically, UNTAET forces received increasing 
intelligence relating to the militia, showing a clear relationship between trust of the 
populace and defeat of the adversary.
99
 As Maj. Gen. Lewis, commander of the western 
sector, including Cova Lima, stated: ―[y]ou could see if we were doing well in certain 
areas because the information would start to flow about the location and activities of the 
militia; whereas, if you were not cutting it so well in any particular village, the 
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information flow would just dry up.‖100 This is an obvious illustration of the importance 
of both the preventative and constructive functions in irregular warfare: by conducting 
themselves in a professional, moral and legal manner, the NZA were able to gain the trust 
of Timorese, which in turn facilitated intelligence on militia, as the local perception that 
UNTAET troops respected human rights and conducted themselves professionally was of 
utility to overall operational success. By early 2001 the militia were a ―spent force‖ 
because their ―support base, which [was] the East Timorese [sic] people, [had] now 
turned their backs on them‖.101 
  
The period of upsurge further revealed the importance of the constructive function, 
particularly when under fire, when acting amongst the people and in its role as the 
facilitator of the preventative. The incident in which Pte. Manning died shows how the 
shock of action irregular warfare has to be countered by expertise, commitment and 
courage. Also, the constructive function was of utility when interacting with the Timorese 
because of the importance of being viewed as professional force, especially in 
comparison to the TNI. To win the local population‘s allegiance after decades of corrupt 
occupation by the TNI was crucial in overall operational success and this could only be 
done by, inter alia, convincing the Timorese that the UNTAET soldiers were amenable to 
control and operating in service of their nations. Finally, the constructive function was 
critical in ensuring the maintenance of the preventative function under the trying 
conditions where the militia were using the ROE against the soldiers; any transgression 
on the part of UNTAET forces would have been counter productive in convincing the 
Timorese that UNTAET was different from Indonesia and, especially, the TNI. 
 
The preventative revealed its increasing utility in the upsurge period, which saw the 
international force concentrate on the political solution over military successes against 
the militia. By showing the Timorese that the UNTAET troops adhered to the LOAC and 
the ROE, and more generally that they were a morally and legally upstanding force with 
integrity, the preventative had a utility that was absent from the NZA‘s historical OE. By 
                                                 
100
 Lewis, ―Lessons from East Timor,‖ 272. 
101
 NZA Major Grant Motley, quoted in Anonymous, ―Militia in East Timor are a ‗Spent Force‘- Kiwi 
Peacekeepers,‖ Stuff, 2 April 2001, in Newztext [database on-line] accessed on 3 December 2008. 
 161 
upholding the moral principles and legal rules the NZA, and the rest of the UNTAET 
forces, convinced the Timorese that it was worth supporting and aiding them in the 
interests of their country‘s security and future. This was especially critical for a 
population that had been suppressed by an unprofessional and unethical- by Western 
standards- military for decades. This was a conclusion supported by NZA Lt. Col. 
Hayward, a NZ BATT Commander, who wrote that to offset the years of TNI-rule the 
NZA ―had to act as a role model for the local community, displaying how a professional 
military force should conduct itself‖.102  
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Response: Deployment 
Multinational 
Both operations were multinational. 22 countries supplied troops for INTERFET whilst 
the PKF element of UNTAET was composed of 30 armed forces, with the main combat 
forces coming from 10 countries.
103
 For the first time ever, various rotations of NZ BATT 
had sub-units from other countries embedded, including a French Canadian company, a 
platoon of Irish Rangers, a Fijian company, a Singaporean platoon and a Nepalese 
company. This degree of multinational integration at battalion level for the NZDF was 
unprecedented.
104
  
Within the battalion there were several issues that arose. In a statement that possibly 
under-emphasised the tensions, Lt. Col. Burnett said that ―[h]aving a large group of 
independent-minded, French-speaking Canadians under their command was an 
arrangement that created ‗a few challenges‘‖.105 Another issue that arose from the 
composite nature of the battalion was that the 2000 Fijian coup occurred during 
operations, resulting in the 185 Fijians being distracted for a number of weeks before the 
situation settled down.
106
 In effect, this reduced the operational efficacy of the battalion 
even though for the New Zealanders the event was largely irrelevant. The necessity of the 
constructive function is clear, the soldiers had to look beyond personal irritation and 
annoyance at the compromises and conflicts inherent in a composite multinational 
battalion and do their duty to the best of their ability, which is what military values, such 
as service, loyalty, integrity and commitment enable. Despite problems, Maj. Gen. 
Cosgrove claimed that the Canadians, Irish, Fijians, and Nepalese ―had all been warm in 
their praise of the Kiwi leadership‖.107  
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At the theatre level there were a number of problems engendered by the multinational 
composition. Variance in pay was one of these. Following the death of Pte. Manning, a 
paper reported there was contention over pay rates in light of the death; the soldiers were 
―reported to have said their pay reflected a lower security rating.‖108 Although the chief 
of army general staff said the pay rates were generous he also admitted that NZ troops 
were getting paid less than their Australian counterparts and a number of NZA personnel 
held meetings in Timor-Leste and threatened to resign because of pay disparities.
109
 
Again, the multinational aspect of the operation created a tension that would not have 
existed in a more hermetic environment.  
 
Furthermore, the multinational composition caused problems due to the individual 
political limitations each contingent had, whereby some contingents were not able to be 
deployed in combat roles, intelligence was not shared or national contingents disobeyed 
orders from the military chain of command due to national imperatives.
110
 In one case the 
NZ BATT Commander and the commander of the western border sector, Australian Maj. 
Gen. Lewis, attempted to move the Irish Rangers from one hill to another when they 
stopped halfway after Dublin intervened, demanding that the Rangers stayed on the 
original hill.
111
 Finally, there were a number of language problems: for example, when 
working in the headquarters personnel section Lt. Kaio was the only person who spoke 
English as a first language and the level of English that was spoken in the section was of 
a low standard, thus causing difficulties.
112
  
 
The constructive function has a remaining utility in finessing difficulties created by the 
multinational element of the operation. All three elements of the constructive function, 
professionalism, ethos and values, demand that the NZA soldier overcome such issues in 
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the interest of duty to their country and provide motivation in the form of morale created 
through the worth and the higher purpose of duty. Professionalism requires soldiers to 
have responsibility, but also that they have the requisite expertise to cope with the 
situation, so that even if they don‘t have particular skills, such as language, they have the 
ability to overcome the stress created by such a situation. The NZA ethos demands that 
soldiers not only have a commitment to complete any task but that they overcome all 
odds to do so, challenges to adversity that clearly entail overcoming problems derived 
from multinational operations. The particular military values that are pertinent are 
service, loyalty and commitment, which all empower the individual to overcome 
problems through dedication to the greater good.  
 
Though comradeship for the NZA is inclusive of other allied nationalities to differing 
degrees depending on shared history, common values and other relevant factors, this 
multinational esprit de corps was tested by variance in pay and differing political 
imperatives, among many other smaller and unreported issues. Each NZA soldier would 
have had to make individual adjustments to this sense of comradeship depending on 
context, so that to have utility it must remain relatively fluid. Similarly, the multinational 
aspect creates tension for service and loyalty, as duty to New Zealand lies at the heart of 
both, yet within such a diverse multinational coalition there are divergent sets of 
obligation and responsibility that go beyond the simple relationship between a soldier and 
his or her country. Obviously the core allegiance and duty to New Zealand remains the 
same but to retain utility the soldier would have to have a certain flexibility wherein 
service and loyalty has several, nested, nodes beyond the traditional state-centric, 
something the NZA has been doing since its inception, though arguably the UN etcetera 
are more nebulous associations than was the British Empire. Conversely however, the 
multinational element would also facilitate the adaptation of the warrior ethos, as the 
presence of numerous other militaries would enhance the perception of collective action 
as a global citizen. Operating with a relatively representative section of the world 
provides a visceral mechanism that aids the widening of duty to encompass a higher 
entity than New Zealand.  
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Joint 
 INTERFET was a joint operation, which was in keeping with its overt invasive purpose. 
New Zealand contributed, besides its land forces, one frigate, one tanker, one destroyer, 
one cruiser and at least 17 support vessels for a total of 21 maritime assets and two C130 
transports and six Iroquois helicopters for a total of 8 airframes.
113
 Interactions between 
the three NZ services were not always satisfactory and, as Crawford and Harper wrote, ―it 
was obvious they did not know enough about each other.‖114 Other evidence regarding 
problems between the NZA and the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) can be 
found in the Auditor-General‘s report, New Zealand Defence Force: Deployment to East 
Timor-Performance of the Helicopter Detachment, which writes that NZA ―lessons 
learned material noted that some Army personnel in East Timor [sic] were not fully 
familiar with working with Iroquois [and also that] [s]ome Army Commanders were also 
unfamiliar with how to use the Iroquois to achieve their tactical objectives.‖115 The same 
report listed a number of other issues regarding joint interaction between the two 
services, particularly at the practical level, having problems with, for example, loading 
the helicopters.
116
 Relations between the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and the NZA 
appeared to have been relatively cordial, with crew from the HMNZS Canterbury sending 
shore parties to ―assist with reconstruction work and humanitarian relief projects‖ and 
helping VC set up accommodation.
117
 As the commander of Canterbury put it: ―[a]ll of 
the sailors that go ashore have really enjoyed the contact they‘ve had with their Army 
brothers, and that‘s exactly how they see it.‖118 
 
Though there is limited evidence regarding inter-service interaction, the little there is 
suggests a mixed result. Clearly the available information on NZA-RNZN interaction 
suggests that it was positive while that that on the NZA-RNZAF suggests that there were 
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some problems. Even though these were of a practical nature, this is relevant with regard 
to the expertise facet of professionalism. The NZA personnel did not have the requisite 
skills needed to integrate with their RNZAF brethren. This issue would have presumably 
created friction between the two services, necessitating the other elements of the 
constructive to ensure operational harmony, namely military values such as service, 
loyalty, commitment, and especially comradeship, for the same reason they are of utility 
for the multinational problems.  
 
Civil-Military 
The UN had 737 international staff in Timor-Leste working for UNTAET and there were 
around 80 NGOs active in Timor-Leste during INTERFET and UNTAET, relations 
between the military and NGOs were strained from the start, with widespread criticism 
from the humanitarian community that Maj. Gen. Cosgrove‘s ‗conservative‘, security-
oriented approach had ―unnecessarily prolonged the suffering of the people of East Timor 
[sic]‖.119 Conversely, a senior NZ officer made a guarded criticism of the agencies when 
he ―suggested that in recognition of the ―ad hoc‖ and disjointed nature of the 
development effort and the ―lack of any linkage or overarching sense of why we doing 
this‖ among the various agencies, the NZDF attempted to provide some level of 
coordination among NGO players in the development area.‖120 In his NZA Occasional 
Paper Hull notes that there was a ―relatively poor opinion of NGOs among NZDF 
personnel‖ and that many soldiers saw the aid workers as ――wishy-washy liberals‖ who at 
times avoided making hard decisions and were out of their depth.‖121 The criticisms are 
illustrative of the mutual suspicion and dislike that can characterise NGO-military 
relations.
122
  
 
The constructive function has remaining utility by lessening the effects of frustration and 
stress that come from operating with NGO workers, with responsibility, expertise, 
service, commitment and integrity demanding the soldiers fulfil their duty to New 
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Zealand to the best of their ability despite problems. Aside from the tension created by 
this mutual distrust, what is interesting here is that the soldiers were not disparaging of 
what the NGOs were doing but rather how they were doing it. This is useful evidence for 
a possible pragmatic adaptation of the traditional warrior ethos, as the soldiers were more 
concerned with the NGOs‘ ability to complete the humanitarian work than disparaging its 
worth.
123
 The soldiers‘ comments suggest that they believe the military ethic, with its 
values of loyalty, commitment, courage and integrity, rather than the NGOs ‗wishy-
washy liberal‘ ethic, is of greater utility in achieving humanitarian objectives. The NGOs‘ 
perceived inability to make ‗hard decisions‘ contrasts with the moral courage and 
integrity implicit in the NZA ethos, which lists behaviours for these values as, ―[m]aking 
and enforcing hard decisions‖ and ―[a]lways completing a task to the standard required‖, 
respectively.
124
 
 
Once Cova Lima was secure, the first NZ BATT began to establish ad hoc links with the 
local populace.
125
 This was formalised with the arrival of NZ BATT 2 who used a mortar 
platoon in a specialist CMA role even though they were regular soldiers. CMA soldiers 
lived in villages alongside the locals for the duration of their deployment, enabling them 
to gain a level of trust and therefore enhancing the flow of intelligence from the 
Timorese, as was emphasised in the irregular section.
126
 The CMA initiative was so 
successful at gaining the Timorese‟s trust that the Sector West Commander, Brig. 
Gillespie, urged the Australian battalion to adopt a similar approach.
127
 The NZ 
contingent was seen as more successful in winning local allegiance because of their 
willingness to “share the risk” rather than staying behind security fences like other 
contingents.
128
 To spend the entire operation living amongst locals with the aim of 
securing their allegiance meant that the NZ soldiers had to maintain a rigorous adherence 
to the constructive function, especially military values such as commitment and integrity 
as well as overall discipline and high morale, for any lapse would have had cascading 
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deleterious effects. By sharing the risks with the locals the NZA CMA personnel 
displayed the remaining utility of the constructive function; while it evolved to provide a 
efficient and effective fighting force in battle, it now has overall operational utility by 
enabling soldiers to live with locals and act in a manner that gains their trust. This 
adaptation reveals the flexibility of the constructive function as the traditional 
characteristics retain utility in new circumstances, though it should be stressed that what 
is occurring is largely an adaptation and not a substantive change. This adaptation can be 
seen in the opinion of an officer who, despite delivering a high standard of CMA work, 
said that he didn‟t “give a shit about the people really, and the sense of satisfaction I get 
out of doing this job is from following orders to the best of my ability”.129 In his case, the 
constructive enabled him to perform a task well despite his lack of empathetic motivation 
because the values of service, loyalty, commitment and integrity drove him to follow 
orders to the best of his ability. 
 
Another indicator of the rigors of operating „amongst the people‟ comes from Corporal 
Higginson, with NZ BATT 1. When they were aiding returning refugees across the 
border, Higginson, who had been at the task since 5am, told a reporter how difficult it 
was to watch the constant stream of people who “have had their lives ruined”; yet, at the 
same time, despite his sympathy, he had to be vigilant for any possible militia 
members.
130
 This sustained intimacy is something that would never have occurred in 
traditional military operations where the battlefield was generally clear of civilians, and 
thus the utility of the constructive function remains as the mental demands increase. This 
can be seen in Higginson‟s statement regarding the inherent stresses: “you can‟t let it get 
to you… but sometimes you see children who are the same age as your kids back home. 
It makes you angry that people like that have had their lives ruined.”131 The utility of the 
constructive function in the COE is clear: whilst Higginson was affected by the plight of 
the people, and the children in particular, the knowledge that he has a duty and a 
responsibility to serve the operation and his country loyally and with honour, courage and 
commitment means that, as he said, he could not let it affect him. This is the utility of the 
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constructive function; it provides both the reasoning- service to the state- and the means- 
commitment, courage and expertise- that underpin the maintenance of an effective and 
controllable force. Again this is an adaptation of the constructive function rather than a 
substantive change, as the actual function remains the same. 
 
Expanded Mandate 
From the beginning of INTERFET, the international operation in Timor-Leste was 
expanded mandate. In the mission briefing for INTERFET, personnel were told that the 
―mission is to protect and support United Nations activities in East Timor [sic] including 
humanitarian aid in accordance with [the] United Nations mandate. INTERFET was 
given authorisation under Article 42 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which enables 
INTERFET to use air, sea and land forces as may be required to restore and maintain 
peace, and achieve its mandated mission.‖132 This briefing, taken from the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF)-issued East Timor Handbook, lays out the full scope of the 
operation from the outset: humanitarian tasks through to the application of force via air, 
sea and land forces. UNTAET would inherit this scope, though the focus would shift 
further toward the humanitarian. 
 
Overall, as Crawford and Harper write, the Timor-Leste mission truly tested ―the 
versatility and adaptability of the New Zealand soldier.‖133 NZ soldiers took on tasks that 
ranged from SASO tasks such as education, humanitarian aid supply, infrastructure 
reconstruction, repatriation, allocation of donated goods, dissemination of information, 
lobbying and advocacy, and coordination with other development agencies to offensive 
COs.
134
 The wide variety of SASO activities required a diverse set of skills and would 
have stretched the expertise of the regular soldier. Unheard of in traditional military 
operations, the NZDF even published a newspaper in Cova Lima, which was promoted as 
independent and designed to endorse democratic values, the rule of law and the benefits 
of a free market.
135
 Soldiers working as publishers is a dramatic example of the expanded 
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mandate nature of the operation, and also illustrates the potential issue between the 
professional tenet of expertise and the modern operational tasks as well as the clash 
between military values and liberal democratic values. 
 
Also, the NZA conducted two fundamentally different types of patrols: there were ―blue 
hat patrols‖, where they wore their UN berets with the intention of showing their 
presence in the region and ―green hat patrols‖, where they wore camouflage paint and 
jungle hats and stealthily hunted militia.
136
 The green hat patrols were demanding, 
sometimes scouting 50 kilometres for 16 days carrying at least 50 kilograms of 
equipment.
 137
 Even the more traditional tasks have expanded mandate aspects, with both 
‗hearts and minds‘ and ‗classic‘ combat patrolling. In sum, both operations can be viewed 
as Three Block War operations, to use Krulak‘s terminology, as the soldiers had to 
swiftly switch between vastly different tasks and situations.
138
 
 
The ROE, which have become a dynamic complication in expanded mandate operations, 
were a stressor for the NZA. The UN mandate for INTERFET ensured that the ROE were 
robust, with soldiers able to fire first at suspected militia. NZA issued soldiers with an 
―Orders for Opening Fire Card‖ which was based on a simplified version of the ROE.139 
At first UNTAET‘s ROE were problematic and required soldiers to challenge an armed 
militiaman who was ―‗patrolling in a tactical way with obvious intent‘‖ before opening 
fire, which, given the operational environment along the border, were overly restrictive 
and threatened both operational efficacy and soldier safety.
140
 It is believed that the ROE 
were partly responsible for the debacle that followed the killing of the NZ soldier, such 
that they were changed immediately afterward.
141
 The graduated nature of the original 
UNTAET ROE was ―recognised by senior PKF commanders as compromising force 
security.‖142 Obviously the difficulty in interpreting and applying such graduated ROE in 
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dynamic and ambiguous situations is a significant stressor. As Maj. Gen. Michael Smith 
and Dee write, the strengthening of UNTAET ROE had ―a positive influence on PKF 
morale‖, which suggests the converse: that the initial ROE had a negative influence on 
morale.
143
 The fact that the militia were using the ROE as an intangible asymmetric 
advantage, as stated in the irregular sub-section, is illustrative of the difficulties of 
operating under such limiting strictures. In sum, the restrictive ROE that are issued for 
expanded mandate operations add another layer of complexity that makes the 
constructive function of remaining utility. Also, the ROE, as a facet of the preventative 
function, must be adhered to, even if overly prohibitive, as they are a source of legitimacy 
and any breach could be detrimental to overall operational success. 
 
As mentioned in the civil-military sub-section, a number of non-specialised soldiers 
performed a CMA function, interfacing with the local community.
144
 The CMA role is 
clearly divergent from traditional military activity and the martial spirit. Interestingly, 
however, Hull writes that rather than causing disillusionment or job dissatisfaction, the 
majority of CMA soldiers perceived expanded mandate roles as being of operational 
utility.
145
 Essentially, aside from the personal satisfaction of helping the locals, the 
soldiers appreciated that by improving the Timorese situation they were ―less likely to be 
influenced by elements within the community that may have a vested interest in stirring 
up trouble.‖146 This appreciation hints at the possibility of a pragmatic re-imaging of the 
warrior ethos, as one senior officer of the NZA in Timor-Leste told Hull, ―[d]evelopment 
was… a necessary component of a wider or more comprehensive view of what 
constitutes security.‖147 Hull found this was a common perception, concluding that, ―it is 
clear that the NZDF sees security as their primary role and that everything they do is 
aimed at achieving this… However… a broader concept of security was evident. There 
was a clear recognition of a linkage between assisting the community to reconstruct, 
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move beyond the devastation to their infrastructure and to make steps toward a better 
future, and a more sustainable security situation.‖148 
 
Another senior officer, again reinforcing the adaptability of the warrior ethos, said that 
the idea of CMA-type work ―could be equated with the notion of ultimate victory 
suggested by Sun Tsu in his treatise on war. For him, the ultimate victory was one that 
did not involve conquering ones opponents by means of engagement in battle. The acme 
of brilliance instead was demonstrated by conquering an enemy without having to fight at 
all. Civil assistance and capacity building could therefore be seen as a way of increasing 
the effectiveness of the primary role of the military through building up the resilience of 
the community.‖149 The CMA-role was perceived as being of primary operational utility, 
which could indicate a change in perception regarding the warrior ethos. 
 
In further support of the constructive function adapting to current operational realities, 
NZA Platoon Commander Wilson‘s statement, regarding his opinion of the operation, is 
informative: ―I am really proud to be here… I sum it up in one word—democracy. I think 
[it] is worth fighting for and people the world over deserve it.‖150 The objective of the 
operation- the creation of a sovereign and democratic state- is a source of motivation and 
inspiration for Wilson, instilling pride and therefore enhancing morale. Wilson sees the 
democratic end point of the operation as validation. His choice of adjective is 
illuminating, in sense it encapsulates the argument regarding the adaptation of the warrior 
ethos. Although the word fighting can refer to any type of struggle or contest, physical, 
psychological or both, its most obvious and immediate connotation is that of a physical 
battle, of the type that the warrior ethos was traditionally premised on. Thus, Wilson‘s 
use of this adjective, in the stead other, less emotive, words, like ‗working‘, is revealing. 
It shows how the aspects of the warrior ethos can be reinterpreted to fit current realities 
without compromising the core aspects. With reference to Janowitz, it shows the 
persistence of the fighter spirit.
151
 His final statement, ―people the world over deserve it‖, 
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suggests the proposed expansion of the warrior ethos by way of the international citizen 
is plausible at a certain level.  
 
Lt. Col. Hayward, a battalion commander, said ―[d]emocracy is a new concept [in Timor-
Leste]… We have to encourage them to grasp the concept that those who lose out 
politically this time will have another chance at the next election- in other words, there is 
a political process to work through rather than settling matters through violence.‖152 
Hayward‘s comment, spoken with regard to the changing of priorities from the, short-
term, cessation of violence to the, long-term, creation of a stable and democratic 
sovereign state, reveals an appreciation of the utility of the expanded mandate tasks and 
their ability to promote change. This appreciation would support the adaptation of the 
combat aspect of the warrior ethos from the narrow to expanded form that covers non-
violent techniques to facilitate the desired outcome. It does, however, also signal a 
potential issue between military values, which are inherently undemocratic, traditional 
military expertise- the application of violence- and the overall operational goal of the 
creation of a democratic state.  
 
The commanding officer of NZBATT 4‘s explanation as to why so many soldiers had 
volunteered to return to Timor-Leste also supports the possible adaptation of the warrior 
ethos: ―[t]hey‘re in the Army. This is what we do… Part of it is peacekeeping. There‘s a 
whole range of operations and I think any opportunity to do something- to be part of a 
NZA operation overseas- is worthwhile.‖153 There is an understanding that peacekeeping, 
and indeed ―a whole range of operations‖, are a ―worthwhile‖ part of the NZA soldiers‘ 
profession. Finally, the aforementioned Cpl. Higginson, discussing an incident where his 
section chased, tackled and apprehended a militia member as he ran from them at their 
border crossing said, ―[t]his is proper soldiering- the guys are alert and on to it, despite 
the heat and the conditions. It‘s a good feeling to get someone, even though he‘s probably 
not a big player.‖154 That Higginson saw this as ‗proper soldiering‘ shows a degree of 
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adaptation, as guarding a border and tackling a militia member does not fit the traditional 
warrior ethos. Although by no means universal, increasing with rank, the appreciation of 
the utility of expanded mandate tasks in the COE indicates the possible adaptation of the 
traditional warrior ethos.
155
  
 
As expected, boredom was a problem in Timor-Leste, especially during consolidation; as 
Longmore wrote, ―[i]f war is long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer 
terror, then peacekeeping [for the NZA in Timor-Leste] is long periods of boredom 
punctuated by scorpions, mud, heat, breakdowns and dreams of home.‖156 The 
combination of low-intensity conflict, prohibitive rules, such as no alcohol or sex, and the 
hostile locality engendered ennui in the NZA.
157
 Longmore, there during the 
consolidation period, described soldiers looking ―very eager when reports filter through 
of the odd cattle theft or armed confrontation near the border‖ and the reality during the 
slow period is that ―one day is much like another.‖158 The utility of the constructive 
function in ameliorating the effects of boredom can be found in professional 
responsibility and  
  
Media and Communication 
For geographic, economic and, fundamentally, political reasons, ―[f]ew countries in the 
contemporary era have been so hermetically sealed as East Timor [sic]‖ with regard to 
both media and communications.
159
 Throughout the Indonesian occupation the island was 
under tight censorship and telecommunications infrastructure was sparse and 
inadequate.
160
 The invasion brought with it a flood of journalists and the promise of an 
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unfettered fourth estate and upgraded infrastructure.
161
 This section will examine several 
issues regarding the media and communication: internal media and communication 
effects on local populace; Indonesian media; and international media. Each of these 
levels of media focus could have potential effects on, and ramifications for, military 
ethics because of both the strategic corporal and CNN effect. 
 
Essentially there was very little in the way of indigenous media or communication 
because as the TNI withdrew from Timor-Leste they destroyed the scant media outlets 
and communication infrastructure that existed, leaving little to build on.
162
 Nonetheless, 
by mid-May 2000 the UN publication Tais Timor listed four independent newspapers and 
two independent radio stations as operational.
163
 It was one of these papers, Suara Timor 
Lorosae, which ran a front-page headline, ―Investigations Into Suspected Sexual 
Misconduct Ongoing‖, on 10 August 2001.164 The headline relates to a series of incidents 
of sexual misconduct by Jordanian troops several months earlier with young boys and 
goats.
165
 The soldiers were sent home injured and in disgrace and the incidents ―caused 
outrage among East Timorese [sic]‖, though considering the severity of the case there 
was limited exposure, probably due to a combination of scant media and resources and 
active suppression by the UN.
166
 The event was reported, but the coverage was minimal, 
as a 2005 Australian newspapers headline ―Hushed Rape of Timor‖ attests.167 Worse 
however, for the integrity of the PKF as a whole, was that due to Jordan sensitive position 
in the Middle East peace process, the resulting investigation was suppressed and no 
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charges were ever laid.
168
 This scandal was one of a number of alleged sexual violations 
by the PKF, none of which resulted in charges, due to the status-of-forces agreements 
(SOFAs) that meant contributing states retained exclusive jurisdiction over their 
military.
169
 Though limited, the Jordanian case is illustrative of the increasing utility of 
the preventative function when operating ‗amongst the people‘ under the media‘s glare; 
the problem was compounded by the lack of justice and the apparent hypocrisy and 
double standards which would make the means incommensurate with the ends.  
 
This odious affair reveals a certain negative proclivity created, or at least enhanced, by 
the increasing utility of the preventative function. As the success of the mission hinged 
upon both the international communities support and winning the allegiance of the 
Timorese populace and this involved convincing them that the interventionary force was 
composed of moralistic and law-abiding professionals, the UN chose to suppress and 
dissemble rather than risk the consequences of a honest and open examination of the 
accusations. Though this may be successful in the short term, and especially at the 
international level, it does not bode well for achieving overall operational success, nor 
does have positive consequences for the constructive function. By not punishing the 
soldiers, it condones their actions and weakens the constructive function‘s potency. 
 
One final note on internal communications and media regards the extensive media 
apparatus set up by INTERFET and UNTAET in what Cotton terms ―information 
operations‖.170 Both operations had newspapers and radio stations as well as distributing 
leaflets and posters in an effort to ―project the message to the population that they had the 
ability and authority to protect them and deal with any future threats.‖171 As mentioned, 
the NZDF even printed a newspaper in the Cova Lima region. The importance lies in the 
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overt recognition of the criticality of the media in controlling local perception and 
opinion and its resultant effect on operational success.  
 
The Indonesian media took an aggressive and critical stance toward INTERFET. Within 
a week of the initial intervention a number of papers were accusing the PKF of 
unprofessionalism and misconduct, with one paper, Detik, claiming that INTERFET 
troops were ―over-reacting‖, whilst another stated that many of the Australian soldiers 
were ―unprepared for the situation‖ and the Indonesian Observer ran the headline 
―Australian troops torture militias‖.172 Indonesian TV made similar allegations and also 
claimed that INTERFET troops were restricting Indonesian journalists movements and 
that the Western media were unfairly demonising the TNI and the Indonesian 
occupation.
173
 Indonesian media were attempting to discredit the operation by stressing 
supposedly unethical conduct and an apparent lack of professionalism. As a counter the 
Australians accused the Indonesian media of ―waging a disinformation campaign to 
discredit Australia‖.174 Further highlighting the power of perception, Hugh White, the 
Deputy Secretary for Strategy in the Australian DoD in 1999, wrote that ―[t]he most 
important strategic issue that arose for Ministers as the operation unfolded was the very 
negative way in which INTERFET was presented in the press in Indonesia.‖175 
Intrinsically linked with this ‗most important strategic issue‘ was the conduct of the 
soldiers; in essence, the ethicality of conduct and concordant professionalism of the 
soldiers was used, via the media, as ammunition during the operation by the Indonesians. 
 
As the intervention commenced, Timor-Leste was flooded with journalists and the 
world‘s attention was firmly fixed upon the small proto-state.176 At the international level 
the strategic corporal/CNN effect aspect of the operation was apparent. In a clear 
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illustration of this, Dickens wrote that developments in Timor-Leste were ―the focus of 
intense international attention‖ and that the ―smallest of incidents could have provoked an 
international incident‖.177 Reaffirming this, Maj. Gen. Cosgrove, retrospectively 
contemplating INTERFET in particular and the changing nature of operations in general, 
wrote:  
 
―In my day, as a junior leader, my decisions had an immediate impact on my 
troops and the enemy. In today‘s military operations the decisions of junior 
leaders still have those immediate impacts, but modern telecommunications can 
also magnify every incident, put every incident under a media microscope, and 
send descriptions and images of every incident instantly around the world for 
scores of experts and commentators to interpret for millions of viewers and 
listeners. Thus the decisions of junior leaders and the actions of small teams can 
influence the course of international affairs.‖178 
 
Further emphasising the increasing utility of the preventative function in the media 
saturated COE, Maj. Gen. Cosgrove wrote that ―[i]n an operation that was being 
broadcast to the world, our morale and ethical ascendancy was as important as our 
military superiority.‖179 This is a clear affirmation of the new power that the preventative 
function has in securing overall operational success; the commander of the operation saw 
ethical ascendancy to be as important as military superiority. It also shows the remaining 
utility of the constructive function, for as Ballard concludes regarding Maj. Gen. 
Cosgrove‘s opinion on the importance of the force‘s morale and ethical ascendancy, 
―[s]uch an approach depended greatly on the maturity of soldiers trained for war, yet 
capable of acting with the flexibility and professionalism in an environment that was 
something very different from, but as dangerous as, war.‖180 Such was Maj. Gen. 
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Cosgrove‘s appreciation of the power of the media in the COE that he began his first full 
day in the Timor-Leste with what would become daily press conferences.
181
 
 
Despite the contributing countries ostensibly strong resolve and INTERFET‘s 
overwhelming conventional superiority, the multinational coalition‘s success was 
contingent upon, inter alia, vastly different levels of domestic support that were 
themselves dependent upon the perception of the operation.
182
 The positive focus and 
high frequency coverage of INTEFET and UNTAET in the New Zealand media 
improved the ―NZ Army‘s profile‖, having a positive effect on morale and being a 
―contributing factor to the success of…. East Timor [sic] deployments.‖183 New Zealand 
public opinion polls taken in late September 1999 found that 82 percent of respondents 
disapproved of Indonesia‘s actions, that 80 percent of those surveyed supported New 
Zealand‘s decision to join the UN peacekeeping mission and 60 percent approved of 
sending troops to Timor-Leste even with a significant risk of casualties.
184
 The New 
Zealand public‘s support of involvement in Timor-Leste was based on, amongst other 
factors, a moral outrage at Indonesia‘s actions which was encouraged by local activists.185 
As public support was based on moral outrage it stands to reason that any moral or legal 
misconduct by the NZA would have had a negative impact on public opinion. Media 
coverage was the ultimate arbiter of the public‘s perception; a concept at the forefront of 
operational thinking, with White emphasising the Australian interdepartmental task 
force‘s position on the importance of ―projecting a positive image of INTERFET‖.186 A 
positive image that was reliant on the coalition forces conducting themselves in a moral 
and legal manner. Maj. Gen. Cosgrove understood the power of perceptions, ―sending a 
message for both internal (Australian) and international (including Indonesia and Timor-
Leste) media consumption concerning the power and righteousness of his force and its 
United Nations mandate for peace. Information was understood to be a powerful 
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weapon.‖187 Blaxland, in his analysis of information-era manoeuvre in Timor-Leste, 
pithily described the INTERFET approach as ―tactics and television‖.188  
 
Justification 
As with most operations, there was no simple single justification; Dunne and Wheeler 
saw Timor-Leste as a representative of the emergent ―use of force for humanitarian 
purposes‖ that has come about since the end of the Cold War, whilst Cotton believes that 
the humanitarian justification for the intervention was ambiguous, with humanitarian 
issues serving as a trigger for addressing other long-standing international and regional 
issues.
189
 INTERFET and UNTAET were both mandated under Chapter VII and 
therefore at the overarching level were justified on the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security.
190
 UN Resolution 1264, adopted on 15 September 1999, 
stated that the Security Council was ―appalled by the worsening humanitarian situation in 
East Timor [sic]‖ after which it authorised ―the establishment of a multinational force…. 
To facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.‖191 Also, though it was motivated by 
humanitarian concerns, because Indonesia had given permission it could be argued that 
the operation was not technically a humanitarian intervention.
192
 A counter argument 
could be made that Indonesia never had the authority to grant permission and that Timor-
Leste was without any legitimate authority able to give such permission. What was 
particularly important, however, was the public perception at both the Timor-Leste and, 
to a lesser degree, international level. 
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INTEFET and UNTAET were seen as morally justified, though within Timor there 
existed scepticism of the international communities‘ reasons for the intervention; 
nonetheless, the Timorese understood that INTERFET had been justified on humanitarian 
grounds.
193
 This is why the local populace were so critical of the overall UN project in 
Timor-Leste; as the Timorese resistance group member Ajiza Magno said when asked if 
she believed whether people in Timor-Leste thought the international community had 
been motivated by humanitarian concerns: ―[i]t may be called humanitarian intervention, 
but if the United Nations really cared about human rights, it would be doing more right 
now to prosecute people responsible for human rights violations.‖194 Though not related 
directly to the military force, this quote shows the reasoning behind the increasing utility 
of the preventative function: to win the respect and allegiance of the local population the 
operation must be conducted in a manner commensurate for the overarching justificatory 
principles. The sentiment is supported by the ―frustration and disillusionment‖ many 
Timorese began to feel under the UNTAET due to the lack of local involvement in the 
process of creating a stable and secure independent state.
195
 The apparent hypocrisy 
between the justification of the operation, to create a democratic state, and the 
domination of the process by non-elected UN officials antagonised the Timorese.
196
 
Intimately involved during this period, Chopra writes: ―the UN had no inclination of 
share the power… during the transition, or to include [local Timorese] in any decision-
making beyond perfunctory consultation.‖197 A Political Affairs Officer with UNTAET, 
Della-Giacoma, described the ―foreboding signs of growing frustration among East 
Timorese [sic] who [felt] excluded from the U.N. operation‖ as early as June 2000.198 
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Further to this is the disparity in wages between international and local staff, with the 
former earning $US95 a day whilst the later received $US5 a day.
199
 
 
At the international level, despite other justifications, the moral aspect was clear with 
both the INTERFET and UNTAET mandates containing humanitarian reasoning.
200
 The 
UN mission in Timor-Leste was driven by ―global moral outrage‖ and the lofty rhetoric 
that surrounded operations on Timor-Leste was extensive; UN Secretary-General Annan, 
on the eve of the intervention said: ―East Timor [sic] is at a moment of great crisis, 
danger and uncertainty. But let us not forget that its people have been able to register and 
vote in overwhelming numbers to decide, for the first time in their history, what they 
want their future to be. The international community has a responsibility to see that their 
wishes are respected and that violence is not allowed to dictate the outcome.‖201  More 
prosaically New Zealand Prime Minister Jenny Shipley said of INTERFET, ―[t]he force‘s 
initial task will be to help ensure peace returns to East Timor [sic] to enable humanitarian 
assistance to be provided to those in need‖.202 Australian Prime Minister John Howard‘s 
‗Address to the Nation‘ speech shows the same moral slant that surrounded INTERFET, 
―our soldiers go to East Timor [sic] as part of a great Australian military tradition, which 
has never sought to impose the will of this country on others, but only to defend what is 
right.‖203 Despite any other reasons, the message the public was given, to both the 
Timorese and international community, was one of a morally justified intervention. 
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Conclusion 
 
Analysis of both INTERFET and UNTAET lends credence to the increasing utility of the 
preventative function. The requisite characteristics were present: humanitarian and 
reconstruction orientated-tasks and as well as irregular conflict, all conducted with the 
aim of gaining the ‗hearts and minds‘ of the local populace, media influence and moral 
justification. However, the main problem is that without any gratuitous breaches of 
conduct this utility can only be assumed rather than identified. There are a number of 
important characteristics and examples present that suggest an increasing utility. Overall 
operational success rested in winning the Timorese‘s allegiance, for achieving both the 
short-term goal of defeating the militia, by denying them support and ensuring 
intelligence was passed on to the NZA, and the long-term goal of creating a stable and 
secure independent Timor-Leste. Lt. Gen. Niumpradit‘s transition of the PKF‘s centre of 
gravity from direct focus on the militia to gaining and maintaining the support of the 
local populace reveals the criticality of the Timorese‘s support. This allegiance was 
reliant on, among other factors, the conduct of the PKF, after almost a quarter century of 
oppression at the hands of the TNI, the multinational force had to represent itself as the 
paragon of morality and legality, otherwise they would have been seen as no different. 
This can be seen in the taint acquired by associating with the TNI. NZA Lt. Stallworthy 
gives an illuminative example of the importance of perception of conduct in Timor-Leste: 
―[t]he first time we arrived, the village men took all the women into the bush and hid 
them from us. The militias or [the Indonesian military] had spread a rumour that Kiwi 
soldiers killed and ate people. They were quite terrified.‖204 Militia and TNI-propagated 
misinformation was widespread and many of the Timorese were originally afraid because 
of propaganda claiming that INTERFET forces were raping, beating and shooting 
locals.
205
 Perception and opinion were paramount; INTERFET and UNTAET forces had 
to be seen as respecting human rights and observing the moral and legal operational 
parameters. This was central to success, to requote Maj. Gen. Michael Smith, ―the PKF 
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was perceived by a traumatized population to be an honest, professional, and friendly 
military force free from major human rights violations and intent on maintaining their 
security and support.‖206 Influential Timorese saw the conduct of the PKF as critical; 
Ramos Horta ―lauded the operation as ―‗almost flawless‘: ‗I haven‘t heard of a single 
peacekeeping operation in the world that matches Interfet [sic] in the way it conducts 
itself. All the contingents remain extremely popular with everybody‘‖ and he vetoed 
Malaysia‘s bid to command UNTAET because of its ―extremely poor record in upholding 
human rights in East Timor [sic]‖ in the years of Indonesia domination and ―warned of 
‗total civil disobedience‘ if a Malaysian were appointed.‖207 
 
The media and communication, present at both the domestic and international level, 
magnified the criticality of moral and legal conduct, though this is far more relevant at 
the international level, as Timorese coverage was, due to decades of suppression, 
underdevelopment of infrastructure and the wholesale destruction that preceded the 
intervention, quite limited. This highlights an important issue, which is that as most 
operations are likely to be in areas at the edge of the global economy and will have been 
in a certain degree of turmoil and unrest, the scope and penetration of media and 
communications networks within the AO are likely to be minimal, as they were in Timor-
Leste. It is supposed here that media and communications within many contemporary 
AOs probably only become advanced enough to have a potent influence near the end of 
any period of relevancy, once the operation has built or rebuilt the media and 
communications infrastructure. Another important element at both levels is that the near-
suppression of the Jordanian peacekeepers deviant behaviour by the UN suggests while it 
cannot be completely sublimated any misconduct will only come to light despite rather 
than because of official channels. Taken together these two issues suggest that this 
increasing utility is not as advanced as originally posited. However, while these are both 
critical issues, the media and, to a far lesser degree in this case, communications, still 
have potency, even if this is not as fully developed as may be expected. That UNTAET 
set up numerous radio stations and newspapers as part of their information operations 
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affirms this, as does the Indonesian media‘s efforts to malign the operation‘s conduct. At 
the international level the media focus was far more potent, with the eyes of the world, 
albeit briefly, focussed on the operations in Timor-Leste. As there was no ‗incident‘ at 
the international level, the full impact of any such occurrence can only be guessed at; 
however, it can also be surmised that possibly there was no ‗incident‘ precisely because 
of the commanders‘ awareness of the criticality of conduct and perception, thus creating a 
self-fulfilling cycle.  
  
The moral justification of the intervention and the desired outcome- democracy- 
reinforced the necessity for commensurate conduct, as can be seen in the comments by 
the Timorese resistance group member Magno. The international community‘s use of 
humanitarian terminology to justify the intervention and the desired end state of the 
operation, the creation of a stable and secure democratic sovereign state, set a precedent 
for behaviour. The NZA conducted itself within the legal and moral parameters leaving 
only a speculative capacity, though a parallel can be drawn regarding the heavy criticism 
levelled at the civil column of the UNTAET operation over the limited local 
representation and the lack of retributive justice. The apparent hypocrisy of the UN 
operation, premised on the creation of a democratic state yet run along authoritarian lines 
in a situation that has an ironic mirror in the relations between a democratic state and its 
authoritarian military, shows the importance of aligning means with ends.   
 
The Timor-Leste operational environment had many of the characteristics that argue for 
the remaining utility of the constructive function: a non-Western, failed (or non-existent) 
state with complex operational geography, ranging from a razed conurbation to 
mountainous tropical jungles; irregular warfare, with its indistinct actors and ambiguous 
tactics; a multinational composition that included five separate armed forces integrated 
into the NZA battalions at different times; a diverse array of actors in the AO, from rogue 
TNI forces, numerous militias, recalcitrant local police and internally displaced Timorese 
as well as a number of NGO workers with different perspectives and objectives; and 
wide-ranging task from humanitarian work to extended combat patrols.  
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These operational environment attributes can be seen as both physical and mental 
stressors, necessitating the positive role that the constructive function plays in alleviating 
negative stress. The constructive had utility in maintaining morale and efficacy in the 
numerous difficult conditions and situations, be they geographic, cultural or operational: 
the Timorese AO was ambiguous, fluid, complex and interconnected through actors, 
motives and manoeuvres. NZA personnel operated in an extirpated city and through 
jungle-clad mountains against an adversary whose numbers, locations, motivations and 
capacities were unknown. Values such as commitment, comradeship, loyalty and service 
and professional responsibility all embody the ideal that a soldier must overcome trying 
situations, for their country, their army and their fellow soldiers. Integrity, honour and 
courage are necessary values in irregular warfare, particularly when faced with an 
intangibly asymmetrical opponent who mutilates comrades‘ and non-combatants‘ corpses 
and uses the preventative function as a weapon, as the militia and TNI did with the PKF‘s 
ROE. The unheralded level of multinational integration at the battalion level added 
complexity to the operation. Forgoing even the limited luxuries of the NZA camp to live 
amongst the Timorese for the overall good of the operation also reveals the remaining 
strength of the constructive function, the sacrifice of personal comfort and safety beyond 
the limits of fellow comrades driven by, amongst other qualities, commitment, courage 
and service. The expanded mandate meant that soldiers were required to do a wide 
variety of tasks they had limited training for, particularly CMA roles but also 
reconstruction and border control, all in a fluid and threatening AO.  
 
Though far from conclusive, the NZA personnel‘s comments regarding NGO workers 
and expanded mandate tasks were revealing. They showed an appreciation of the utility 
of such tasks, perceiving their inherent value in achieving overall operational success. 
Though this pragmatic alteration of the warrior ethos is not altogether surprising from 
NZA personnel, it is of interest because it shows the adaptive nature of ethos, able to 
adjust to contemporary realities to remain effective. It is of no surprise that the higher the 
rank the greater the appreciation: the logical flow of this cognisance would be that it 
descends through the ranks and, thus, the assumption is that this attitude would permeate 
down. That the entire operation was premised on and propelled by an altruistic and 
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humanitarian purpose also instilled a degree of worth in the operation that would have 
further facilitated the adaptation of the warrior ethos. This just purpose is a vital aspect in 
ensuring the maintenance of the constructive function, particularly morale and it is 
obvious in Wilson‘s statement, quoted in expanded mandate, when he said, ―I am really 
proud to be here… I sum it up in one word—democracy. I think [it] is worth fighting for 
and people the world over deserve it.‖ The sense of worth embodied by a just cause, or at 
least the perception of a just cause, empowers the constructive in the same manner that 
the preventative does and seems to have aided the in the re-imagining of the warrior 
ethos. Also the multinational aspect of the operation would have facilitated the 
adaptation, the action of 30 states in creating a new democracy providing a collective 
legitimacy and expanding the duty beyond the national to the international. 
 
The Timorese OE, whilst not the medium to high-intensity operation that most armies 
train for and have historically expected, had an ambiguity, diversity and complexity that 
ensured the remaining utility of the constructive function in ensuring that the NZA was a 
effective and efficient force that maintained a professional demeanour and were true to 
the military values and ethos.  
 
The constructive and preventative functions‘ utility is apparent in the relative success of 
INTERFET and UNTAET, though the increasing utility of the preventative function is 
possibly not as evident as expected because of the limited media within Timor-Leste. 
Nonetheless, INTERFET and UNTAET media efforts in theatre, Indonesian media 
coverage and the international media focus were sufficient to suggest that there is an 
increasing utility. In assessing the factors that contributed to the success of INTERFET 
Maj. Gen. Michael Smith emphasised the importance of the ―professionalism, discipline 
and restraint shown by the INTERFET forces‖208 
 
One fascinating, and concerning, issue for the ethical conduct of any future NZA 
coalition is highlighted in Martinkus‘ book, Martinkus, a correspondent with many years 
experience covering Timor-Leste, described how his fellow correspondents had found the 
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 Smith and Dee, ―East Timor,‖419. 
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body of another foreign journalist mutilated, with both his lips and nose cut off in a 
purposeful manner with a sharp object, he continued, writing ―[t]he body had been 
mutilated, but in the official report of the incident released later by INTERFET, and in all 
the official statements at the time, INTERFET continued to claim the mutilation was 
caused either by wild dogs or the motorcycle accident. It was official lies like these, told 
by INTERFET only to save face for the Indonesian forces, that chipped away at their 
credibility from the start.‖209 The complex political nature of the situation- namely that 
the UN forces had to placate Indonesia as both a strategy to avoid the escalation in 
Timor-Leste and because the composite states of the coalition had their own political 
interests- meant that INTERFET actually suppressed information regarding 
immoral/illegal conduct by the militia/TNI. This suppression was both immoral on their 
part and counter-productive, in that it eroded their credibility. The political nature has an 
internal conflict, the domestic situation in Timor-Leste required one course of action 
whilst the coalitions relations with Indonesia and its actions within Timor-Leste 
demanded another, chosen, course of action. This incident has many parallels with the 
suppression of the Jordanian soldiers‘ misconduct and has many of the same 
implications. 
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Conclusion 
To Define and Control 
 
―Great power involves great responsibility.‖ Franklin Delano Roosevelt.1 
 
This thesis took as its main focus the utility of military ethics in the NZA‘s contemporary 
operational environment. Underpinning this focus was an appreciation of the reciprocal 
relationship between conflicts, militaries and forms of control. Alongside numerous 
internal and external reasons for change, all three influence each other and adapt to one 
another. Conflicts usually reflect the societies that wage them, their history, structure, 
mores and values. Similarly, militaries reflect their client societies, and shape the 
conflicts they fight. Military ethics, as the tool of internal and external definition and 
control, reflect the client societies and the conflicts they wage. The process is imperfect, 
as most real world developments are, and thus, there are periods of relative disjuncture 
between the three, as there are periods of relative harmony. The NZA‘s COE has 
undergone a number of changes in recent history, from conventional war in defence of 
the empire conducted in relative isolation to morally justified ‗three block‘ operations 
conducted ‗amongst the people‘ by polyglot coalitions under the scrutiny of a global 
media.  However, military ethics, which originated several hundred years ago, remain 
relatively unchanged. This was the disjuncture that propelled the thesis. 
 
Summary of Findings 
The initial step for this thesis was to ascertain what the functions of military ethics were 
in order to provide a conceptual starting point, whilst simultaneously fixing the origins 
and development of military ethics into a holistic historical perspective. The current 
conception of military ethics has its origins in Europe during a period of intense internal 
conflicts and as such they reflect those conflicts and the societies that fought them. 
Military ethics were the product, and a reflection, of nascent, industrialising, nation-
states, with all the  political, societal and economic issues that connotes, and the conflicts 
                                                 
1
 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, undelivered Jefferson Day Address, 13 April 1945, accessed on 21 November 
2008, available from http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450413b.html. 
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they fought, namely conventional large-scale, industrial war. Military ethics have two 
functions, serving as both a preventative and constructive influence on behaviour, with 
the purpose of creating and maintaining an efficient and controllable military (and 
individual soldier) that acts within established moral and legal parameters.  
 
The underlying logic for the thesis was then provided by giving a brief synopsis of the 
relatively dramatic changes to conflict that have occurred, with particular focus on those 
brought to the fore at the end of the Cold War. The concept of utility and, of military 
ethics‘ specific utility, was discussed and the hypotheses given. 
 
This thesis had two hypotheses, which were assessed in relation to the germane 
characteristics of the NZA COE. The first of these hypotheses was to examine whether 
the preventative function has an increasing utility. The preventative function‘s utility is 
on the psychological plane and resides in its ability to convince all parties- neutrals, 
adversaries, and the soldiers themselves- of the justness and legitimacy of action and, 
thus, provides the intangible strength behind such action. For the soldiers this instils 
worth and therefore morale, and for others it acts as an effecter of perception. This 
hypothesis was premised on the effects of the growing irregularity of conflict and the 
combatants who conduct it, the soldiers increasing proximity to the indigenous 
population and their increasing involvement in expanded mandate tasks, the increasing 
focus and reach of the media and communications and the rise in morally justified 
operations. These characteristics mean that the preventative parameters are both harder to 
apply, yet more critical to operational success.  
 
Comparisons drawn from the NZA‘s historical OE, especially between World War Two 
(WW2), and the Timor-Leste OE supports the first hypothesis. All the relevant indicators 
have changed significantly, though the media influence within Timor-Leste itself was less 
than expected. However, the media‘s role in the increase in utility is as an amplifier 
rather than as a fundamental instigator so its relatively limited influence within Timor-
Leste does not fundamentally alter the hypothesis. This does suggest that, considering 
conflicts are expected to occur in the least developed parts of the world, the impact of 
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international media and communications will be less than assumed, though with the 
proliferation of cheap cell phones, which are allowing underdeveloped states to bypass 
landline development, this will probably not be true for long. Perhaps more revealing was 
the suppression of the Jordanian soldier‘s misconduct, which, while also illustrating the 
UN‘s understanding of the criticality of perception, hinted at a negative solution: a 
bureaucratic smokescreen. Though possibly effective in the short-term, and at the 
international level, this can only have detrimental consequences for the overall success of 
the mission. Though not widely publicised, word of the Jordanians actions spread through 
Timor-Leste and the resultant opinion and perception of the operation, already reduced 
because of the incident, must have dropped when it became clear that the incident was 
being actively suppressed.  
 
The logic of the first hypothesis is based on a set of interconnected characteristics in the 
OE: the irregular nature of the combatants and their resultant techniques, the operational 
tasks conducted by the NZA, the overall justification and desired outcome of the 
operation and the media scrutiny focussed on the operation. These factors all make the 
populace‘s allegiance, or at least the denial of the irregular adversary‘s support, central to 
success and it is in this situation that the preventative function has an increased utility, as 
it is ‗weaponised‘ beyond that of conventional war. The preventative function is a force 
multiplier in the NZA COE, as it has increasing power in effecting the outcome of an 
operation because opinion and perception have become more critical.   
 
Timor-Leste showed this clearly, the troops‘ conduct, and the perception of their conduct, 
was critical in convincing the populace that they should trust the interventionary force 
and, despite threats and intimidation, provide intelligence regarding the militia. Thus, the 
preventative function‘s utility has increased in comparison to its utility in WW2, where 
the main utility of military force was in its ability to directly defeat other military forces 
in decisive battles and the preventative had a lesser function in aiding overall operational 
success. Malaya marked the beginning of the NZA‘s preventative function‘s rise in 
utility, though its power as an affecter of perception was largely limited within theatre 
because of the lack of international media focus, the limited nature of the NZA‘s 
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operational tasks in comparison to later operations and the security-oriented justification 
of the operation. The Vietnam War brought the international media focus on military 
conduct to the fore, though the NZA performed traditional military tasks and the 
operation was premised on collective security. During this period peacekeeping 
operations were getting more ambitious, evolving from traditional military observer 
missions to cover more diverse and difficult operations. UNTAC was another landmark, 
with a broad mandate that gave it virtual sovereignty and intense international media 
focus, it represented the new milieu of operations in which the preventative function‘s 
utility was enhanced, though the NZA‘s limited role in the operation meant that it was of 
relatively limited scope. 
 
As the largest and most ambitious NZA operation in decades, as well as one of the UN‘s 
most comprehensive missions ever, Timor-Leste took this enhancement further. The 
operation was morally justified and had the overall aim of creating a stable and 
democratic sovereign state. In Timor-Leste, this meant that the conduct of the soldiers 
was critical, the moral justification and the goal of a democratic state created a situation 
whereby to succeed, the soldiers had to act in a manner commensurate with the logic 
behind the intervention and the values that would facilitate the desired end state, if the 
operation was to be a success. To do otherwise would have been hypocritical, at the least, 
and would have alienated the local populace. In Timor-Leste the population‘s allegiance, 
and thus their individual and collective positive opinion and perception, was the centre of 
gravity of the operation, without which there could be no real or lasting success. This 
truism lies at the heart of irregular warfare, yet it is also a centrality created by the overall 
operational goal of creating a democracy. Timor-Leste showed this centrality, and the 
utility of the preventative function in securing this allegiance. It did this by providing the 
parameters of moral and legal conduct, which ensured that NZA personnel acted, and just 
as critically, appeared to act, as an honest and professional force that respected human 
rights and international law. Expanded mandate tasks were a tool in securing the 
population‘s allegiance and in creating a stable democracy. Both the irregular nature of 
the conflict and the expanded mandate meant that the soldiers were operating ‗amongst 
the people‘, making conduct all the more critical as the constant interaction with 
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Timorese increased the chances of misconduct. The media presence was important as a 
tool of amplification of conduct and transmission of perception, as predicated by both the 
CNN effect and strategic corporal theories. In the case of Timor-Leste, this function was 
only used as a tool for the intervening force and the Indonesians to alter opinion and 
perception and was not present in any significance at the indigenous level, mostly 
because of the TNI‘s occupation and the destruction surrounding their withdrawal. 
Nonetheless, at the international level the importance of the media was shown, with force 
planners and commanders using it to gain and hold opinion and perception both 
domestically and internationally, as can be seen in Maj. Gen. Cosgrove‘s previously 
quoted belief that for INTERFET, ―[i]nformation was understood to be a powerful 
weapon‖.  
 
Underlying all the aspects that give the preventative function increased utility are opinion 
and perception. The centrality of opinion and perception was obvious in Timor-Leste, the 
need to win the allegiance of a population, who had been ruled by a military who had 
disrespected moral and legal parameters for over a quarter of a decade, meant that to gain 
their trust the NZA had to convince them they were upstanding moral and legal actors. 
Opinion and perception were also important with respect to the internationally 
community in general, and the NZ populace specifically. Just as conduct was important 
for convincing the Timorese of the overall validity of the operation, it was also necessary 
in ensuring the vital support of the NZA‘s home populace and the international 
community at large. Finally, the conduct of the NZA was also critical in facilitating the 
constructive function, as being a morally and legally valid actor instils worth, thus 
creating and sustaining morale. This can be seen in the comments made by NZA 
personnel, which were quoted in the expanded mandate section. The fact that the NZA 
were conducting themselves in a morally and legally upstanding manner, on a mission 
that was morally justified and had the creation of a democratic state as its overall goal, 
gave the operation worth. Opinion and perception were paramount across the spectrum as 
a means of convincing every involved party of the worth of the operation and also, 
through that worth, as a means of empowering the constructive function. 
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The NZA and the operation as a whole were, as far as documentation shows, perceived in 
a generally positive manner by the Timorese, NZ and the international community, and 
themselves. This was no serendipitous occurrence, but was because it was part of the 
overall strategy as the NZA and its coalition allies were cognizant of the preventative 
function‘s increased utility in the Timor-Leste OE. This was why the NZA were 
particularly conscientious in their adherence to the preventative function, operating with a 
heightened restraint and in some cases going beyond legal requirements to ensure a 
positive perception. This was in spite of an ambiguous and complex AO and adversaries 
who used the NZA and coalition partner‘s adherence to the preventative function to their 
advantage as an intangible asymmetry. As well as emphasising the increased utility of the 
preventative function, this highlights the constructive function‘s remaining utility in 
facilitating the former.  
 
The second hypothesis, that the constructive function has a remaining utility, is based on 
the decreasing intensity and growing irregularity of conflict and the growing complexity, 
fluidity, diversity and interconnectivity of the OE. The constructive function‘s utility lies 
in its ability to maintain an effective and controllable military force against internal and 
external pressures and stressors by giving military service a worth and purpose and 
outlaying a set of behaviours, attitudes and skills required to fulfil that worth and 
purpose, and as a facilitator of the preventative function it has retained utility. Also 
however, it was argued that even though the stress from actual combat may have 
decreased, the pressures of operating in the COE mean that it has a remaining utility. 
Again, comparison between WW2 and Timor-Leste supports this hypothesis, WW2 
encapsulated high-intensity combat and, aside from logistics, the majority of soldiers 
were engaged in combat oriented tasks and operated in relatively hermetic manner, 
whereas Timor-Leste was mostly low-intensity irregular conflict with soldiers involved in 
numerous non-combat tasks, acting with numerous actors under the glare of the 
international media spotlight.  
 
The evolution can be seen through the NZA‘s history, though in a dual track, with 
combat becoming increasingly irregular from Malaya onward and peacekeeping 
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operations becoming increasingly complex and diverse, particularly from UNTAC 
onward. In Malaya the techniques were irregular though the adversary was still relatively 
identifiable, in Vietnam the adversary was increasingly amorphous. On the other track 
peacekeeping operations developed from impotent, neutral and consent-based to 
encompass a diverse array of muscular missions. Now the distinction between 
peacekeeping and conflict operations is blurred beyond easy recognition and the NZA 
operate across the spectrum and soldiers are expected to be able to transition from 
humanitarian to combat tasks during one mission. Also, the NZA increasingly work with 
numerous other actors, including non-Commonwealth militaries, NGOs and IGOs, and 
locals under the ever-increasing focus of the media and in areas that are underdeveloped 
and often have significantly different local cultures. All these factors have made the OE 
increasingly complex, fluid and interconnected across numerous indices. These 
developments have meant that, although the constructive function‘s traditional utility has 
declined because of the abatement of high-intensity conflict, it has retained its utility by 
managing and ameliorating the new demands placed upon NZA personnel.  
 
The Timor-Leste OE was complex, diverse, fluid and interconnected across the expected 
characteristics, and thus the constructive had a remaining utility. Though of limited 
duration and intensity, there was irregular conflict, fought in both difficult urban areas 
and complex natural locations, against an amorphous foe that used the intangible 
asymmetries. Though already an issue, this asymmetry was particularly obvious when the 
mutilated body of Pte. Manning was recovered. The NZA operated with a number of 
armies, several of which were integrated into the NZA Battalion (an unprecedented 
occurrence in NZA history), who, despite shared Commonwealth history, had 
significantly different ethoi and political objectives. They also operated in close 
proximity with the RNZAF and the RNZN, though admittedly there was a distinct lack of 
information, which meant this area was under-evaluated. At the civil-military level, there 
was a plethora of actors, from UN and NGO staff through to the TNI, militia and the 
local populace, all of whom the NZA interacted with in an intense and constant manner. 
The NZA worked with a varied and heterogeneous group of non-military actors and a 
number of the NZA personnel were unimpressed with the characteristics and values of 
 196 
NGO workers, in particular. The diversity of tasks required to fulfil the NZA‘s expanded 
mandate in Timor-Leste covered the spectrum, from setting up a newspaper and handing 
out humanitarian aid through to offensive combat operations. Furthermore, soldiers were 
expected to be able to transition between these tasks instantly. The pressures of operating 
under media scrutiny were also present, with the strategic corporal phenomenon 
acknowledged by, amongst others, INTERFET‘s force commander as an issue in Timor-
Leste. All these characteristics added to the mental and physical fatigue and stress of the 
operation, which meant that the constructive function had a remaining utility even though 
the actual conflict was relatively low-intensity. The constructive function utility, as a 
source of coherence, control and efficacy under pressure, translates to a diverse array of 
situations, and it has therefore retained its utility despite the decrease in high-intensity 
conflict. 
 
The retention of utility by the constructive function appears to have been, at least in part, 
facilitated by the pragmatic adaptation of the warrior ethos, as shown in the comments by 
NZA personnel in Timor-Leste. The warrior ethos is deeply entrenched in military 
thinking, so much so that a number of commentators have perceived of a clash between 
the traditional warrior ethos and the nature of modern operations. This clash does not 
appear to have been too drastic in the NZA because it seems the warrior ethos is 
relatively malleable and has been able to adapt to current operational realities to remain 
of utility. It should be stressed that this is an adaptation only; the reinterpretation of what 
it means to be a ‗warrior‘ in the 21st Century does not change the constituents of the 
warrior ethos but rather how they are viewed. The core aspects of the warrior ethos 
remain essentially the same, in that the values and motives that empowered it originally 
have not changed in essence but have been reinterpreted to suit modern conditions. The 
idea of service through combat has been expanded through the concept of New Zealand‘s 
position as an international citizen and the demands of wider, human security-oriented 
operations. Admittedly, Timor-Leste did have operational characteristics that would 
facilitate the adaptation of the warrior ethos, specifically, it was a broadly multinational 
operation with a robust mandate that involved both combat and wider SASO tasks and 
had as it desired outcome the creation of an independent democratic state. The operation 
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had an inherent worth because of its intended outcome, was conducted by a relatively 
representative cross-section of global society and, while not combat-orientated, used both 
violent and non-violent means to achieve its strategic goal. These attributes would, and 
did, assist in the adaptation of the warrior ethos. It is probably facilitated by, depending 
on the individual, an adjustment to the image of what the heroic encompasses, so that 
‗fighting‘ for democracy is heroic, or by the ability to have separate, compartmentalised 
personas, so that in Timor-Leste there was an emphasis on the managerial, because it was 
of relative utility, without the overall degradation of the heroic. The heroic can be either 
reconceived or de-emphasised dependent on the type of operation. Therefore, with 
respect to Janowitz, rather than the managerial and heroic working against each other, in 
the NZA they appear to be able to coexist in some fashion, probably because of this re-
conception or de-emphasis of the heroic, as well as the fusion of conflict and 
peacekeeping supported by the unique characteristics of the NZA, which will be 
examined shortly. 
 
In sum, analysis of the Timor-Leste OE has shown both hypotheses to be accurate, with 
respect to Timor-Leste, at least. Military ethics are relatively adaptive, retaining and even 
increasing their utility despite the remarkable changes in the OE since their development. 
The era in which they evolved contrasted markedly with both modern society and the 
COE and rather than being an archaic irrelevance or an oxymoron, are still of utility for 
the NZA in overall operational success.  
 
Applicability 
There are a number of implications for both the NZA and at the international level. To 
assess these implications, this section will examine the applicability of the findings from 
Timor-Leste to three other relevant contemporary NZA operations, Bougainville, 
Solomon Islands and Afghanistan, then it will list the NZA‘s unique characteristics, 
followed by an assessment of the general implications for the NZA‘s preventative and 
constructive functions and, finally, the international implications will be analysed. 
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The three relevant contemporary NZA operations, Bougainville, Solomon Islands and 
Afghanistan, provide a contextual backdrop with which to assess the differences and 
commonalities from the assessment of Timor-Leste. The conflict in Bougainville between 
the locals and Papua New Guinean (PNG) Government and mercenaries displayed many 
of the traits of irregular warfare and was fought across complex natural terrain. The NZA 
intervened as part of an international monitoring group, in which they served with Fijian, 
ni-Vanuatu and Australian personnel, on a mission that comprised a variety of relatively 
limited tasks with the aim of securing the locals‘ allegiance and returning the island to 
PNG with a negotiated autonomy.
2
 It was a limited operation in comparison to Timor-
Leste, in terms of mandate, size, duration and intensity, and media coverage, amongst 
many other lesser factors, however.   
 
With respect to the preventative function, although there was prior irregular conflict, this 
was largely over by the time the NZA arrived and a number of the other factors that led to 
the increase in utility were not present in any significant manner, such as media coverage 
or expanded mandate tasks. That said, the NZA still had to operate amongst a traumatised 
population with the aim of securing the island for, if not independent democracy, a 
negotiated autonomy. This was however, not a coercive intervention but rather a consent-
based monitoring group.
3
 Bougainville did not have all the requisite characteristics that 
have increased the utility of the preventative function, though there were some changes 
that indicated there might be an incremental increase even for limited contemporary 
operations. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations, Bougainville was an intervention 
into an intrastate conflict that was not intended to maintain the status quo and was 
conducted ‗amongst the people‘.4 This contrasts sharply with Kashmir, where the NZA 
worked amongst regular Indian and Pakistani soldiers with the aim of maintaining the 
status quo. 
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 Bob Breen, ―Reflections on the Truce Monitoring Group,‖ Conciliation Resources, 2002, accessed on 28 
April 2009, available from http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/reflections.php. 
3
 David Hegarty, Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands 
(Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Paper, 2003), 2, accessed 24 May 2009, available from 
http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/conflict/hegarty_interventions.pdf. 
4
 Breen, ―Reflections on the Truce Monitoring Group,‖  
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The characteristics that argue for the remaining utility of the constructive function were 
in some cases present, such as the difficult natural environment and limited infrastructure, 
problems with multinational partners and close proximity to locals.
5
 In general though, 
because of the limited nature of the operation there was not the degree of complexity, 
diversity or fluidity, or even the presence of all the various characteristics, for 
interconnectedness.  This is not to say that the constructive did not retain a degree of 
utility under trying conditions, though in comparison to Timor-Leste the demands placed 
upon it were far less.  
 
The two thousand personnel of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI), which included the NZA and four other national military contingents, arrived 
in 2003 to enforce the Honiara Peace Accord and bring an end to the years of internecine 
conflict between two irregular groups that had ravaged the failing state.
6
 Under police 
control the NZA operated with police and military personnel from Australia, PNG, Tonga 
and Fiji, mainly patrolling throughout the islands. Like Bougainville, the operation in the 
Solomon Islands was limited in terms of mandate, size and intensity and media coverage.  
 
RAMSI took place in a less secure environment than Bougainville, with both irregular 
armed groups still fighting each other and resisting the intervention and, correspondingly, 
had more media coverage internationally and in NZ.
7
 During the operation troops had to 
counter misinformation spread by their adversaries in a play to discredit them and one of 
the operational tasks was to ensure that the NZA came across as a capable but non-
threatening force.
8
 Furthermore, the short-term aim of the operation was ―taking the 
moral and operational high ground‖ and the long-term aim was the stabilisation of the 
Solomon Islands and the re-creation of democracy, though, as with Bougainville, this was 
a consent-based operation.
9
 Aside from expanded mandate tasks, RAMSI had the 
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characteristics that give the preventative function an increased utility, and apart from the 
size and mandate of the operations, was similar in the base mechanics as in Timor-Leste. 
 
The characteristics emphasised as important in the remaining utility of the constructive 
function were present in the Solomon Islands to a greater degree than in Bougainville. 
Ongoing irregular conflict, amongst two antagonistic groups, which created a degree of 
tension and ambiguity.
10
 A high degree of interagency cooperation between a number of 
other militaries and other services, as well as police, foreign affairs personnel and aid 
agencies.
11
 The NZA did not conduct expanded mandate tasks however, and due to the 
size and mandate of the operation the utility of the constructive function was probably not 
as significant as that in Timor-Leste, though it was perhaps more pronounced than that of 
traditional peacekeeping operations.  
 
Finally, there is the ongoing operation in Afghanistan, which began in 2002 with the US-
led invasion. Unlike the two preceding operations, the Afghani OE is as, if not more, 
complex as operations were in Timor-Leste. Also like Timor-Leste, Afghanistan has been 
wracked by conflict and occupied over the last quarter of a century. The NZA‘s original 
involvement in Afghanistan was through the NZSAS who took part in initial invasion. In 
2003, the NZA provided a provincial reconstruction team (NZPRT) in Bamiyan that is 
still active.  
 
The NZSAS have been involved in mid-level intensity, irregular conflict on at least three 
operational rotations. They have been working in close quarters with other Special Forces 
and the US Air Force. The NZSAS in Afghanistan, to a greater degree than in Timor-
Leste, has borne the brunt of the actual combat, fighting in a number of high-intensity 
battles. For the NZSAS, most of the missions in Afghanistan have been fairly routine for 
Special Forces, though they have been used in larger-scale battles that would traditionally 
have been fought by regulars. For example, Operation Anaconda, which pitted around 
1700 US-led Special Forces against about a 1000 Taliban and al Qaeda forces, was the 
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type of battle that in the past would have been fought by regular forces. The NZ 
Government has used Special Forces for combat and regulars for the peacekeeping in 
Afghanistan, creating a divide that has interesting implications for the future of both, with 
the potential for the role and identity of the regular armies to be confused and damaged 
by this division. 
 
The AO in Afghanistan has many of the same germane traits as Timor-Leste, and, 
consequently, it is likely that the preventative function has a similarly increased utility. A 
complex natural environment with limited, but increasing irregular warfare occurring 
amongst, but not widely supported by, the local populace. The NZA, while living in a 
separate camp, are involved in a diverse array of tasks including reconstruction, 
education and patrolling, though these tasks are not as wide ranging as those in Timor-
Leste so, although they are working among the people, there is a more of a divide than 
that in Timor-Leste. The justification for the coercive operation, while still largely 
premised on collective security, also has an increasing moral element and the overall 
operational goal is the creation of a stable democratic state. Unlike Bougainville and the 
Solomon Islands, Afghanistan belongs to the new muscular and ambitious operational 
paradigm. These new operations have fused peacekeeping and warfighting and are 
conducted with the intention of changing the status quo within a state by both destructive 
and constructive means. Afghanistan is subject to a large degree of media scrutiny, 
though, again like Timor-Leste, the majority of this scrutiny is international as 
Afghanistan, as another underdeveloped and conflict-torn country has an extremely 
limited indigenous media. The fulcrum of the NZPRT‘s operation is the locals‘ 
allegiance, and, like in Timor-Leste, the soldiers have to prove themselves as an upright 
moral and legal entity to gain this allegiance.
12
 This would, along with the intense focus 
of the international media and the overall goal of the creation of a stable democracy, 
suggest that the preventative function would probably have a similar utility as it did in 
Timor-Leste. 
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 David Fisher, ―Armed with Fresh Hope in Bamyan,‖ New Zealand Herald, 5 August 2006, accessed on 
13 January 2009, available from 
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The constructive function probably has a remaining utility in Afghanistan in a similar 
manner as in Timor-Leste. While the actual combat is close to zero, for the regular NZA 
at least, the threat of it is ever-present and on the rise, and the NZA operates amongst the 
people, sharing the risks with the locals by living in small villages and isolated forward 
patrol bases ―despite risks to personal health‖.13 Bamiyan has been described as ‗biblical‘ 
in its development levels. Although the NZA does not share its base at Bamiyan with any 
significant numbers of other national armies, there are a number of aspects that make the 
Afghan AO as complex as Timor-Leste, if not more so in the joint and civil-military 
categories. Firstly, there are many other personnel scattered through the AO, with 11 
personnel operating at Bagram with over 12 000 US personnel, and as one of them joked, 
―they should have been prepared for culture shock in dealing with Americans, rather than 
Afghans.‖14 Secondly, and more importantly, is the unprecedented joint nature of the 
mission, where all three NZDF services are operating together at the NZPRT. Such is the 
integration that RNZ Navy and RNZ Air Force officers are leading patrols, creating 
tension and causing stress, which according to a NZ Ministry of Defence report, ―[arises] 
from the perceptions junior Army personnel [have] with respect to command and control 
at the patrol level‖.15 Also, there are a number of NGO, IGO and US aid workers 
stationed with the NZPRT who have numerous different objectives and values.  Finally, 
the NZA operate in close proximity with the local populace whose different culture has 
created several issues, especially surrounding the lack of gender equality in Afghanistan 
and the subsequent treatment of female NZA personnel.
16
 In sum, the level of complexity 
and diversity of the AO argue for the remaining utility of the constructive function in 
Afghanistan. With regard to the adaptability of the warrior ethos, there was one 
illuminating remark from a soldier in Bagram, who asked a New Zealand Herald reporter, 
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―[w]ill you call us peacekeepers?‖ ―[i]ts been a long time since I‘ve seen the Army 
referred to as soldiers‖.17 The comments, spoken with regard to the dangers those in 
Bagram face and the lack of coverage they receive compared to the larger, ‗hearts and 
minds‘ oriented NZPRT, are revealing. Clearly, the soldier is frustrated that the NZA 
personnel are constantly referred to as peacekeepers, especially when he feels that the 
work he is doing is soldiering. This would suggest that there are issues with the 
perception of the NZA and the work it does, and could indicate some potential problems 
for the warrior ethos.  
 
Though these operations are clearly different, they can be placed in proximity on the 
NZA spectrum, existing in the no man‘s land between traditional peacekeeping and war 
that the modern operation inhabits. Most importantly, it is considered that though all 
different, there are enough similarities to consider them mongrel siblings, which, with the 
vast operational scope possible, is as close as they could get. Even though Bougainville 
and the Solomon Islands were relatively limited, they were not traditional Cold War 
peacekeeping missions. Afghanistan, like Timor-Leste, embodies the new operational 
paradigm and it is likely that in the foreseeable future the NZA will be deployed on 
operations that range from the Bougainville/Solomon Islands-type, small and relatively 
simple peace observer/enforcer, through to Timor-Leste/Afghanistan-type, complex and 
multifaceted missions. This operational spectrum places high demand, and thus utility, on 
both functions of military ethics. Because of the nature of these operations, with 
perception at the core, soldiers‘ conduct is crucial to overall success. The mandate is 
typically ambitious, yet the soldiers are restricted in their actions. The complexity of the 
AO- the diversity of actors, the proximity to locals, the demands of the mandate, the 
focus of the media, the nature of the combatants and the techniques they use- mean that 
the constructive function still has utility despite the drop in conflict intensity. The 
consequences for the NZA‘s warrior ethos are interesting. While it appears to be 
adaptable, the emphasis on peacekeeping, and the divide between the NZSAS and NZA 
regulars in Afghanistan, could cause a weakening in morale and retention of soldiers.  
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Unique Characteristics of the New Zealand Army 
The hypotheses appear to have a general applicability to the NZA and its COE and, 
consequently, general implications for the NZA can be drawn. First however, the unique 
characteristics of the NZA must be examined, to provide context for both the NZA-
specific and general implications. The NZA is distinct in a number of interrelated 
measures, most of which stem from several fundamental truths: NZ is a proactive moral 
international actor that exists in a relatively benign security environment and the NZA is 
small in size and budget, as considered in both real and relative terms. Thus, the NZA has 
a multinational operational history, because of both its history as a British Colony and 
because of NZ‘s participation in collective security missions. As has been shown, it has a 
history of operating for purposes other than direct national defence due to NZ‘s benign 
strategic situation and collective security operations. It has a high operational deployment 
tempo, with most soldiers completing numerous deployments over their career because of 
both the NZA‘s size and NZ‘s proactive nature on the international scene. As an 
organisation it is relatively adaptable, as promoted in The Way of the New Zealand 
Warrior, due to its small size and high tempo, but also because traditionally NZA 
personnel have been sent into the field with few supplies and little training as well as the 
residual effects of the NZ colonial-era meme regarding its ‗number eight wire‘ 
mentality‘. The NZA has relatively low level of specialisation, including no specialist 
civil-military affairs personnel, also because of its small size. The NZA does not have a 
long-term officer‘s academy, with officers undergoing initial training of around a third of 
a year, meaning that there is less socialisation and therefore less corporateness. Finally, 
the NZA is relatively integrated with NZ society, mainly because of its small size and 
budget. With these unique characteristics given, the implications can now be examined 
 
Implications: New Zealand Army 
The most critical implication for the preventative function for the NZA is the increasing 
possibility and growing consequences of misconduct. Because of changes in the OE, the 
conduct of the NZA is one of the central aspects of operational success; yet, the average 
NZA soldier has an increasing amount of responsibility on his or her shoulders, with 
regard to the LOAC and ROE, as well as from the pressures of the Nuremberg Principle. 
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While the OE has become increasingly complex, fluid and interconnected across the 
indices, the rules proscribing the soldiers‘ behaviour and conduct have become 
increasingly prohibitive and exacting. The possibility for an incident is relatively likely 
for the NZA because of the high operational deployment tempo and low specialisation, 
meaning that more is demanded of soldiers, who may not have the requisite training. 
Although the possibility for an incident is significant, the real importance of this 
implication lies in the consequences of misconduct, which for the NZA would be 
disproportionate to the misconduct itself. This is not just due to the relevant 
characteristics that create and amplify the increased utility of the preventative function. It 
is also because NZ, and therefore the NZA, promotes itself as a moral actor on the 
international stage it, therefore, has a high degree of moral authority and prestige to lose, 
and also the small size of the NZA means that negative ramifications would be felt in a 
personal manner because there are few ‗degrees of separation‘ between personnel, which 
would impact on the constructive function.  
 
Though the constructive function has proven adaptable thus far, there is potential for its 
decline in utility through the erosion or diminishment of military values, expertise, 
corporateness, responsibility, and thus, morale, discipline and the consequent collapse of 
the warrior ethos. Numerous issues could trigger the breakdown of the constructive 
function. The two most critical are the ‗demilitarisation‘ of missions and the clash 
between military values and the implementation of desired operational outcomes. 
 
The ‗demilitarisation‘ of missions refers both to the growing number of peacekeeping 
missions as well as the NZ Government‘s representation of these operations and the 
resultant public perception. Though, as argued in this thesis, NZA peacekeeping and 
conflict have fused to form a hybrid, new operational type, these are generally at the 
lower threshold of traditional conflict, with most being between low and mid-intensity. 
Furthermore, and critically for the constructive function, and morale in particular, the NZ 
Government has a vested interest in representing these as ‗peacekeeping‘ operations 
because of NZ‘s status as a moral international actor and the pejorative implications that 
war and conflict sometimes have for democratic governments. Thus, there is the potential 
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for the constructive function to suffer because the government downplays the soldiering 
aspect of the NZA in favour of the peacekeeping role. Ironically, this deterioration of the 
constructive function could happen as the combat aspect of operations increases. This 
problem was clear in the soldier serving in Bagram‘s question. Afghanistan illustrates 
this issue clearly: while the government is keen to publicise the actions of the regular 
NZA at the NZPRT, it has kept NZSAS missions shrouded in secrecy, even beyond that 
of its coalition partners such as Australia and the US. By being disingenuous the NZ 
Government damages the core of the constructive function, for, although the concept of 
service to country with honour and loyalty does not demand an equal commitment from 
the state, has to be a level of respect and loyalty shown to empower the constructive 
function. The obfuscation of operational realities also denigrates the professional‘s 
expertise and thus calls their professionalism into question. It should be noted that the 
importance of ‗war‘ as a key element of soldiering varies from soldier to soldier so this 
effect would not be general and that many in the NZA would not have a problem 
working, and being described, as peacekeepers. It has been an operational reality for the 
NZA for a long time. For those whom it is a problem, the danger would be that the leave 
the NZA and either join another army, or a private military company (PMC). Thus, the 
retention of personnel could be a problem for the NZA. 
 
The second implication for the constructive function is the clash between military values 
and the implementation of desired operational outcomes, namely democracy. This is a 
problem that is mirrored in traditional civil-military relations in liberal democratic states; 
as is often stated, ―liberalism customarily transmutes or extirpates military values‖.18 To 
prevent this transmutation or extirpation, traditionally militaries were isolated and 
indoctrinated with a separate ethos and set of values from that of the liberal democratic 
society from which they were drawn. Historically, the nature of the operation-interstate 
war- necessitated martial values, as there was utility in the maintenance of an effective 
and controllable force that was disciplined and obeyed the chain of command. In this 
context, the corruptive danger to these values came from the home polity, not from the 
operational environment. The traditional operational environment actually reaffirmed the 
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values and ethos: their utility was obvious; under fire, comradeship became stronger as 
men were bound by the shared danger, in battle, the virtues of courage, honour and 
commitment were clear and during high-intensity conflict, the utility of a chain of 
command was obvious. The interstate nature of the conflict made the values of service 
and loyalty clear cut and obvious. The implication for the NZA in situations like Timor-
Leste now is nearly the opposite, the modern deployment is such that their martial values-
service, loyalty, commitment- are, in a sense, under attack by the very nature of the 
operation: the implementation of democracy. 
 
This attack on the constructive function by liberal democratic values, such as were 
promoted in Timor-Leste could compromise the chain of command by eroding the 
unquestioning obedience that military values like service and loyalty provide. The chain 
of command is a central and critical aspect of military utility, and it is one that stands in 
opposition to key liberal principles, such as liberty and equality. The chain of command 
is premised on the, near, unquestioning obedience to orders and is a keystone of military 
utility. Liberal democratic values stand in stark opposition, with both liberty and equality 
demanding that an individual has the right to act according to their own will and that all 
people should be treated as equals, respectively. In operations like Timor-Leste the 
overall goal is the creation of a stable democratic state and the promotion of democratic 
values was a key objective, with the NZDF even operating a newspaper in Timor-Leste 
with that aim.  
 
For the NZA to promote democratic values without issue is, on one level comprehensible, 
as all members come from a functioning democracy and, as Platoon Commander 
Wilson‘s previously quoted statement suggests, many feel that ―people the world over 
deserve‖ democracy. However, although soldiers are clearly able to balance the conflict 
between being a citizen of a democratic country and a soldier in an undemocratic army, 
this duality is, aside from being traditional, part of an individual soldier‘s nested 
identities, in that they are a servant of their state, and, simultaneously, a citizen. 
Furthermore, in a glib sense, these identities are relatively hermetic, in that while the 
soldier is on leave, he or she is primarily a citizen- though still a soldier- and while they 
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are at the base or on deployment they are primarily a soldier- though still a citizen. In the 
current conception, there is a fundamental disjuncture because military and liberal values 
are occurring simultaneously in the AO, which would seem to make the destabilisation of 
the authority equilibrium probable. In comparison to the traditional duality, where the 
soldier had nested identities that had different spheres, now the soldier is promoting 
liberal values, under the propulsion of military values, in the same sphere. The attack on 
the chain of command by the promotion of liberal values is constant and chronic during 
an operation, with soldiers actively promoting them as a tool in facilitating overall 
success.  
 
Implications: International 
At the international level the implications relating to the possibility and consequences of 
misconduct are similar as those for the NZA, though the susceptibility depends on the 
relevant characteristics identified in the previous section. NZ, and the NZA, are at the 
upper limits with respect to both possibility and consequences for this form of amplified 
misconduct. Clearly some other militaries have a higher potential for misconduct in 
general, but it is precisely because they have a higher potential that, in general, the 
misconduct would not have such magnified consequences. Without examining every 
cause behind misconduct, excluding size, most stem from, at the foundational level, 
insufficiencies that would reduce the magnified consequences- for example; the 
misconduct by the Jordanian soldiers in Timor-Leste had lesser consequences for a 
number of reasons: Jordan is undemocratic, has a fettered press and the Jordanian Arab 
Army‘s primary purpose is ―maintaining the incumbent regime against any domestic 
threat‖19 These are clearly interlinked, an undemocratic regime that controls the media 
and uses the military to stay in power, and make both the potential for misconduct higher 
and the consequences less. Implications increase when a state is democratic, has a free 
press, is a moral international actor and, to a lesser degree, is small and has a high 
operational deployment tempo. There have been several significant examples in the 
recent past; Canada‘s ‗Somalia Affair‘ and the US‘s Abu Ghraib scandal both had 
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deleterious ramifications for the operations, the militaries and the home states. While the 
consequences for the operations would not change significantly due to which state had 
perpetrated the indiscretions, the militaries and states suffer proportionate to the above 
indicators. Taking the Canadian example, after the death of a Somalian boy, the Canadian 
Forces suffered a significant drop in morale, recruitment, as well as a damaged domestic 
and international reputation and subsequent drop in support.  
 
The first aspect that needs to be examined with regard to international implications of the 
constructive function is the adaptability of the warrior ethos. The NZA is ideally suited 
for the adaptation of the warrior ethos via the expansion of client and operational tasks. 
The constant background influence of the ‗number eight wire‘ mentality meme, which 
perpetuates in NZ society, predisposes the NZA to embrace the concept of adaptability in 
a manner that would not find its analogue in many other states. NZ as a society embraces 
a resourceful and flexible approach that demands malleability. In addition, as the military 
of a secure, moral international actor that has a history of coalition operations conducted 
for purposes other than direct defence of the state, the NZA has a history and a purpose 
that further predisposes it to this form of adaptation. Because it has always acted in 
concert with other states, usually under the auspices of the Empire or the 
Commonwealth, for a higher good and never in its own direct defence, the NZA has 
always had an adaptive regard to its client and what constitutes valid security measures. 
Though not unique in this sense- Australia shares a similar history- this operational past 
is an anomaly and, to contemporise the situation, Australia now places far more emphasis 
on domestic security. Furthermore, the increasingly moral foreign policy of NZ further 
facilitates the idea of client being, if not greater than, more than just NZ. Again, though 
not unique, NZ is relatively active, and, as importantly, it perceives itself as a moral 
actor. At the organisational level there are also a number of factors that expedite the 
adaptation. The small size and resultant high operational deployment tempo and lack of 
specialisation demands flexibility that would not be found in larger, less active armies. 
Also, the lack of a long-term officer‘s academy and the relatively high integration 
between NZ society and the NZA mean that the warrior ethos is probably not as 
thoroughly indoctrinated as in states like the US where officers spend up to five years in 
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initial training. The qualities that give an army the malleability and flexibility to adapt in 
this manner would be: a society that embraces adaptability; a secure client-state with a 
moral internationalist outlook; a history of working in multinational formations for higher 
ends; a small size, a high operational deployment tempo and a low specialisation; and 
finally, a relatively weakly ingrained constructive function. Thus, it is likely that 
Janowitz‘s perceived problem with regard to the ‗heroic‘ taking issue with constabulary 
tasks may be more pertinent for bigger militaries that have a higher degree of 
specialisation and emphasise traditional warfighting as their primary purpose.   
 
The ‗demilitarisation‘ of missions is a problem occurring throughout the world‘s armies, 
though internationally the issue is more pertinent with regard to the actual increase in 
peacekeeping operations and not as widespread with regard to the government‘s 
representation of operations. The problem with regard to the government‘s representation 
is, while not unique to NZ, not so widespread because the NZ Government, as a moral 
actor, wants to represent itself in such a manner, whereas this is not such a problem for 
the majority of other states. Conversely, the first part of the problem, the rise in 
peacekeeping operations, is a far greater problem for many other states. This is because 
for many other states national defence is a far greater priority than in NZ. NZ‘s benign 
security situation provides a sense of complacency not afforded other states. 
 
The corrosion of the chain of command due to the promotion of liberal democratic values 
is a problem that could be found in many armies that conduct this type of operation. The 
NZA‘s small size, high operational deployment tempo and lack of specialist CMA 
personnel, as well as the relatively weak inculcation of the constructive function would 
mean that the impact may be more intense than it would be for larger, more specialised 
armies with a strongly inculcated constructive function. Conversely, however, the 
argument could be made that the same factors that make the NZA adaptable would also 
buffer further from this form of corrosion. Consideration needs to be given to the home 
polity of the army; clearly, an army whose client is democratic has different issues with 
respect to this problem than those whose client is undemocratic. For the democratic 
states, chain of command is the issues, for the undemocratic, the problem lies with 
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soldiers returning with democratic aspirations. For democracies, it is felt that the 
adaptability of an army is more effective than its size and inculcation in insulating an 
army from the degrading effects of promoting democratic values as an operational task. 
Thus, the qualities that make an army more adaptable with regard to its warrior ethos also 
make it better able to cope with attacks on the core values of that ethos.  The further issue 
is, however, that the states with the most adaptive armies are more likely to be those that 
conduct these types of operations more often. 
 
Extrapolating the COE trends into the future suggests that the utility of both functions 
will increase, dramatically. Thus, it would be of use to ensure that the inculcation of 
military ethics becomes increasingly effective. The preventative function requires 
instruction and experience and is relatively straightforward. By comparison, inculcation 
of the constructive function is a more difficult task. Clearly of vital importance, part of 
the difficulty for the NZA in the future lies in maintaining the adaptability, whilst 
ensuring that the core values and concepts still have coherence. Though it appears that 
currently the NZA are in a state of equilibrium with regard to this, balance will be hard to 
maintain as the demands of the COE increase. This is why the equilibrium must be 
maintained. 
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